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Introduction to the Series
Cities and Regions: Planning, Policy and Management is an 
international series of case studies addressed to students in pro­
grams leading to professional careers in urban and regional affairs 
and to established practitioners of the complex crafts of planning, 
policy analysis and public management. The series will focus on 
the work-worlds of the practitioners and the ways in which the 
construction of narratives shapes the course of events and our 
understanding of them. The international character of the series is 
intended to help both novice and experienced professionals extend 
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Introduction
In 1991 I went to Sydney, Australia, thinking that I was going to 
study a large suburban development project in its transition from 
planning to implementation. If the project -  Rouse Hill -  had gone 
according to schedule, this volume would have tracked adjustments 
in the “best laid plans” when development finance is arranged, 
roads and pipes are put in place, and the first residents move into 
their new homes.
In fact, the project had already fallen behind schedule before I 
arrived and its future was uncertain. A national debate about the 
course of urban developments centered on Australia’s ability to 
sustain its familiar patterns of settlement. In Sydney -  a metro­
politan area home to over one fifth of Australia’s population -  that 
debate brought planning for some large suburban projects to a halt. 
Rouse Hill survived the controversy; when I returned to Australia 
in 1995 around a thousand of its lots had been sold. However, the 
first bulldozers had hardly begun to work when policy makers 
announced limitations on the scheme (Department of Planning 
[DoP] 1995). In the short-term the development will go ahead, 
although the target population has been scaled back to about a third 
of its earlier projection of 250,000. In the long-term more of the 
area may be developed, but this is likely to be a difficult and 
controversial process.
In this context I reconceived the research. What emerged was a 
study of the ways in which several fundamentally different accounts 
of the world shaped the planning of the project and the working 
lives of the planners, development professionals, and activists who 
were involved in the development. The case study also became a 
way of examining how these groups approached urban development 
at a time when its context was changing rapidly. By examining a 
large project over a number of years, I was also able to analyze l
l
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how ideas about urban form changed over time and how the shifting 
ways of imagining and debating urban development interacted with 
the power of money, political connections, and bureaucratic control 
to reshape physical development.
The accounts I listened to were all ways of reconciling a large 
number of social, economic, and environmental needs into a plan of 
action. All were justified by proponents as in some sense representing 
a public interest in terms of various economic, social, and environ­
mental goals. In the Rouse Hill project, professionals and activists 
frequently claimed to be creating a holistic or balanced position, 
telling the whole story, or providing a rational outcome.1 That one’s 
view on urban form was more comprehensive or rational seemed to 
matter, and few people expressed doubts that they had found the 
most comprehensive and rational view. However, these views were 
not commensurable; they were not based on a common set of 
priorities and values.
On one level this language was not so surprising as planners 
have long been concerned that their work is comprehensive, rational 
in process or in outcomes, and serves a wider public good. Even 
those critical of mainstream planning have often been critical of 
its lack of these characteristics; for example, wanting planning to 
be more inclusive of less powerful groups, that is to be more 
comprehensive. On another level, however, it was intriguing that a 
similar language of rationality and balance was used to articulate 
very different perspectives on urban growth.
This is the broader context of the study, although the particular 
case of Rouse Hill focused the research on a specific set of issues. 
The rhetoric of planning in Australia, during the past decade, was 
confronted with a dilemma. The ideal of a home-owning egalitarian 
democracy came up against new financial and environmental 
constraints as development became more expensive and ecological 
issues more pressing. Various groups proposed different ways of 
reinterpreting the public interest in the face of the dilemma. Some 
environmentalists introduced a fundamentally new conception of 
the public interest that emphasized basic ecological principles of 
survival; property developers, and planners favoring expansion, 
tried to adapt a traditional egalitarian and pro-growth framework 
to new circumstances; others favored limiting growth by 
consolidating urban areas, trying to create a compromise between
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environmental concerns and housing needs. Each position had 
obvious strengths and weaknesses. The pro-growth group could 
not solve the environmental problems except at great expense and 
with quite a lot of uncertainty as to whether problems were actually 
solved. The environmentalists did not have a ready resolution of 
housing needs. Those supporting consolidation faced the objection 
that the new higher-density housing they proposed would be less 
desirable than the traditional suburban home. Each side used images 
of good and bad cities to bolster their vision. Each side fought over 
the formal planning process and the process of infrastructure finance 
and development as a way of obtaining their goals.
By the 1990s these somewhat abstract positions were articulated 
in terms of a fairly limited set of actual policy alternatives for 
urban growth. Some choices for changing growth patterns had 
already been rejected in the 1980s as major options, although 
they had not entirely disappeared from the political agenda. These 
included stopping immigration, and decentralizing growth to new 
towns or existing smaller cities.2 This left two real choices in the 
early 1990s. The first was to continue suburban expansion, and 
find a way to finance the cost of infrastructure and environmental 
control in developments such as Rouse Hill. The second involved 
consolidating existing settlements. In the short- and medium-term, 
the first of these options won. The financial obstacles were 
overcome by the device of privatization, although as property 
developers assumed more of the cost of infrastructure develop­
ment the housing became more expensive and expansion lost some 
of its justification as an instrument of the egalitarian suburban 
ideal. The property developers also did not assume any of the 
cost of new social infrastructure, such as schools, so reluctant 
government departments and non-profits were left to do that, leading 
some to question the quality of social life in new areas. The 
outcome, then, was hard to justify in terms of the public interest, 
as those supporting urban expansion first represented that interest, 
and harder still to justify in terms of other conceptions of the public 
interest.
The arguments for consolidation were more robustly taken up in 
the 1995 metropolitan plan. This document projected slower growth 
than the previous metropolitan plan, published in 1988. The 1995 
plan also proposed that only about one third of the 520,000 units
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needed in Sydney, as the population increases from its 1991 figure 
of 3.7 million to 4.5 million in 2021, will be on the fringe, rather 
than a majority of them (DoP 1995, 75; DoP 1988). This was the 
plan that also scaled back Rouse Hill.
In the case of Rouse Hill’s first stage, however, the momentum 
of prior commitments gave an edge to those supporting its 
development. The idea of expansion had been endorsed in principle 
in decades before environmental concerns had grown prominent. 
Public and private sector developers who already owned land in 
the area had a good deal at stake, and could wait out the opposition. 
It would have taken sustained, insistent, and powerful opposition 
to prevent all development, and that was not forthcoming. Why 
not? There seems to have been, at least until the end of the 1980s 
when the major decisions were being made, no serious alternative 
to expansion. Some critics did complain about the costs of 
development and warned about environmental problems. However, 
they did not succeed in creating an alternative image of a good 
city that was comfortable for Australians. This lack of a strong 
alternative urban vision meant that the momentum of real estate 
development faced opposition that only became powerful in the 
early 1990s, too late to totally stop the project.
The environmental, economic, and social issues that people fought 
over in Rouse Hill parallel those dealt with in recent intellectual 
arguments about sustainability, pluralism, privatization, economic 
power, and justice. It is no mistake that these issues were the focus, 
as throughout the 1990s these have been major concerns in many 
planning processes in many parts of the world.3 They are also likely 
to continue to be key areas of concern in the coming decades as 
urban development projects are pushed into ever more difficult sites. 
In this international context, the Australian case is interesting in that 
it stakes out a middle ground between the planning and urban 
development situations in the more developer-driven context of the 
United States and the more government-led and centralized Great 
Britain. This middle ground is reinforced by Australian planners’ 
tendencies to adopt planning ideas from these two countries.4
Context
Four areas of scholarly work offered ways to approach these 
questions and issues. Writing on the public interest gave insights
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for examining competing claims to balance, rational, and holistic 
approaches. Work analyzing conflict though an interpretive rather 
than an interest-based framework seemed to offer ways of under­
standing conflicts between people and groups with ostensibly the 
same interests. Research on narrative and discourse analysis, popu­
lar in planning from the 1980s, had the potential to be extended 
beyond studies of individual plans and planners, or short planning 
episodes. Finally, discussions in anthropology about how to repre­
sent complex societies provided models for dealing with the au­
thorial problem of preserving some of that complexity in “writing 
culture.”
The public interest can be defined as those interests that people 
have in common as members of the public (Barry 1965, 190); 
something is in the public interest if it “serves the ends of the whole 
public” rather than just a sector of it (Meyerson and Banfield 1955, 
322).5 Within this definition there is room for a number of differ­
ent ways of arriving at an understanding of what people have in 
common; for some it is a process of balancing up different indi­
vidual interests or ideas about the public interest, for others it means 
tapping into a set of common ends (Meyerson and Banfield 1955, 
323-325; Howe 1994, 77-78). The exact content of the public 
interest in planning has never been completely clear either, and 
emphases on aesthetics, efficiency, individual interests, hygiene, 
equity, community, and ecology have existed in different balances 
at different times.
In dealing with this issue of the public interest, planners are 
concerned about the roles of powerful groups like real estate and 
industrial capitalists, or political elites. These groups often argue 
that their private interests and the public interest coincide, however 
that is not always clearly the case. In addition, planners are confronted 
with a growing number of popular social movements -  like environ­
mentalisms, women’s movements, ethnic and national groups, and 
anti-government movements -  groups that also claim to represent a 
public interest, even if in some cases there are multiple publics.
However, to say that some concept like the public interest is a 
crucial concept in planning does not imply that anyone can agree 
what it is or can measure it. That is why the words used by planners -  
the rhetorical devices and arguments, the everyday discourses -  are 
so important.6 Planners not only seek to analyze the important issues 
and needs that must be dealt with to satisfy the public interest, but in
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doing so planners also define what the public interest is. Planners’ 
arguments are both technical and moral.
In examining this debate I brought to the study a set of ideas 
coming out of research that had explored the politics of urban 
development not only as an example of competing interests but 
also in terms of differing interpretations of those interests. Through 
the case of Rouse Hill I came to see that suburban development 
involved the working out of quite complex ideas about nature and 
equality, family and opportunity, insiders and outsiders. This working 
out was accomplished in public debates and influenced governments, 
property developers, and other professionals. Although the debates 
were certainly informed and constrained by people’s economic 
interests, roles, and social positions, they were more complex and 
interesting than mere reflections of mainly economic characteristics, 
involving different interpretations of this wider context (Fainstein 
1994; Logan and Molotch 1987; Mansbridge 1990; Perin 1977; 
Sandercock 1990, 266; Schwarz and Thompson 1990).7
In the 1980s and early 1990s there had also been a great deal of 
work exposing the rhetorical nature of planning and related 
disciplines, and the political nature of planning communication 
and discourse.8 This third area of work intrigued me, but generally 
dealt with relatively bounded planning projects and events rather 
than large developments like Rouse Hill. It frequently examined 
individual documents, interviews, or short-term interactions such 
as meetings, and had little to say about the influence of those 
rhetorical and communicative practices on planning outcomes. I 
worried that without a larger context it was hard to judge the effects 
of positions and views and it seemed that the influence of planning 
arguments on planning outcomes was worth examining. Other work 
on language and planning did deal with general and long-running 
debates over planning; however, this lost some of the useful detail 
provided by case studies (Beauregard 1993; Dear 1989; Marcuse 
1989; Smith 1996).
In 1991, as I started this research, I thought that a case study of 
a large and long-running development, including interviews with 
people from different sides of the controversy, offered the chance 
to assess some of the effects of positions and rhetorical strategies. 
It also made it possible to go beyond analyzing how people 
represented themselves and their agencies, to examine how they
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were perceived by others as well. With this kind of extended study 
I thought it would be possible to build up a more complex picture 
of the rhetorical, cultural, political, and economic aspects of 
contemporary development practices (see also Grant 1994; Hillier 
1993; Marris 1987; Peattie 1987; Rabinow 1989).
The influence these planning debates had on the planning process, 
and the urban development itself, required an analysis of power 
relations. In this study I came to define power fairly simply 
following Giddens, where: “power relations in social systems are 
regularized relations of autonomy and dependence. Power relations 
are always two-way; that is to say however subordinate an actor 
may be in a social relationship the very fact of involvement in that 
relationship gives him or her a certain amount of power over the 
other” (Giddens 1979, 6). That is, rather than seeing power as 
something held by a few I was interested in the “manifold relations 
of power” (Foucault 1980, 93) evident in the project with various 
actors trying to gain control of the situation in order to act in the 
way they thought best. Power also operated through a variety of 
mechanisms with different persons and groups having access to 
different forms of power in different areas: economic, political, 
administrative, and in the realm of ideas.9
My particular emphasis on the power of ideas may seem unusual 
as other forms of power are more commonly associated with urban 
development. As a number of other authors have pointed out, 
however, ideas had power as persuasion, inspiration, legitimation, 
rationalization, and as a means of identity formation (Gottdiener 
1977, 117; Throgmorton 1996; Nelson et al. 1987). Some groups 
skillfully presented their ideas in ways that they expected to be 
compelling and in fact had an influence on the project.
In this study I focused on middle-level, middle-class professionals 
and activists. These people were the technical and intellectual 
workers who shaped the week-to-week running of the project: 
planners, environmental bureaucrats, staff of regional and inter­
national environmental groups, and resident leaders. These types 
of people had frequently been the subject of study in earlier work 
on planning rhetoric. To one side of these professionals and activists 
were the government and business elites who had considerable 
autonomy due to their ability to finance infrastructure and their 
influence in state parliamentary cabinet. They were not, however,
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all-powerful. For example, in developing their land in a timely and 
thus profitable manner, those involved in property development 
depended on the cooperation of others such as the professional 
planners I studied. Unorganized local residents similarly focused 
much of their energy on this middle-level group both in terms of 
getting access to information and expressing opposition. For 
example, at a time of intense pressure on the local governments by 
the directors of the Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium that 
needed rezonings to secure loans, Baulkham Hills Council received 
almost 1000 written objections to their Draft Local Environmental 
Plan (Baulkham Hills Shire Council 1991). The time needed to 
read and respond to these submissions made speedy planning 
difficult. This ultimately was an example of the economic and 
political power of the consortium, that had contacts in state cabinet, 
being resisted by the landowning public. However, it was some of 
the professionals I studied who were in the middle, reading all 
those letters and writing replies, engaging in communicative and 
rhetorical actions.
Finally, in terms of scholarly work that influenced me, in the 
1980s and 1990s anthropologists had been exploring issues of 
“multivocality” as a critique of much previous anthropological 
writing. This earlier writing had suppressed differences among those 
being studied, often by drawing the boundaries of study very tightly 
in time, space, and social grouping. It had also tended to drown out 
all voices except that of the anthropologist (Clifford 1988a; Mascia- 
Lees et al. 1989). Of course this was not true of all classics in 
anthropology, but these critiques of previous, seamless, writing 
offered a useful way of dealing with research and writing about 
situations of conflict. Work in the anthropology of law and disputes 
offered a number of prototypes (e.g. Clifford 1988b; Engel 1984; 
Krasniewicz 1992; Sarat and Felstiner 1986).
Of course the people I studied were not the marginalized colonial 
and postcolonial subjects of such concern to anthropologists, and 
in fact most of them were busy producing their own “texts.” They 
are also an audience for this text in a way unlike that traditionally 
envisaged in anthropological work. However, these debates about 
giving voice to subjects of study, and about writing style, were still 
relevant in that they dealt with the issue I faced; that of representing 
a situation with many voices.
8
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Responding to this body of work, I have constructed an account 
of Rouse Hill from four different angles. In chapters one and four, 
the volume explores how the formal planning process created a 
“Development Area” out of a location. In chapter two, it analyzes 
five perspectives on urban form that confronted each other as the 
development was about to start. In chapter three, it examines how 
the project’s future was represented as if it would become another 
city -  a Los Angeles, Toronto, or Canberra -  and then judged by 
their problems and strengths. In chapter five, it outlines how partial 
privatization allowed public and private developers to keep the 
project moving forward. Through the four narratives I show that 
there were multiple ways of experiencing and interpreting the 
project. In the end it was not possible to say the “real” story revolved 
around the formal planning process, or economic power, or who 
was most adept at framing the planning debates. All these were 
important at different times, for different groups, and in different 
parts of the development.
Methods
In examining these issues of planning ideas and actions I looked at 
the day-to-day work of a set of professionals and activists; the 
writing, reading, drawing, talking, and keeping silent that form the 
repertoire of what planners and activists do. Most of the research 
for this study was done between July 1991 and July 1992 in Sydney, 
the largest of Australia’s cities. I also returned in 1995. The first 
half of the 1990s was an exciting time to be looking at planning 
issues as the public and professional interest in urban sprawl was 
on an upswing. This was an important issue given Australia’s high 
level of urbanization. In 1991, 85 percent of its population was 
classed as urban and three-fifths lived in just five cities of a mil­
lion or more: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, and Adelaide 
(McLennan 1996, 80). Numerous state and federal government 
initiatives dealt with questions about future patterns of urban 
growth. One informant suggested this rise in interest was a reac­
tion to rising “community awareness” and was following a US 
trend: “I mean all these social phenomena, they appear in the States 
and two weeks later they appear in Sydney” (Claude, interview). 
This comment had some truth for me personally as it had been my
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experiences in US cities, particularly Los Angeles, that had pro­
voked my interest in the character of the growth debate in Sydney.
Over the main year of research Rouse Hill, and the major actors 
involved in its development, were frequently in the news. Two 
independent inquiries into the Department of Housing re­
commended abolishing or dramatically restructuring it because of 
mismanagement (Gyles 1992; Mant 1992). In the Australian 
political system local governments have relatively few powers and 
are subject to a high level of state government control. In this period 
Baulkham Hills Shire Council, one of the local government areas 
the Rouse Hill Development Area was located in, also underwent 
external inquiries nearly having its local planning powers taken 
away by the state government (Cook 1991a).
These events both helped and hindered my research. While I 
was able to attend public meetings on Rouse Hill and on issues 
of metropolitan growth, the heated debates made gaining access 
to sensitive data more difficult. I was also working in the aftermath 
of Sharon Beder who, as a doctoral student researching engi­
neering decisions on sewage treatment, inadvertently discovered 
that the Water Board and State Pollution Control Commission 
had not released the results of studies showing extraordinarily 
high concentrations of pollutants in Sydney ocean fish (Beder 
1989, 112-114). Leaked to the press, this information caused a 
major controversy. Several of my interviewees asked me if I was 
trying to “do a Sharon Beder” and expose secrets. For some I 
think this possibility increased frankness; but for others it had 
the opposite effect. This was a particular issue for the Department 
of Housing that was under investigation as part of a Royal 
Commission (Gyles 1992). Given these difficulties, the advantage 
of including interviews and observations in the research design 
was in being able to gain answers to a somewhat different set of 
questions than those being answered in public documents, 
conferences, and media reports. With a focus on multiple groups, 
and multiple processes within the development, I was also 
sensitive to people’s silences as well as their talk.
My data include 38 formal interviews with at least a two 
representatives of all major organizations involved with the 
development. I conducted these in 1991 and 1992.1 attended over 
40 formal meetings about Rouse Hill or about growth more
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generally, conducted dozens of informal interviews, and had 
conversations with the people I came to know through this 
process.10 I observed the operations of two regional organizations. 
I also reviewed hundreds of documents: planning reports; activist 
publications; newspaper, radio, and television reports; parlia­
mentary and corporate records; and an architectural competition 
for the case study site. Only those documents I directly cite are 
listed in the reference list.11 I visited the site, and by 1995 I was 
able to see the new sewage treatment plant along with hundreds of 
new houses.
I asked formal interviewees for a history of their involvement 
in Rouse Hill; what they thought were the main issues in the 
development; why they thought other people saw things differently; 
where they saw Sydney being in twenty or thirty years time; key 
experiences that had shaped their own ideas about urban 
development; and why they thought people lived in cities. A few 
individuals did not allow me to tape their interviews but most did 
not object. Whether migrants or native-born, involved profes­
sionally or as activists, interviewees were quite articulate and 
homogenous; almost all had university degrees and middle-class 
jobs.
Although Rouse Hill as a project was too large to hide, I promised 
anonymity to those I interviewed. Quotations from transcripts are 
cited with a pseudonym.12 Toward this same purpose, meetings 
that were not completely public are cited as “Meeting X” where X 
indicates a location in my fieldnotes and names are, again, 
pseudonyms.
My promise of anonymity means that at times I have had to 
change or omit small parts of transcripts in order to protect 
identities. Unlike authors interviewing individuals without reference 
to specific named projects, I have also had to minimize reference 
to some personal attributes of my informants. To create more 
elaborate profiles of participants would have undermined my 
promise of anonymity.
Apart from these changes I have only lightly edited transcripts 
seeking to enable other interpretations of these data. I took out 
some idiosyncratically repetitious phases like “you know” or “sort 
o f’ but left in other potentially distracting phrases where informants 
circled around the subject (see also Perin 1977, 15). Where the
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quotations were responding to one of my questions I have included 
the question. However, often one question led to a rather lengthy 
and free-ranging discussion -  professionals and activists are often 
quite talkative -  and many quotes are taken from the midst of these 
long passages.
Where people I interviewed spoke in public situations, or 
produced written work where they claimed authorship, I have 
followed normal academic practice and attributed their comments. 
A few times in this study the same person is quoted using a 
pseudonym from an interview; using their real name where they 
claim authorship; and in cases where they have written reports 
representing a group, as an organization. These different settings 
are reflected in the way personal names are used in this text. 
Pseudonyms used in the interview transcripts are all first names; 
published authors are indicated with their last names only. Only 
public personalities involved in the Sydney or national scene are 
referred to using both first and second names.
Given my focus on the public face of the debate, all the documents 
I used were publicly available although the definition of public 
deserves some comment. Many of the documents I used were 
published and widely distributed. Many of the conferences I attended 
were inexpensive and well advertised. Government inquiries as­
sembled a wide range of very interesting submissions that were often 
available for the price of the photocopies. These were obviously part 
of a public debate. A second level of documents and meetings was 
very important but not quite as obviously public. Minutes of meetings 
in interdepartmental government working groups, particularly those 
held in the early 1980s, were widely circulated and thus available 
from a fair number of key players. Many reports with limited 
circulation, even ones that were initially confidential, were eventually 
placed in organizational libraries. These were often leaked before 
making it onto those library shelves. Background material produced 
by the state government was also available through the Freedom of 
Information Act; although as many documents were circulating as 
photocopies, or placed in public files held by community groups, I 
was able to avoid this formality.
As someone trained in physical and social planning, and with a 
keen lay interest in environmental issues, I was very similar to 
many of the professionals and activists I interviewed and observed.
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At the same time, as a researcher I was not one of them. Although 
I participated in many activities, my desire to study multiple 
sides meant I had to assume a certain detachment or neutrality. 
Maintaining such detachment was sometimes difficult, particularly 
where I was present as “experts” misled lay people, and where 
some groups tried to persuade me to side with them and were 
disappointed by my distance (see also Douglas 1976; Shupe and 
Bromley 1980). I had also studied and worked in Sydney in the 
years 1981 to 1987 and had developed my own professional views, 
close to that of the group I call consolidationists. However, I 
persisted in my public neutrality. In part this was a way of protecting 
my welcome in the various camps, but it was more than a calculated 
strategy for maintaining access. By putting aside my own position, 
as much as feasible, I was able to listen to informants’ views in a 
way that would not have been possible if I had taken one side; and 
having access to opponents’ views of each other gave me a much 
richer sense of the landscape of ideas and actions. As so much 
professional life is spent where the lines of conflict or confidentiality 
are already drawn in a way that precludes contact with others, the 
chance to look at multiple sides was something I did not want to 
give up. This stance clearly shaped this research.
The most difficult aspects of studying the project, however, were 
its dispersion through time and space and the resulting infrequency 
of crucial interactions to observe. The Rouse Hill Development Area 
is a location created by this planning process, but relatively few people 
lived there before it was developed and its planning happened in 
sites scattered across the metropolitan area. People in offices read 
reports, went to occasional administrative meetings, wrote memos, 
answered the phone, and tried to keep up with what was happening 
in other government departments, the Rouse Hill Infrastructure 
Consortium, and among activists. They planned for a future time 
and were far less concerned with the site’s present condition.
Resident activists ran their daily lives and made a few phone 
calls, wrote letters, went to meetings, and struggled to keep up 
with events. All groups read newspapers, watched television, and 
listened to the radio; but often there were no events to keep 
up with. Everyone was waiting in their dispersed offices and 
homes, and going on with other parts of their lives. Face-to-face 
communication between people with different views was
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comparatively rare for all those involved but particularly for 
unpaid activists whose daily lives were filled with other activities. 
When interactions between different parties did occur they took 
on special meanings. In these situations people were often 
interacting for short periods with others who they had already 
typecast. Although on one level this makes Rouse Hill sound like 
a leisurely project with plentiful time for planning and public 
input, this lurching rhythm meant there was -  at least in my 
fieldwork period -  enough activity to disrupt other endeavors but 
often not enough to sustain a high level of interest. For those 
professionals who had Rouse Hill as part of their job the project 
was more continuous; however, even for this group it was 
frequently interspersed with other projects, particularly before 
construction began. This slow process gave an advantage to those 
who could write Rouse Hill into their job descriptions.
This kind of dispersed case also raised methodological questions 
about defining the Rouse Hill project itself. The meaning of the 
Rouse Hill project was defined and redefined through the planning 
process. The North West Sector was originally a small bubble on 
the 1968 plan. The 1984 environmental study however examined a 
huge area. By the 1989 Regional Environmental Plan the Rouse 
Hill Development Area took up only a small part of this area deemed 
suitable for development, an area of 9,400 hectares (Department 
of Environment and Planning [DEP] 1984a; DoP 1989a; State 
Planning Authority [SPA] 1968). Public and private responsibilities 
and interests also shifted through time. In many ways Rouse Hill 
was more a train of events than a site, although at the same time it 
was focused on the activity of land development in a particular 
location. Thus its boundaries were partly geographic, but also 
boundaries of interest, involvement, and regulation.
As a researcher there to look at the development I found the 
combination of dispersed geography and the “real time” of urban 
development at first very frustrating and then, in the end, very 
interesting. A process that moves forward over such a long period 
gives great influence to those who can stay with it for the long 
haul. In chapter four, on the formal planning process, I turn again 
to this issue.
This research design is closest to the approach called grounded 
theory. This is a form of exploratory work where a middle range
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theory is developed from research data, such as the Rouse Hill 
case study, in contrast to research that uses data to test or illustrate 
an existing theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 32-33). This does 
not mean that the work is not theoretically informed, but rather 
that the researcher is open to a variety of theoretical possibilities 
depending on what emerges from the study.13 Overall this book 
analyzes a planning project in multiple ways, exploring its com­
plexity, rather than explaining it through a singular theory.
Study Outline
Looked at from abroad, Australian cities have long been domi­
nated by suburban development, with vast tracts of detached houses. 
From inside, however, the suburban pattern has periodically been 
the subject of intense debate. By the early 1990s suburban growth 
was hotly contested in professional debates, among environmen­
talists, and in wider government circles. In chapter one I set the 
context for these debates over growth in Rouse Hill by outlining 
the history of project and of western Sydney’s postwar growth more 
generally.
In chapter two I examine five major images of good city form 
articulated in these debates over Rouse Hill. These perspectives 
were held by professionals and activists as ways of approaching 
urban development and did not correspond exactly with the 
positions of agencies and organizations, partly because many 
agencies experienced internal disagreement. The first group, 
expansionists, had a strong and evocative image of an egalitarian 
society, inextricably linked to low-density suburbia. Employed by 
state and local planning agencies, their views had been important 
in shaping the early conceptualization of Rouse Hill from the 1960s 
through the early 1980s, and the group was still vocal in the 1990s. 
For a second group, Rouse Hill was the story of public and private 
sector developers doing their job producing housing they could 
sell. In Rouse Hill the developers were faced with a difficult 
situation of increasing infrastructure and financing costs, and a 
sophisticated range of growth opponents. This was the group where 
an image of the city was most clearly linked to a set of “interests.” 
A third group, scientific environmentalists, had a regional and long­
term approach to environmental problems without a strong concern
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for social issues. Represented among environmental professionals, 
including some planners inside and outside of government, this 
group relied on technical information and broadly scientific 
techniques. In contrast, local environmentalists were residents 
directly affected by the Rouse Hill development. Often recently 
arrived, they were articulate and motivated to save their “natural” 
surroundings. The final group, consolidationists, were a younger 
set of planners and human service professionals in state and local 
government, and some non-profit groups, favoring compact, mixed- 
use development as a way of solving the environmental, social, 
and financing problems of suburban development. They were also 
concerned that the shift away from nuclear families indicated a 
need for housing forms beyond the detached house.
Explanations of planning conflicts have frequently put these kinds 
of differences in ideas down to differences in interests, information, 
or to problems with leadership. Often the explanations divide 
conflicts into two sides. In Rouse Hill, however, people with the 
same interests and access to the same information still disagreed. 
Although perspectives did reflect characteristics such as owning 
land in the area and professional involvement, the positions were 
much more than mere translations of these interests. Rather the 
frameworks linked beliefs about the nature of human life in cities 
with conceptions of the city forms that could best support those 
lives and that could be practically achieved. Opposing views were 
often equally sincere attempts to evaluate competing claims, to 
reflect on the lessons of past experience, and to make sense of 
the changing city. While there were a limited number of positions 
there were certainly more than two sides (see also Schwarz and 
Thompson 1990).
This second chapter analyzes some of the reasons for dis­
agreement among groups. It draws on Mannheim (1952) to explore 
generational effects. It then examines how personal experiences, 
including gendered family experiences, shaped perspectives; 
describes how the ritualized character of interaction in meetings 
and the media structured how ideas were represented and worked 
against consensus; and outlines informants’ own views on the 
reasons for disagreement. From time to time alliances were formed 
based on shared views of good urban form, that is agreement was 
forged about outcomes if not underlying principles.
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In chapter three I examine one part of this debate in more 
depth; a set of metaphors used in arguments about Rouse Hill. 
In the early 1990s, Rouse Hill’s and Sydney’s futures were fre­
quently imagined in terms of three other cities: as heading toward 
becoming a Los Angeles, a Toronto, or a Canberra. The chapter 
outlines how these images were used in the growth debates and 
how they shaped people’s actions by highlighting and obscuring 
different possibilities. Linked strongly to media images of the 
places, these city metaphors also left space for action by those 
planning and protesting the development.
Although Rouse Hill is an actual location, a hill, to the north 
west of Sydney, the “Rouse Hill Development Area” is a political 
artifact created through a planning process. The fourth chapter 
describes how the development area was created out of a set of 
events partly structured by this formal planning process of met­
ropolitan, regional, and then local plans; of environmental studies, 
and environmental impact statements. As problems developed and 
costs rose the formal planning process continued to provide an 
overall structure and to set the agenda. The problems that emerged 
over the decades of planning tended to be perceived as severe 
enough for action only one at a time. This allowed property 
developers and bureaucrats to incrementally adjust the planning 
enough for Rouse Hill’s first stage to go on, but in a way that eroded 
its original purposes.
Chapter five examines how the planning process was increasingly 
privatized, focusing on two coalitions involved in developing Rouse 
Hill: the Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium (RHIC) and the 
Rouse Hill Community Planning Team (RHCPT). Addressing 
physical and social infrastructure respectively, they shared similar 
starting points inspired, at least partly, by public servants inter­
ested in continuing infrastructure policies after privatization. The 
coalitions were both lobby groups and alternative providers of ser­
vices. Each had, however, unequal access to political and economic 
resources, and to information and administrative power, inequali­
ties that led to their having quite different impacts on the Rouse 
Hill development. The Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium, able 
to finance hundreds of millions of dollars worth of infrastructure, 
pushed the development through numerous obstacles. The Rouse 
Hill Community Planning Team, in contrast, stmggled to provide
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and lobby for the most basic human services. In Rouse Hill 
privatization involved a complex set of activities with uneven im­
pacts on social and physical infrastructure even within a single 
development.
Finally, in chapter six, I return to examine three general issues 
raised by the Rouse Hill development: the effects that talk and 
ideas had on urban form; the prominence of claims to rationality, 
holism, and balance in growth debates; and the conflicts between 
ideas of what was right to do and the scope of job descriptions.
End Notes
1 Rationality has been hotly debated in planning circles and has been variously 
defined as a kind of process (e.g. formal rationality) and a kind of outcome 
(e.g. social or substantive rationality). In the debates I observed, “rational” 
seemed to mean something like “better,” “correct,” or “sensible ”
2 Decentralization, or deconcentration to some North Americans, was eventually 
revisited with some minor decentralization to Wollongong and Newcastle be­
coming part of the 1995 metropolitan plan (DoP 1995).
3 Mandelbaum (1997,231) -  reviewing recent plans from Los Angeles, Toronto, 
and New York -  calls these the “great cosmopolitan themes in contemporary 
planning debates: the global economy, regionalism, cultural diversity, immi­
gration, institutional competence, privatization, fiscal federalism, and the rec­
onciliation of economic growth, environmental protection, and equity.”
4 By focusing on a large planning project this work joins a number of other 
studies stretching from Orlan’s (1953) account of developing the British new 
town of Stevenage, and Meyerson and Banfield’s (1955) study of public housing 
location decisions in Chicago, through more recent work by Peattie (1987) on 
planning the industrial growth pole Ciudad Guayana, and Marris (1987) on 
community development projects and the London Docklands (see also Clavel 
1983; Dalton 1989; McLoughlin 1992).
5 Some of the critiques and analyses of the idea of the public interest include 
Altshuler (1965, chapter 5), Howe (1992), Klosterman (1978), Meyerson and 
Banfield (1955), and Simmie (1974, chapter 5). Friedmann (1987, chapter 1) 
points to the connection between the public interest and social rationality. I 
have conceptualized perspectives on urban form as ethical as they provide 
answers to the Socratic question ‘how should one live?’ (Williams 1985, 1). 
The small but growing empirical literature on planning ethics provided a starting 
point for this research (e.g. Baum 1983; Feld and Hohman 1989; Hendler 
1991,1995; Howe 1994; Howe and Kaufman 1979,1981; Thomas and Healey 
1991). The work has tended to focus on only one or two sides of a conflict, or 
else more abstractly on generic situations, but was nonetheless useful. Par­
ticularly relevant was recent work by Forester (1992, 1993), Hillier (1993), 
and Throgmorton (1996) analyzing stories told by planners, or in planning
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situations, for their ethical content. Also useful was more general social 
scientific work on the limits of social choice theories (Zey 1992).
6 Discourse is in its most straightforward definition a kind of talk, and I therefore 
try to avoid using the word when that is all I mean. More technically, the term 
discourse means the “ensemble of social practices through which the world is 
made meaningful to oneself and others” (Johnson et al. 1994). Meanwhile, 
“rhetoric is the study of persuasive discourse” including work on stylistic de­
vices such as metaphor (Johnson et al. 1994).
7 Another body of research was also useful, that looking at more popular 
perceptions of planning issues. Pincetl’s (1992) study of growth control in 
Pasadena focused on debates over the benefits of growth, exploring alliances 
between groups that were otherwise at odds (see also Tauxe 1995). A famous 
series of studies by planners had non-planners map or describe existing cities 
(Appleyard 1976; Banerjee and Baer 1984; Lynch 1960). Researchers in both 
North America and Britain had also used more sociological methods to examine 
conflicts over growth, analyzing the differences between those supporting and 
opposing growth (e.g. Dubbinck 1984; Evans 1988; Orlans 1953; Spain 1993; 
cf. Hummon 1986). This group generally found that newer residents were 
likely to oppose growth.
8 There is a large literature on language, discourse, and planning including some 
historical work (Boyer 1983). Generally, however, research has focused on 
fairly contemporary planning processes (Forester 1989; Grant 1994; Green 
and Zinke 1993; Howe 1994; Mandelbaum 1990a, 1990b; Marris 1987; 
McCloskey 1985, 1990; Moore Milroy 1989; Nelson et al. 1987; Rydin and 
Myerson 1989; Tett and Wolfe 1991; Throgmorton 1996; Till 1993).
9 In this I have also been influenced by Marris (1996, 1) who emphasizes power 
as the control of uncertainty, creating “a way of thinking about power which 
emphasizes control over contingencies rather than control over resources.” He 
explores how the power to manage and control uncertainty is unequally dis­
tributed in society and, as people compete to protect their freedom of action, 
the weakest are further burdened. Society as a whole becomes less reciprocal 
and uncertainty increases.
10 Pilot interviews and a “suburban soiree” with half a dozen professionals were 
conducted in June, 1991, in Adelaide.
11 For comparison, Perm’s Everything in its Place: Social Order and Land Use 
in America was based on taped interviews with approximately 20 people, and 
a taped meeting between six people, as well as a number of documents and her 
own professional (planning) career (Perin 1977,17-18). Fainstein (1994, 17) 
interviewed a total of around 100 people in two cities. Powell (1993, iv) in a 
study of western Sydney life, relied heavily on newspaper accounts as well as 
experiences from her own life.
12 I indented transcriptions or marked them with quotation marks. I have not 
used page numbers in interview quotes as I used a computer to search for text. 
My spelling in transcripts is US spelling to conform with the rest of the text. I 
apologize to any interviewees who may find it odd to see themselves talking 
in “American.” In all but the largest public meetings, where explaining my
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purpose would have seemed very odd, I was quite open about my project in 
researching the debates over Rouse Hill.
13 This gave me some surprises. Given my interest in ideas about good urban 
form, I had thought that the categories used by analytical philosophers in ex­
amining ethics, and that Howe (1994) had used in empirical work based on 
interviews, would be easier to distinguish in this kind of case study. I had also 
been interested in empirical work on ethical reasoning -  as opposed to purely 
theoretical work and surveys. The work of Gilligan and others, for instance, 
emphasized the diversity of ways in which people made decisions in the moral 
realm, rather than proposing a universal path (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan et al. 
1988). Work by Jack and Jack (1989) on the moral orientation of women and 
men lawyers in the US, and Smith and Valenze (1988) on these orientations in 
nineteenth century British working-class women, had taken these studies out 
of experimental situations, grounding them in particular social and historical 
circumstances. I found however, that in the realm of public policy Gilligan’s 
typology of a morality based on rights and justice, and another on responsibility 
and care, was hard to find. I was surprised to find that the work of Foucault 
(1980), on manifold relations of power, and Schwarz and Thompson (1990), 
on cultural theory, was helpful in analyzing the case.
Chapter One
Big Projects in a Time of 
Uncertainty: Facing the Future in a 
Contemporary Urban Development
In 1968 the New South Wales planning agency marked out an oval 
zone -  the North West Sector -  on the metropolitan plan for Sydney, 
Australia. This zone was to be investigated for future 
development as a growth corridor. By 1994, after the Sector had 
been recreated as the Rouse Hill Development Area with a planned 
population of 250,000, the first lots were produced (DoP 1995, 82).
As the growth corridor’s planning moved slowly through the 
decades, the postwar consensus about (sub)urban growth as a 
social, economic, and environmental benefit was increasingly 
contested. Some Australians were concerned about regional-scale 
environmental impacts on water and air quality and called for a 
moratorium on development and more study. Others wanted to 
provide suburban homes for a growing trade-up market or for first 
home buyers, and worked hard to provide innovative financing to 
allow this. Still others worried about access and isolation and wanted 
more compact development and better transportation. These debates 
interrupted the smooth course of suburban development. In 1991, 
two of the three new inland growth corridors being explored by the 
New South Wales state government were placed on hold. Only one, 
Rouse Hill, remained on the government’s development program 
and even it was scaled back almost as soon as the first houses were 
occupied.1 In the rest of this chapter I sketch out a history of Rouse 
Hill’s long planning process.
Sydney's Postwar Growth
Sydney, Australia, was founded as a European settlement in 1788. 
For the next 160 years it grew without the discipline or coordinating
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vision of a comprehensive plan. After World War Two, like many 
other cities, Sydney entered the era of formal planning. This account 
of suburban planning and growth debates is set within a series of 
metropolitan plans and an elaborate planning bureaucracy. The 
Australian government structure, with relatively weak local gov­
ernments, meant that a significant amount of overall planning for 
Rouse Hill was conducted at the state level.
Sydney is set on a large plain bounded to the east by the ocean 
and to the north, south, and west by mountains, forests, and 
waterways (see figure 1). Metropolitan plans for Sydney have 
been created every twenty years: the 1948 Cumberland Plan 
(adopted in 1951), the 1968 Sydney Region Outline Plan (SROP), 
and the 1988 Metropolitan Strategy.2 In 1995, following early
Figure 1 Sydney Region 
Map produced by Dave Kvinge.
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criticisms of the 1988 plan, a new strategy was published breaking 
this 20 year cycle. Each plan emulated British and North Ameri­
can planning styles. The 1948 plan proposed freeways, 
greenbelts, a strong central business district, and a network of 
district centers. The 1968 plan shifted to a set of principles and 
policies, giving up the greenbelt and advocating growth along 
transport corridors along with a network of commercial centers 
generally located on existing train lines. In 1988 the plan con­
tinued the centers emphasis, as well as urban consolidation in 
the form of some infill and slightly increased fringe densities.3 
The 1995 plan -  centered around the goals of equity, efficiency, 
environmental quality, and livability -  called for more stringent 
consolidation and significantly redirected growth to Newcastle 
and Wollongong, mid-sized cities to the north and south of Sydney 
(Winston 1957, 84; SPA 1967, 11). These cities are linked to 
Sydney by electric trains and freeways, however national parks 
and difficult topography mean they are quite separate from the 
Sydney metropolitan area. Each plan encountered difficulties 
coordinating state and local government agencies, striking the 
right balance between vision and practicality, and confronting 
pressure by the development lobby exercised through the state 
parliamentary cabinet.4
Urbanized western Sydney, the location of Rouse Hill, was 
a product of this postwar era. In 1948 it was largely rural with 
scattered towns and a population of 210,000 out of a metropolitan 
figure of 1.6 million (Cumberland County Council 1948, 37). By 
the early 1990s the west contained large stretches of low density 
suburbs but most of its area of more than 5,500 square kilometers 
was not yet urbanized.5 Its population had expanded to over one 
million out of a total population of 3.7 million in the Sydney re­
gion (DoP 1988, 7; DoP 1995, 126).6
Sydney’s population growth in the 1980s showed interesting 
patterns. From mid-1983 to mid-1990 Sydney gained around
248.000 people through immigration from overseas and lost around
140.000 -  often Australian-born or long-term residents -  through 
out migration to other parts of Australia (Vipond and Ho 1992, 
83). This net gain of 108,000 represented more than two thirds of 
overall population growth in Sydney with natural increase making 
up the rest. The outer ring of suburbs experienced 92 percent of
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this overall population growth, although much of this growth was 
from Australian residents moving to the western suburbs (Vipond 
and Ho 1992, 82). There were, however, concentrations of newly 
arrived overseas immigrants in several parts of western Sydney 
and these reflected Australia’s contemporary immigration stream 
with many from Asia and the Middle East as well as a decreasing 
proportion from Europe. As over one fifth of Australia’s population 
were bom overseas, nearly three times the US proportion, these 
immigrant concentrations were not that unusual.7 However, the 
1980s was a period of unusually high immigration, peaking at a 
net national growth rate of one percent per annum in 1989. It then 
dropped to under half that figure in the 1990s, a level compa­
rable to the 1970s (McLennan 1996, 77). Given that Sydney 
was a major settling place for migrants, the high immigration 
level in the 1980s played a significant part in debates about 
Rouse Hill.
As in many locations, population and urban growth brought 
opportunities and problems. This was put quite eloquently by a 
senior planner opening the Western Sydney Regional Organisation 
of Councils (WSROC, pronounced “wez-rock”) conference on 
“Western Sydney’s Growth -  Can We Manage It?
There is a popular image of the growth of Western 
Sydney as being something unfortunate which has de­
livered outcomes [to be] accepted or tolerated rather 
than welcomed. As one who has from childhood lived 
in Western Sydney, I can see a more mellow version of 
the “urban sprawlW ithout growth and development, 
centres like Campbelltown, Penrith, Blacktown and 
above all, Parramatta, would not exist as the lively 
diverse cities they are today. A great many choices and 
opportunities we enjoy would not be available... .
[But tjoday, more vigorously than before, the value and 
wisdom of Sydney growing by adding more of the same 
to its edges is being questioned. These questions are 
being asked by a society very concerned with main­
taining and improving its quality of life and its lifestyle; 
one concerned with the welfare of the environment; and 
one increasingly prepared to argue in support of its 
various positions. (McDonald 1991, n.p.)
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Project History
Initial planning for Rouse Hill was carried out by the state gov­
ernment planning department (see chronology). Under the 1948 
Cumberland Plan the area had been zoned rural as it was largely 
outside the metropolitan plan’s green belt.8 Rouse Hill, part of a 
more general area called the North West Sector, was proposed 
for investigation for urban development in the 1968 metropolitan 
plan, the Sydney Region Outline Plan. Under the SROP the North 
West Sector was slated for development only after a number of 
other areas to the west and south of Sydney (see figure 2).9 It was 
given lower priority because of the “high proportion,” and thus 
greater cost, of new physical infrastructure needs (SPA 1968,21- 
22, 83). Rouse Hill, the patch of ground that gives the Rouse Hill 
Development Area its name, was at that time, and into the period 
of my fieldwork, a semi-rural area. It is a landscape of market
Figure 2 Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1968: Urbanized Area and Sectors with 
North West Sector Highlighted
Reproduced from the Sydney Region Outline Plan (1968) with permission from 
the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, Australia.
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gardens and a crematorium, hobby farms and buildings housing 
small industries; although many of these features will disappear as 
development progresses. It is the site of a historic building, Rouse 
Hill House (built 1813-1816), and the probable location of part of 
the Battle of Vinegar Hill (1804), the earliest convict uprising in 
Australia. It is also in an area with significant Aboriginal archaeo­
logical and rock carving sites (DEP 1984a, section 7; DoP 1989a, 
12, 17, 23).
The Sydney Region Outline Plan envisaged the North West 
Sector providing housing in three areas, although Rouse Hill 
was the major focus with a proposed population of 370,000 people, 
a figure reduced in subsequent studies to 250,000 (SPA 1968, 21- 
22; cf. DoP 1989a).10 The North West Sector in 1968 spanned three 
local government areas: Blacktown, the site of large areas of pub­
lic housing; Baulkham Hills, situated on the western fringe of the 
more exclusive northern suburbs of Sydney; and Windsor, subse­
quently renamed Hawkesbury, a more rural area.
While the Sydney Region Outline Plan announced that “change 
is constant... and the process of changing the plan to meet new 
conditions must be simple and rapid,” it also stated that “in view of 
the limited extent of the areas for development which are avail­
able, there is no alternative to the development of this land when 
the time is opportune” (SPA 1968, 7, 81). As “guidance to private 
developers, local councils, and Government Departments and State 
Instrumentalities” this was a clear indication that change would 
occur and profits were to be made (SPA 1968, 104).
Internal state government studies of the sector commenced 
in the early 1980s with the public planning process starting in 1984. 
In 1981, at the request of the state cabinet, a document called the 
“North West Sector Structure Plan” was prepared as an internal 
state government document by the Department of Environment 
and Planning. (The state planning agency, like many other govern­
ment agencies, frequently changed its name. For a detailed listing, 
see abbreviations.) It was presented to the Housing Committee of 
the state cabinet in early 1982. The “Structure Plan” was a very 
broad exercise done in the context of a proposal to place a second 
Sydney metropolitan airport in the area. This was not an officially 
recognized plan but rather a planning study done for internal pur­
poses." Transportation studies for this plan indicated that full
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development of the sector (put, by 1982, at 340,000 people) would be 
extremely expensive and so a truncated sector of 252,000 people was 
devised in order to reduce costs. This development was to be at a den­
sity of 10 lots or 35 persons per gross hectare (DEP 1982,1,22-23).
By 1982 a number of public authorities and private developers 
had already bought land in the area. These included: the state hous­
ing authority called the Housing Commission with approximately 
600 hectares; and the land banking and development authority, the 
Land Commission, with 134 hectares. The Housing Commission 
and Land Commission were amalgamated in 1986 to form the De­
partment of Housing (DoH).12 By the mid-1980s the state planning 
agency held 167 hectares around the proposed regional center and 
there was also a 385 hectare site held for a long period by North 
Sydney Brick and Tile (DEP 1982, 14, map 5; DEP 1984b, 10). A 
number of other property developers bought parcels, eventually 
forming the core of the consortium group I describe in chapter 
five. This turned out to be one of the last large areas of land banking 
on the fringe of Sydney (Bird 1991a, 23; Cardew 1985; Daily 1982, 
chapter 4).
In 1983 a “Medium Term Options Study,” prepared by the in­
terdepartmental Urban Development Committee, was in turn pre­
sented to the Housing Committee of Cabinet.13 It recommended 
development around Rouse Hill in the North West Sector ahead 
of other major options in western Sydney.14 The report pointed to 
four main attractions of the area: lower servicing costs than other 
remaining areas; attractive natural features; a better chance of at­
tracting employment even given that a large number of residents 
would be employed outside the sector; and more possibilities for 
upgrading transport, particularly rail (DEP 1984a, 10-11, 157).
Detailed planning, open to public and local government comment, 
then commenced and followed a predictable, if slow, sequence 
under the 1979 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act. The 
state planning agency prepared a Regional Environmental Study 
in 1984, followed in 1986 by a Draft Regional Environmental Plan, 
and in 1989 Regional Environmental Plan. These defind environ­
mental planning quite broadly, as general land use planning. The 
two local councils in the first stage of the Rouse Hill Development 
Area then took over the planning process preparing local planning 
instruments for the Parklea and Kelly ville-Rouse Hill Release Areas
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in Blacktown and Baulkham Hills respectively. Draft Local Envi­
ronmental Plans in 1990 were followed by Local Environmental 
Plans in 1991, which were broad rezoning instruments. Finally, 
Development Control Plans prepared in the mid-1990s indicated 
street layouts.15 Each study or draft plan was exhibited with 
submissions sought from the public and other government authori­
ties.16
Although coordinated by the state planning agency, the state 
housing authority and the Water Board were also key players in 
this planning process as they were involved in physically devel­
oping the site. Each had large staffs of hundreds of professionals; 
the Department of Housing owned and managed 130,000 rental 
properties in addition to its sale program (DoH 1997). Rouse 
Hill, of course, was only one of many projects for these depart­
ments. Interviews with participants and minutes of meeting in­
dicate work on Rouse Hill was generally conducted by small 
teams of one to six people, at least some of whom also dealt with 
other projects.
The two local governments, which were important actors in the 
later stages, each created a small team of planners and other profes­
sionals to work on the project. Blacktown, an area with significant 
large suburban public housing areas, many with thousands of resi­
dents, focused on getting adequate human services and recreational 
facilities from governments and property developers, and on hav­
ing them in the early stages of the development (e.g. Pund and 
Fleming 1997). Baulkham Hills had to deal with an articulate set 
of residents who were inclined to protest every move, but council staff 
were also interested in improving subdivision design (Baulkham 
Hills Council Environmental Services 1993, 1994a, 1994b) (see 
figures 3 and 4).
This process of formal planning coincided with, and contributed 
to, a number of controversies over the costs of continued suburbani­
zation and the future shape of Sydney. Key issues included infra­
structure pricing, finance, and subsidies, along with water and air 
pollution. Urban consolidation was proposed as the main alterna­
tive to low-density suburban developments like Rouse Hill. This 
approach argued for planning much new development in 
existing areas, redeveloped at higher densities, although some more
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compact expansion would occur on the edge. This policy seemed to 
some to minimize a number of the economic and environmental 
costs of growth, although as is explained later this was a matter of 
heated debate. Given the long history of government support of 
suburban expansion these debates represented a major rethinking 
of public policy.
In the postwar period, state governments in Australia have 
directly provided most infrastructure in new urban areas and have 
done this on the assumption that first-home owners at the lower end 
of the market would be the buyers. Infrastructure provision has thus 
been a form of housing assistance for lower- and middle-income 
earners buying suburban houses. There has also been significant 
public housing in the outer suburbs including detached houses, 
townhouses, and some small-scale, low-rise apartments. This 
contrasts with the United States where the federal tax deduction 
for mortgage interest has been a major form of housing subsidy
Figure 3 New Housing, Baulkham Hills 
Photograph by the author, 1995.
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Figure 4 New Housing, Blacktown 
Photograph by the author, 1995.
and where attached units dominate public housing provision. In 
the early 1990s in Sydney the state Department of Housing ex­
pected to develop around 30 percent of land in the fringe Urban 
Development Program (UDP) release areas. Although UDP 
areas provide only 40 percent of new housing in Sydney, the 
Department of Housing was still a significant developer (Depart­
ment of Health, Housing and Community Services [DHHCS] 
1992b, 44, 52).
In the late 1980s, increases in real interest rates made govern­
ment borrowing to finance infrastructure more expensive. At the 
same time the federal government lowered the limit on state gov­
ernment borrowing, making it harder to fund large government 
infrastructure projects. The demographics of home buyers in outer 
areas also shifted to include more of the move-up market making 
government, that is taxpayer, infrastructure provision seem like an 
unnecessary subsidy to the already established.
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Meanwhile the only areas left to develop in Sydney, including 
Rouse Hill, were physically difficult to service and therefore more 
expensive than previous locations. The Rouse Hill Development 
Area was placed in a relatively isolated location already subject to 
high levels of air pollution (Hyde and Johnson 1990). Although a 
rail line ran through the area it was surrounded by flood plains. 
Roads needed major augmentation to serve a larger population of 
commuters. The area was just beyond the ocean outfall system for 
sewage treatment that much of Sydney used and so its effluent 
and runoff had to drain into the much more fragile Hawkesbury- 
Nepean River system (Wilson 1990; Water Board 1991b, 7). New 
environmental requirements, combined with some deterioration 
in environmental conditions, also increased the overall cost of the 
development, undermining affordability. With less money to fund 
infrastructure, and its increasing price tag, Rouse Hill’s planning 
came close to a halt in 1987.
In 1988 a Liberal government replaced Labor at the state level. 
In this context, the state Department of Housing, owner of 800 
hectares in the first stage of Rouse Hill, formed the Rouse Hill 
Infrastructure Consortium with private developers who were also 
landowners in the area. They proposed to finance water services 
privately as these were the major services legally required before 
land could be released (rezoned) for urban development. This was 
a controversial proposal.
Privatization allowed the project to proceed, and promised to save 
the government some expense for water infrastructure and costs to 
the Department of Housing. Other departments, however, were then 
required to provide additional services to the area without the 
same possibility of private sector funding. In an area with very little 
existing infrastructure, and in a period of high real interest rates, 
these other infrastructure costs represented a huge expense.
As local government zoning and subdivision planning commenced 
in the early 1990s, federal interest in urban issues also increased, 
driven by similar situations across the country. In Sydney, Rouse 
Hill’s environmental and financing problems became especially criti­
cal, feeding into wider concerns about the costs of growth. While 
the Rouse Hill Development Area was only one of many growth 
areas in Australia, in Sydney it formed an important focus for
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debates, particularly after the other two large western Sydney growth 
areas -  areas that were not as far along in the planning process -  
were drastically reduced in size or placed on indefinite hold because 
of similar economic and environmental problems (DoP 1991a, 1991b, 
1991c). An early review of the 1988 metropolitan plan commenced, 
spurred by these debates over growth (DoP 1993; DoP 1995).
Following the publication of the revised 1995 metropolitan plan 
it now seems likely that the later stages of Rouse Hill will be 
delayed for a very long time and possibly canceled altogether (DoP 
1995) (see figure 5). Although land for around 23,000 dwellings or 
70,000 to 75,000 people was rezoned in Rouse Hill mainly in 1991, 
in this newest metropolitan plan the rest of the area is again, as in 
1968, represented by an oval and labeled as under investigation for 
development. This new plan deals with a “Greater Metropolitan 
Region” including Sydney and the coastal cities of Wollongong 
and Newcastle, and includes significant consolidation of urban ar­
eas (DoP 1995,4). Although Sydney already has a large stock of 
attached dwel-lings, around a third of its housing, this means a 
further shift away from the cultural ideal of quarter- and eighth-of- 
an-acre blocks, to houses on smaller lots, townhouses, and apart­
ments (Thome 1991). This shift in focus from the 1988 plan that 
essentially filled in the previously undeveloped areas, clearly re­
flects the debates analyzed in this volume. While other cities in 
Australia have not yet reached the kind of physical limits and high 
infrastructure prices Sydney has been encountering, Rouse Hill’s 
problems do seem indicative of the future shape of urban develop­
ment, part of a new round of developments involving far more 
difficult and contested tradeoffs (National Housing Strategy [NHS] 
1991d, 66).
These controversies over infrastructure, water quality, and air 
pollution were still unfolding in 1991 and 1992 when I under­
took the fieldwork for this study. There were many public meet­
ings to attend and even a housing design competition with Rouse 
Hill as a competition site (Next Move 1991). A series of initia­
tives by all levels of government, sometimes in conjunction with 
industry groups, was also focusing on the future of urban devel­
opment in Australian cities. The federal government conducted 
inquiries, strategies, and conferences on housing, social justice, 
ecologically sustainable development,17 and patterns of urban
33
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Figure 5 Longer-Term Housing Options, 1995 Metropolitan Plan 
Reproduced from Cities for the 21st Century (1995) with permission from the 
NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, Australia.
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settlement.18 A background report for the National Housing Strat­
egy explicitly considered urban form and development strategies 
(Minnery 1992).19 One of the four federal Building Better Cities 
projects in New South Wales, announced in 1992, incorporated 
bus priority lanes to Rouse Hill as part of a model project (DHHCS 
1992c, 12-13).20
Reports from the various inquires and programs were used by 
people involved in Rouse Hill in their deliberations and arguments. 
Rouse Hill’s history was thus both a fairly ordinary, if slow-mov­
ing, example of large-scale development, but also coincided with a 
period where some aspects of urban development were being dra­
matically reconsidered in a public debate.
This discussion, finally, requires a note about the words 
“urban,” “suburban,” and “city,” that I have been using as partial 
synonyms in a way that is unusual in the United States. Austra­
lians, particularly Australians involved in housing and urban de­
velopment, used the terms suburbs and suburban in a particular 
way. “Suburbs” were small geographical units with a name and 
could found across the metropolitan area, somewhat comparable 
to the US term “neighborhood.” Often they had a separate postal 
code but they were generally not equivalent to a local government 
area; local government areas were made up of many suburbs, and 
the Sydney metropolitan area was made up of nearly 50 local gov­
ernment areas. Suburbs were highly differentiated and generally 
were specified as inner suburbs (or the inner city), middle-ring 
suburbs, and outer or fringe suburbs, moving outward from the 
historical core of the metropolitan area. “The suburbs” was used as 
a term by planners to mean areas of detached housing generally 
not right in the middle of the city. The development of outer sub­
urbs was more likely to be called “urban development” than “sub­
urban development.” In Australia, outer suburbs are very mixed in 
income with many outer suburban areas developed for first-home 
buyers and many containing significant amounts of public hous­
ing. Thus the Rouse Hill project was an urban development, in the 
outer ring of suburbs.
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End Notes
1 In the 1995 metropolitan plan one of the other sectors, South Creek Valley, 
was again marked for investigation, along with future stages of Rouse Hill.
2 The first metropolitan plan was prepared by the Cumberland County Council. 
Its successor agency, the State Planning Authority prepared the 1968 plan; 
and one of its successors, the Department of Environmental and Planning, 
reviewed it (see DEP 1980). By the time of the 1988 plan the agency’s name 
was the Department of Planning.
3 Densities were increased from 8 lots per gross hectare to 10 (DoP 1988).
4 Each metropolitan plan had a mix of successes and failures: the Cumberland 
Plan grossly underestimated population growth, the Sydney Region Outline 
Plan overestimated, and so the 1988 Metropolitan Strategy avoided the issue 
by planning for a future population of 4.5 million but not stating the date 
when it would reach that population. A number of historians have assessed 
these successes and failures (see Freestone 1992; Parker and Troy 1972; 
Sandercock 1990; Spearitt and DeMarco 1988; Winston 1957).
5 Western Sydney is defined here as the Western Sydney Regional Organisation 
of Councils (WSROC) area. Perhaps because WSROC produced and popu­
larized a variety of data on the area of western Sydney within its boundaries, 
this was perhaps the most common professional definition. This definition, 
however, excluded the south western councils of Camden, Campbelltown, 
and Wollondilly. Moreover, in census terms the Western Sydney Statistical 
Subdivision included the Local Government Area of Auburn (which left 
WSROC in 1980). From 1979 WSROC, however, also contained Liverpool 
(see DEP 1984a, 121; WSROC no date).
6 The figure of 1.6 million in 1947 represented the population of the contiguous 
urban area, however the regional population, defined by the County of 
Cumberland, numbered 1.7 million the rest of whom lived on farms and in 
towns and villages (Cumberland County Council 1948, 37). By 1991 urban­
ization had largely swallowed up the separate farms, towns, and villages and 
so the difference between the County and urban population was not as signifi­
cant.
7 Various researchers and planning documents referred to this massive growth 
both in Australia as whole and in western Sydney in particular (Collins 1988; 
DEP 1984a, 121; Fulop and Sheppard 1988, 610; Fagan 1986, 12).
8 This plan was technically prepared by the Cumberland County Council and 
not a state authority, but this was a precursor to the state planning agencies.
9 The areas were, going from west to south: the West Sector, Hoxton Park- 
Fairfield, South West Sector, and Menai (SPA 1968).
10 In this plan Rouse Hill was called Rouse Hill-Maralya (SPA 1968, 21-22).
11 The officially recognized plans defined under the 1979 Environmental Planning 
and Assessment (EP&A) Act include: State Environmental Planning Policies 
(SEPPs), Regional Environmental Plans (REPs), Local Environmental Plans 
(LEPs), and Development Control Plans (DCPs) (NSW 1979).
12 The Housing Commission had operated throughout the postwar period and 
provided public housing, mostly for rent. The Land Commission was set up in
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1975 at the instigation of the Whitlam Labor government as a public land 
bank to decrease market speculation and fluctuations in land supply.
13 The Urban Development Committee, set up in 1980, had representatives from 
twenty state agencies with the state planning authority as chair. It prepared the 
Urban Development Program, a rolling five year program of land releases 
(DHHCS 1992b, 41). It coordinated social and physical infrastructure provision 
with planning and land acquisition, and generally advised the Minister for 
Planning on growth issues (DEP 1948b,4). The Urban Development Committee 
had number of subcommittees including Human Services, Transport, Local 
Government, Physical Services and Land Assembly, and Urban Consolidation 
(Lang 1990, 94). For part of the 1980s it also had a North West Sector Sub­
committee.
14 The other options at this time were: Riverstone-Schofields area in the northern 
part of the North West Sector; Austral in Bringelly, later called South Creek 
Valley; and two versions of Macarthur South (to the south of the South West 
Sector) (DEP 1983, 2-3).
15 The Regional Environmental Study, Draft Regional Environmental Plan, and 
Regional Environmental Plan were prepared by the state planning agency in 
“close consultation with” the North West Sector Sub-Committee (in 1984 and 
1986) and Rouse Hill Development Area Sub-Committee (in 1989) of the 
Western Sydney Planning and Development Committee. These Sub-Commit­
tees included representatives from Local Government Areas (Penrith, Hornsby, 
Hawkesbury, Blacktown, and Baulkham Hills in 1984 and 1986, the latter 
three in 1989), the Western Sydney Regional Organization of Councils 
(WSROC) (1986, 1989), and various state government departments (DEP 
1984a, 261; 1986a, n.p.; DoP 1989a, n.p).
16 This process created quite a pile of reports (see DEP 1984a, 1986a; DoP 1989a; 
Baulkham Hills Shire Council 1990, 1991; Blacktown City Council 1990, 
1991).
17 The term “sustainable development” comes from the 1987 Bruntland Report 
Our Common Future (Bruntland Commission 1987). This report emphasized 
both ecological and economic goals. In Australia the sustainability debate was 
generally specified as ecological sustainability. Economic issues were either 
subsumed into this debate or seen as widely separate.
18 Federal conferences, reports, and lectures were quite diverse (see Common­
wealth Environmental Protection Agency 1992; DHHCS 1992a; Edwards 1991; 
Howe 1991; NHS 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1991d, 1992; Throsby 1991). Paul 
Keating, just before becoming Prime Minister, also entered the debate (Keating 
1991).
19 Minnery (1992) analyzed seven “archetypal” urban forms: current low density, 
more compact cities, nodes or centers within the existing urban fabric (also 
know as urban villages or district centers), linear or corridor growth, regional 
cities, twin cities or growth poles, and an (even more) spread out city. This was 
not the only Australian work examining alternative city forms. In New South 
Wales the Australian Institute of Urban Studies produced a report on transport 
and urban form analyzing three scenarios: likely (urban sprawl), possible (high- 
density urban villages), and desirable (a combination) (Simons and Black 1992).
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This echoed work in the mid-1970s by the then federal Cities Commission 
(1975) as well as by the West Australian and Victorian governments in the 
early 1990s (cited in Minnery 1992, 16-17).
20 The Building Better Cities Program was announced in 1991 by the federal 




Five Images of a Suburb: 
Competing Perspectives on 
the Economy, Environment, 
and Family Life
This chapter explores some of the ways that groups of generally 
middle-class people -  planning, development, and human service pro­
fessionals; environmental activists; and local residents -  talked about 
Rouse Hill. Five major visions of good city form ran through the 
messages I collected from these groups during my fieldwork. I call 
these perspectives expansionists, developers, scientific environmen­
talists, local environmentalists, and consolidationists (see figure 6).
Position
Reason for
involvement For Growth Against Growth






Expansionists Consolidationists ^ — ^ScientificProfessional
Interest Environ­
mentalists
a. This is a sixth group not dealt with in detail. 
^ —^Tw o party alliances.
Figure 6 Perspectives and Frameworks
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In the context of often heated debates over growth, some ideas 
crystallized into frameworks or perspectives. An image of popular, 
inevitable, egalitarian suburban growth set the framework for the 
project in the 1960s. This framework remained important into the 
1990s, being drawn on by public and private sector developers and 
some planners. In the 1990s, however, environmental concerns about 
sustainability and economic concerns about affordability provided 
alternative perspectives that started to slow and reshape the develop­
ment. Low-density suburbs that had seemed natural and egalitarian 
began to seem environmentally and economically wasteful, at least 
to some.
I called the ways that people talked about good city form ideas, 
frameworks, or perspectives, because other words seemed either 
too vague (attitudes, norms, preferences), too loaded with judge­
ments about their truth (ideologies), or too formal and coherent 
(ethics, morals). I also wanted to keep the term stories as a more 
general word for the various kinds of stories it was possible to tell 
about Rouse Hill as exemplified by this book’s central chapters. I 
use the word image to mean both these frameworks and perspec­
tives and the more metaphorical portrayals of the development; 
for example, as being like Los Angeles.
Groups drew on a variety of sources in constituting their frame­
works including interests, their past experiences, and beliefs about 
the future. The frameworks were not necessarily coherent and 
consistent at all levels. They were often more of a collage of ideas 
made and remade from the residues of past experiences, traditions, 
and insights, that were formulated and reformulated in the public 
debates about growth.
Previous studies approached this issue of classifying perspectives 
in a number of ways. Some used self identification in highly polarized 
situations such as the abortion debate (Ginsburg 1989; Krasniewicz 
1992). Others used professional training or job descriptions.1 Orlans 
(1953, 132ff.), in an early study of the Stevenage new town in En­
gland, categorized people by their “rational interests” and “mo­
tives or arguments” leading to a long and uneven list of such groups 
as the: agricultural interest, rural cult, property interest, planning 
versus freedom, Residents Protection Association, and so on. My 
categorization is closer to that of Pynoos (1986) who created cat­
egories related to bureaucratic style: traditionalists, reformers,
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survivalists, and avoiders. It also echoes Hummon (1986) who 
developed a quite complex typology of popular perspectives on 
urban life: villagers, suburban villagers, suburban enthusiasts, ur­
ban suburbanites, temporary and transitional urbanites, local ur­
banists, and cosmopolitan urbanists.
The categories I created for the frameworks also follow those 
that some of my informants made in the process of working on or 
protesting the project.2 Only one group name, developers, ex­
actly corresponds to that used in the actual case; this was the 
only group where a perspective cleanly matched an interest. How­
ever, to avoid confusion I use the terms property developer or 
public and private sector developer, to indicate the social role 
rather than the perspective. In the cases of other frameworks I 
use names that are sympathetic with the various groups’ self- 
understandings and self-representations. For example, one infor­
mant divided environment activists into two groups -  “real” and 
“fake” -  a division that I have represented with the terms scien­
tific environmentalist and local environmentalist Interestingly, 
all five groups contained people trained as urban and regional 
planners, although they were more concentrated among expan­
sionists, consolidationists, and scientific environmentalists. The 
state planning agencies contained both expansionists and 
consolidationists in their Rouse Hill teams, environmental agen­
cies included consolidationists and scientific environmentalists, in­
frastructure agencies an even wider variety including developers 
and scientific environmentalists. It is important to emphasize that 
these groups shared common perspectives rather than interests, 
professional training, institutional affiliation, or social role. Two 
other groups had a less vocal or organized role in the debate and 
are not included in the analysis. Local speculators were local land- 
owners who accepted development and focused their efforts on 
channeling it in locally advantageous ways. Various intellectuals 
often prided themselves on having idiosyncratic views.
The frameworks I located were not static. At different times 
stories or frameworks gained and lost popularity and people some­
times moved between them. The frameworks themselves devel­
oped through time as situations and perceptions changed. While 
the frameworks evolved and often lacked detail, they staked out 
the contested ground in a way that was relatively stable. In addition,
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few attempts were made to promote compromise, rather groups 
took a more adversarial approach toward alternative views.
This chapter takes the frameworks at one point in their history, 
the early 1990s, examining their content and structure, and outlining 
their approach to urban form and the politics of urban develop­
ment. In outlining each perspective I start with quotes that provide 
a broad overview of the position. I then analyze the structure of its 
argument, its knowledge base, its concept of community and soci­
ety, and its ultimate vision of a good city. Positions varied in their 
level of coherence about each of these areas and the descriptions 
that follow reflect this unevenness. As some people were more 
articulate and succinct than others the quotes that follow reflect 
this subset of interviewees. The descriptions also weave together 
interviews with published accounts, although these sources are al­
ways clearly distinguished. The chapter concludes by analyzing 
differences among perspectives. Differences were articulated in 
several areas: in terms of the importance and character of environ­
mental and economic issues; through differing interpretations of 
which urban forms were practically achievable; through debates 
over forms of knowledge, particularly pitting local against pro­
fessional views; and by variations in the geographic and social 
scope of professional, or activist, concern and responsibility. Un­
derlying these more readily articulated issues were a range of as­
sumptions about the character of individual lives and of their 
realtions in society. In explaining their own underlying assump­
tions, professionals and social activists talked surprisingly often 
about their family history, a history patterned by generation and 
gender rather than simple interests. However, when describing why 
others disagreed with them their explanations were far more 
diverse.
Expansionists
One way to read Rouse Hill was an expansionist’s dream envi­
ronment:
Low-density suburbia is really synonymous with a very 
egalitarian community and in fact if there's one thing 
Australia has achieved in its two hundred years is [that] 
it's the most egalitarian society; which is absolutely
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fantastic. And some of the baggage that goes with that 
is low-density housing, because Australia has, as you 
know, the highest home ownership, higher than 
America. And that is recognized throughout the world 
as a great tick [i.e. check]. That’s a great social tick, 
and it has achieved that. And low-density or detached 
housing is again synonymous with house ownership.
It’s very hard to, it’s not as pleasant to own a home 
unit under strata [i.e. condominium] title and all that 
with [homeowner associations] as it is your own house.
So that’s been easy, that’s been the desire, that’s been 
why people desire that. And that’s been good, and in 
fact it has allowed a working class for the first time 
ever in the English-speaking world to own something.
When they die they have 200,000 dollars they can pass 
on to their children which has allowed the next genera­
tion to buy something as well. I mean it’s an incredible 
success story. And this is a physical manifestation of 
that. And so suburbia from that point of view is great.
(Frank, interview)
Expansionists had a strong and evocative image of an egalita­
rian society, inextricably linked to low-density suburbia.3 Their views 
had been important in shaping the early conceptualization of Rouse 
Hill from the 1960s through the early 1980s. Their broad argu­
ment was that suburban growth promoted equality as it provided 
access for the working class to the highest quality form of housing. 
This perspective echoed the work of contemporary Australian aca­
demics such as Hugh Stretton and Patrick Troy (e.g. Troy 1996). 
In this passage from Housing and Government, the 1974 Boyer 
Lectures broadcast nationally on radio by the then Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, Stretton outlined the expansionists’ 
basic tenets.
The figures show at least three kinds of winners in the 
international housing stakes. First there are the coun­
tries that build the most housing -  the biggest houses 
with the most rooms, the most space per head of popu­
lation, the most houses with private gardens. Overlap­
ping with that group there are the countries with the 
highest proportion of home owners (whether they own 
houses or flats or caravans). Third are the countries
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which distribute their housing best; give their people 
the most equal shares of private indoor and outdoor 
space.
Very few countries are near the top on all three 
counts, and the best of the few are Australia, New 
Zealand and Norway. (Stretton 1974, 9)A
Although expansionists admitted that greenfield suburban dev­
elopment led to some problems, particularly access to jobs and 
services in the early years, these drawbacks were essentially short­
term, a minor tradeoff in providing the best form of housing on a 
large scale. Although temporary, this situation of poor initial plan­
ning and servicing was still a concern. It led expansionists to re­
state the 1948 Cumberland Plan stressing housing and social 
service standards that were vital for a “full” family life: roads, 
drainage, libraries, public pools, restaurants, medical care, access 
to cultural events in the center city, and access for “the male of the 
house ... to go out and earn a few bucks to buy luxuries like bread 
and milk and theater tickets” (Thomas, interview; see also Cumber­
land Country Council 1948, 67).
Expansionists also pointed out that by the 1990s the deficits of 
services and facilities that had plagued the growth of Sydney were 
in the process of being eradicated in many fringe suburban areas. 
People could now make their entire lives on the edge.
That's what suburbia ought to be is its own little city, 
and it's happening if everybody lets it happen. And it's 
happening, but half the people who criticize it have 
never been there, wouldn't even know where it was... .
I've worked too much in the area, I've worked in the 
[outer suburbs, the] Mount Druitts and Campbelltowns.
There's a place for everybody. I mean people there like 
it. (Frank, interview)
And lots of people are very happy living out this way.
The people out at [exurban] Wollondilly way... they'd 
think you were mad if you said you were going into 
[central] Sydney today, down to all that smog. And out 
here you've got beautiful bushlands and water.... (Tho­
mas, interview)
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As competent practitioners with a broad knowledge of practice 
both within Australia and overseas, expansionist planners supported 
Rouse Hill as the best remaining option for Sydney’s growth and an 
exciting chance to build a new city. They talked about “doing a 
Canberra,” replicating Australia’s national capital, to provide 
“homes for the people.” Like most of those involved in Rouse Hill, 
they were concerned about its cost but hoped that this would not 
prove an insurmountable problem, even if that involved extensive 
government funding.
If something goes awry and the state government's got 
to come good with 100 million or so [to bail out the 
consortium], which is really not very much for a state 
government, [I hope] that they'd be prepared to do that 
to keep the show on the road. Because if they fail it's not 
just a matter of them being portrayed as bad managers, 
it means there's not homes for the people, and that's the 
bottom line, that's what it's all about, the whole exer­
cise. Everything is combined to get some bloke [ i.e. man] 
with a roof over his head so his family can grow up in 
reasonable surroundings. And that's what it’s all about, 
and that's the only thing.... (Thomas, interview)
Clearly expansionists believed that the government should sup­
port homes for “people” of a particular sort -  nuclear families -  and 
in a particular form of “reasonable surroundings” -  low-density 
suburban dwellings. In this perspective, cities, or at least their outer 
suburbs, were fundamentally places of access; access for male 
breadwinners in nuclear families to jobs, and access for the rest of 
the family to a variety of services and cultural activities.
In the 1991 Australian census married couple families with chil­
dren under 18 made up just over one third of Australian households, 
and in 1990 the US figure was just over one quarter,5 so these kinds 
of families are almost as rare in Australia as in the US. Expansion­
ists occasionally mentioned that other household types existed; 
however, the nuclear family form was dominant for this group. 
Expansionists certainly revealed a rich and complex understanding 
of the details of these families’ daily lives, an understanding that 
they explained was based on both their professional experience 
and their experiences as members of nuclear families. Absent from 
their description was any discussion of other kinds of relationships
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and access; to wider social networks of friends and extended family, 
or of organizational memberships.
The expansionists ended the 1980s thinking that they worked 
within abroad Australian consensus about suburban housing. How­
ever, their vision was increasingly challenged by those worried 
about the social and environmental costs of growth. With their 
appeal to popular support no longer so certain or obvious, they 
responded by pointing to the inevitability of growth. As one senior 
planner explained in answer to my question about why people dis­
agreed with their position on growth:
They ’re looking at things very simplistically, and of course 
they have no answers, they have no answers. The only 
answer they’ve got is “stop Sydney growing ” or “let them 
go to the established areas ” or, you know, “try harder 
on urban consolidation.” All those things which if you 
really know about urban issues you ’ll realize there’s no 
quick f ix ... .So you almost have to give a complete town 
planning course to these people who are the critics be­
cause they can ’t see the total picture and that’s the prob­
lem and that’s up to government to articulate that, to get 
it over to people. (Frank, interview)
Expansionists were either suspicious of or doubtful about attempts 
to avoid the economic or environmental costs of suburban sprawl by 
increasing densities. In their eyes, the higher-density solution was a 
lower-quality solution. They agreed that expansion was costly. 
Expansionists argued, however, that the alternative strategy of con­
solidation would involve even more expensive replacement and up­
grading of infrastructure in existing areas. Although resigned to some 
increases in developer charges for infrastructure, they were concerned 
that these were already increasing too much and too fast, excluding 
lower-income groups from owning detached houses. Similarly, they 
argued that threats to the environment need not stop growth. Some 
problems such as water pollution were amenable to technical solu­
tions -  “it just costs money” (Frank, interview). Other more intrac­
table problems such as air pollution linked to automobile dependence 
were not really the severe problems portrayed by environmentalists, 
rather they were acceptable costs of mobility.
Thus this group were populist and pragmatic: people wanted 
suburbs and should have them. They also had a basic commitment
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to an ideal of fairness, realized as government-supported access to 
suburban homes for all income groups. The expansionists’ desired 
outcome reflected a long tradition of urban development in Aus­
tralia. They appealed to a set of common understandings about 
growth and development, but these common understandings came 
under increasing criticism as Rouse Hill’s development progressed.
Developers
A second reading of Rouse Hill was as a story of developers doing 
their job producing serviced land and housing: “Obviously the De­
partment of Housing’s interest is to develop land; it has this charter 
in life to do that. The private developers that were involved... had the 
same sort of goal” (Gregory, interview).
Although the private sector developers were concerned about 
housing sales, and the public sector had both sale and rental pro­
grams, the cultures of the public and private sector professionals 
were quite similar. For both groups the crucial issues were:
The timing of the development of the land, [and] keep­
ing costs of development down. And I guess timing is 
driven by the money where if there’s no money you can 't 
do it anyway... The cost is driven by what's necessary 
to service the area for release, but also, it's also influ­
enced by what's the minimum acceptable service re­
quirement. (Timothy, interview)
In Rouse Hill the developers were faced with increasing produc­
tion and financing costs, and a sophisticated range of growth op­
ponents. They had changed their practices significantly in the late 
1980s in response to this changing development context, although 
this occurred in only a limited number of areas essential for gov­
ernment approval of the land rezoning and development. They 
focused on providing mandated physical infrastructure and on low­
ering costs. They spent a great deal of effort in figuring out the 
water and road infrastructure financing and trying to minimize the 
cost of environmental regulations. They were also primarily fo­
cused on housing development and were not much interested in 
creating “lifestyle” developments that included significant addi­
tional services and facilities.
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When asked about the future of Sydney’s urban development 
they talked about more of the same, fringe growth, although infill 
development would become increasingly accepted as “the current 
fears about overcrowding and poorly designed products” were over­
come (Timothy, interview). As one professional continued:
I'm trying to think what my view is on urban develop­
ment and I think that, in a nutshell, it's that urban 
development on the fringe is certainly going to be the 
major area of satisfying the demand for increasing 
growth. I don't think there's any question of that.
Urban consolidation will have a role in it but not 
anywhere near as major as people seem to make out.
That's purely because people don't want to live that 
sort of lifestyle; some people do, a lot of people don't.
(Timothy, interview)
Like expansionists, developers were critical of the recent ascend­
ance of environmental issues in public debates, an ascendance that 
had led to policies that they believed would be unbalanced in the 
long-term. While acknowledging that the environmental issues in 
western Sydney would seriously constrain future growth, and had 
already changed its form, the developers’ stance emphasized 
technical solutions to environmental problems. Further, in the 
short-term, the goal of providing housing overrode the more diffi­
cult environmental issues such as air pollution. I
I think that on the environmental side a lot of the 
desires that people have are quite commendable, and I 
think they 're certainly supported by not all developers 
but certainly most developers, and by most sensible 
people. But there's practical reality as well. Now... a 
number of environmental groups are now pushing for no 
development in western Sydney, and that's a very com­
mendable goal. But the only problem there is [that] 
people are still moving into Sydney, and Sydney's still 
growing, and until you can work out a way to stop that 
you've got to put them somewhere. So there's a practical 
reality somewhere short of the ideal, and I guess that's 
one of the most difficult things to balance .... The envi­
ronmental issues have really, really arisen over the last
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couple of years, in fact probably only in the past 18 
months, and they really have become fairly big issues.
And well that's evident from the fact that all the other 
urban release areas in Sydney have now been stopped, 
and I think that's a mistake. (Timothy, interview)
While not particularly happy with privately financed infrastruc­
ture -  it would have been far cheaper and easier for them if the 
government footed the whole bill -  the developers saw it as the 
only way to develop land quickly in troubled times. However, un­
like the expansionists who were committed to low-density fringe 
growth, developers were also open to the emerging government 
requirement for more compact development as long as it would 
sell. As one developer explained in reply to my questions about 
how his ideas were formed about good suburban development:
I think my ideas are changing all the time .... I think 
[they have] been changing in terms of the role that the 
environmental sort of areas need to play in it, I mean... 
planning a development so you minimize the environ­
mental impact. That's always been a goal, I suppose, 
but I take it a lot more, I don't want to say seriously 
now, I mean I think I've always taken it seriously, but I 
give it a lot more weight. ... The need for affordable 
housing, to be more efficient with the use of land, a 
diminishing resource, all those things I think have made 
me change my ideas. (Gregory, interview)
Developers’ ideas about why people chose to live in cities parall­
eled those of the expansionists -  access to goods and services -  
however they talked less explicitly about families or about equity.
What distinguished developers from expansionists was that they 
were not as intellectually tied to fringe development as a good in 
itself but only as a means to make money. In a different context, 
where consolidation was cheaper and where they owned land in 
existing urban areas, they would consolidate. However, in the con­
text of owning large tracts of land in Rouse Hill they argued that 
expansion would maintain affordability by increasing the supply 
of housing. Allied with the expansionists, developers had pushed 
Rouse Hill along. People from a variety of perspectives referred to 
the project as “developer driven.”
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Scientific Environmentalists
Although the Rouse Hill Developement Area owed its genesis to 
expansionists and developers, by the 1990s it was being drasti­
cally reshaped by environmentalists. Although people in each of 
the remaining groups called themselves environmentalists, in this 
section I deal with those with a regional, long-term, and “scien­
tific” approach to environmental problems and without a strong 
social concern. Part of an expanding group of environmental pro­
fessionals in both larger environmental organizations and among 
bureaucrats, this group relied on highly technical information and 
applied science methods.
Scientific environmentalists characterized their position as “holis­
tic,” although they had a rather narrow definition of the term with 
(ecological) “sustainability [as] the bottom line” (Roger, interview). 
As one environmental bureaucrat explained in response to my ques­
tion about why other groups saw urban development differently:
I think the operative word would be sustainability. We ’re 
not against development by any means, in fact the popu­
lation has to grow, but really if you’re going to do it, do 
it well. It's just what your motivation is, whether it's 
the dollar, whether it's sustainability. And more often 
than not we find now, and I don’t know if it’s any re­
flection on Rouse Hill, but the temptation is always there 
for profits, profits, profits. And if you ’re going to go for 
profits, then your environment is going to suffer. It’s 
proportionate, with two extremes. (Roger, interview)
In Rouse Hill, scientific environmentalists wanted more time to 
study and quantify the situation and more time for planning, often 
calling for some kind of development moratorium. They believed 
they could deal with complicated issues by measuring them accu­
rately. Their central fear was pushing beyond an irreversible limit. 
As a representative of the Water Board explained to a conference 
on growth in western Sydney:
Effective management of any natural resource requires 
multi-objective planning and rational compromise be­
tween conflicting objectives....
To find this balance we have to quantify land degra­
dation and water quality parameters on the basis of
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assessments of the river’s condition and its anticipated 
reaction to development impacts.
Until we more fully understand the river system, and 
indeed as our understanding increases, the trade-off 
between these objectives must never be allowed to push 
the ecosystem beyond its ecological limitations -  it 
would not be able to recover from mismanagement of 
this magnitude. Abusing this natural resource beyond 
its ((environmental threshold” now will leave future gen­
erations with a biologically dead river system of no 
beauty and little use. (Dodds 1991, n.p.)
In the face of long-term environmental problems scientific envi­
ronmentalists tried to argue not only for more study but for new 
“baseline” service requirements, new minimum standards for en­
vironmental technologies. As an activist explained: “It’s either go 
the whole hog now, which is terribly expensive, or have no more 
urban sprawl in the western Sydney basin, or lose the river system. 
They’re your choices” (Gerald, interview). In this context they 
called for more planning based on a fundamental good, the “yard­
stick” of environmental protection.
What we need... in Sydney is a combined\ or a coordi­
nated forward planning land use and urban transport 
strategy aimed at improving the water quality in the 
Nepean-Hawkesbury system and reducing the levels of 
air pollution in the western Sydney basin. Now if for­
ward planning were based on [that], if they were the two 
guiding principles of what we did, then we would get 
environmentally responsible forward planning. But I think 
the Department of Planning should have written into its 
credo that we shall do nothing that will increase Sydney’s 
air pollution or worsen the water quality of the Nepean- 
Hawkesbury [River] system, or possibly other rivers as 
well. And if suddenly, if everything had to be measured 
against that yardstick, you ’d have forward planning that 
was rational. (Gerald, interview)
Whether the need to protect the environment was because of 
nature’s intrinsic worth, because of the effects of ecological damage 
on human life, or a combination of the two, was not really important 
in this argument. The generally vague level of public debate
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obscured these differences often seen as fundamental in scholarly 
arguments about environmental ethics.
Scientific environmentalists were also comparatively pessimistic 
about human society. To this group, people were the ones damaging 
the environment and needed to be controlled to behave responsibly. 
Although some felt at ease with cities, the majority seemed reluc­
tant converts to the idea of higher densities as a way of physically 
containing population growth to prevent damaging more natural re­
sources. They supported the approach for strategic reasons, but they 
did not see much positive value in more dense urban life. Dense 
cities were more of a technology to mitigate environmental impacts 
rather than a desirable human environment. As one commented:
Urban consolidation is an answer and it seems to be 
the only answer at the moment to cope with the de­
mands for housing. It just has to be planned wisely.
I ’ve lived in areas and even worked prior to this job as 
a volunteer worker at a family crisis-center. That’s 
where they’re all putting them into consolidated and 
densely housed areas. So you create, if you don ’t have 
open space et cetera around a development, you create 
all sorts of social problems. (Roger, interview)
Some scientific environmentalists advocated planning for de­
centralization to growth areas outside the Sydney region, although 
in the early 1990s they did not seem to have thought about how to 
prevent decentralization from merely pushing the same problems 
somewhere else. Because Sydney was the primary Australian des­
tination for overseas immigrants, others called loudly for a stop to 
immigration, a call that placed them more or less uneasily on the 
side of xenophobic opponents of Asian immigration. All warned 
that continued growth would lead Sydney to become “another Los 
Angeles,” a city of freeways and smog (see chapter three).
In this group’s perspective, environmental values were pitted 
against economic ones with little middle ground. However, as 
neoclassical economics, dubbed “economic rationalism,” was the 
dominant language of Australian politics they often posed their 
arguments in terms of a calculation of economic costs and 
benefits. They supported increased developer charges for infra­
structure because they hoped that the high cost would make devel­
opment of new fringe areas prohibitively expensive. However,
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privatization moves were not always in their favour as the consor­
tium proposal had, through privatization of physical infrastructure, 
kept the Rouse Hill project going.
Scientific environmentalists in the bureaucracy also used those 
environmentalists outside to apply pressure on politicians while 
they tried to form a sympathetic culture on the inside. Activists 
mentioned receiving documents leaked by bureaucrats. Bureau­
crats, in turn, talked about the pressure put on government by 
activist arguments. To broaden their base the non-govemment sci­
entific environmentalists were also often in coalition with local 
environmentalists in groups such as CHANGE, the Coalition of 
Hawkesbury and Nepean Groups for the Environment (see next 
section). Sustainability, in its ecological sense, has been a compel­
ling argument that to date has helped delay future inland growth 
areas in Sydney, including the later stages of Rouse Hill.
Local Environmentalists
Although for most groups development at Rouse Hill raised a set 
of regional issues, for local environmentalists Rouse Hill was a 
threat to their homes and daily activities.
When did I become involved? It was really by accident 
even though I live very [close]. I have chosen this envi­
ronment to raise my family because I consider the natu­
ral environment and nature very important, and it’s one 
of the philosophies, one of the things I want to be able 
to give my children... .
It's the land that the planners seem to look at, not 
the total picture, not the environment. There’s already 
a community and a lifestyle that exists in the area that’s 
been totally disregarded. And when I ’ve spoken to plan­
ners they talked about it as remnant farmland, open 
fields, and it’s really land of little importance. It’s land 
that they see that can be developed, and it’s really the 
opposite of the way 1 see it. And while [ the ] people who 
are making decisions to develop this land are looking 
at it as, you know, remnant land, they say “subdivide 
and put houses up.” And it’s very important land, very 
important for the sanity of Sydney. It really is the last 
greenbelt area around Sydney, and when that goes it’s
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a major threat to the existing urban developments.
{Sarah, interview)
Local environmentalists were among the people most directly 
affected by Rouse Hill. Their homes will eventually be surrounded 
by it. Often recently arrived, within the last decade or so of exurban 
expansion, they were nevertheless committed to the lives they had 
made for themselves. This group was very passionate and moti­
vated to save their semi-rural lifestyles.
Closness to “nature” was extremely important to this group, 
although their definition of nature was not wilderness untouched 
by people, but an aesthetic value, the “unique visual qualities” that 
they found when they arrived in the area (Nancy, interview). This 
included those “landscape features which have been enjoyed by 
artists and people that are tuned in to nature for centuries” (Rufus, 
interview).
Although often members of professional households -  giving 
them a similar background to those employed to work on the 
project -  their local focus distanced them from those they con­
fronted. They also expressed higher expections of professionals 
than other groups did. In particular, local environmentalists saw 
planners as the primary shapers of the urban environment.
Whose function is it to keep [natural features] safe for 
the rest of the community to enjoy and for the future 
community to enjoy? /  would suggest it's the responsi­
bility of the town planner. If the town planner has no 
awareness or no understanding of these values, then 
he will not do his job very well and the community will 
suffer over a long period of time. (Rufus, interview)
Unlike the scientific environmentalists, their relationship with 
the bureaucracy was a difficult one. Local environmentalists had 
experienced numerous problems with bureaucrats “passing] the 
buck” (Rufus, interview). They saw this as due to more than mere 
bureaucratic recalcitrance, but rather involving a clash in priorities 
among government, consortium, and locals.
When you meet with the council, when you meet with 
the consortium, when you meet with people from the 
government, we sit down, we explain the situation, they 
agree with us. But each time we leave they turn to us
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and smile and say, “but we must have housing. ” So what 
we've said and tried to get them to listen to and under­
stand is already dismissed. It's not really being taken 
into consideration . . . .  (Sarah, interviewf
In Rouse Hill, local environmentalists had a variety of explanations 
for this clash in objectives. On the part of planners of various types 
they saw: a lack of information of the tradeoffs involved in provid­
ing housing, a lack of commitment to finding better solutions and 
gathering adequate data, pressure from the development lobby, bad 
initial data collection on the corridor that was never rectified, and a 
predisposition by planners to promote development because then- 
jobs relied on development occurring for them to guide and regulate. 
As one local environmentalist explained: “When I’ve spoken to 
people involved in planning they actually -  on a sort of personal 
level -  they agree that they want the best thing for the environment. 
But that is not in their brief. They have a brief that they’ve been 
given. It’s usually to develop something, and that’s the way they 
go” (Sarah, interview).
Not all explanations were so generous. Local environmentalists 
could be very critical of planners and other professionals who did 
not have detailed local knowledge of the area, or an emotional 
connection to it, but worked at a broad scale from aerial photo­
graphs and selective data sets without visiting the site. One local 
environmentalist explained: “I realized that the people that ended 
up in planning jobs in the planning department were basically those 
who were not bright enough to run a business or have their own 
expertise accepted in the community” (Rufus, interview). This local 
environmentalist explained his activism as “a mechanism for grief 
counseling where people who are affected very badly by govern­
ment decisions can get with other people who have these affecta­
tions,7 and they can arrive at some sort of balance in their own 
psyche as to accepting what the government’s doing to people” 
(Rufus, interview). In turn, expansionist and consolidationist plan­
ners in state and local government complained about the local 
environmentalists’ confrontational style. This “emotional” and con­
frontational component also placed them at odds with other land- 
owners (see also Hillier 1993, 105).
The intensely personal impact of Rouse Hill corresponded with local 
environmentalists’ propensities to argue against it in all possible terms:
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that they had a right to property, that the council had a responsibility to 
its rate payers, that professionals were incompetent and evading a clear 
truth, that everyone deserved clean air and water, that there was a 
conspiracy that would defraud the public, that the public was unaware 
and apathetic. With the scientific environmentalists, they warned that 
Sydney could become “another Los Angeles.”
In terms of solutions, they opposed further urban growth. Like 
the scientific environmentalists, they favored decentralization and 
halting immigration. Urban consolidation was an inferior option 
although, as it was often part of their platform in coalitions with 
scientific environmentalists, local environmentalists were forced 
to give it quite a bit of attention. They pointed out that consolida­
tion could “be done in an attractive way” and with a “good balance 
of open space,” important components to people who valued visual 
amenity and natural features highly (Nancy, interview).
However, for this group very low densities were synonymous 
with a high quality of human existence. When asked why people 
lived in cities one replied:
I don't know. I mean I, I haven't lived [in cities], I've 
lived on the outskirts of cities so it's hard to really 
understand. And speaking to some people, they seem to 
think that they need to be surrounded by people. Be­
cause I haven't had that environment, haven't grown 
up in that environment, I don't relate to it, so it's hard 
for me to relate to that. I just see it as where the infra­
structure is, where people have to go. And if there are 
alternatives, [that's] fantastic, in having smaller cen­
ters, are there? Well, is there an alternative? Do we 
have to have cities? (Nancy, interview)
Although forced, in a similar way, to advocate the use of more 
public transport, they were both unconvinced about its popularity 
and, I think, personally not enthusiastic about it. As exurban resi­
dents in areas accessible only by car, they had chosen an automo­
bile dependent lifestyle. Although rarely mentioning cars, they were 
sure that their total lifestyle package was a superior one.
Thus local environmentalists made sense of Rouse Hill as a threat 
to their good life centered around a particular form of semi-rural 
family life, in a setting they had worked to acquire. Local environ­
mentalists were, however, only a minority of local residents, if a
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vocal one. Most residents -  from old time farmers to affluent new­
comers -  wanted development or were at least resigned to it. These 
residents tried to influence the development’s character though for­
mal planning mechanisms, in some cases requesting early devel­
opment around their homes. In contrast, local environmentalists 
tried to gain some measure of control over the process through 
opposition.
Consolidationists
The final group, consolidationists, were generally trained as planners 
and community workers in the 1970s and 1980s, when spatial 
inequality, social isolation, and social conflict were high among 
planning concerns. Although seeing outer suburban growth as in­
evitable in the very short-term, it was not their favoured long-term 
option. Rather compact, mixed-use urban forms seemed the most 
viable way of responding to environmental problems, fiscal aus­
terity, and demographic changes, while maintaining the cultural 
and social benefits of city life. In answering my question about 
what Sydney would be like in 20 or 30 years’ time, a social planner 
explained the logic behind her position, but also its unpopularity.
It's back to the quarter-acre block thing again. That's 
OK when you ’ve got your nice little nuclear family. That 
is not what, or in a few years time that is not what house­
holds are going to be made up of. Households are going 
to be made out of people without children, or elderly 
people living on their own, and it's totally inappropri­
ate. And most of them wouldn ’t want to live in a house 
where they have to look after a garden and they have 
two spare bedrooms that they never use. So I think there 
will be a shift in expectations, but it will be fairly slow.
I still think there will be a lot of people who think this is 
their dream, and it's what they're entitled to, and it's 
what they want. (Margaret, interview)
Consolidationists also talked about “the other aspect [of their po­
sition] being a bit of an environmentalist” (Margaret, interview), 
something that needed to be balanced with social concerns.
I mean I suppose the ideal that I see is that [Sydney will] 
continue to be a vibrant cultural center, which is what
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cities are, which can minimize the impacts on the natu­
ral environment. I think the reality is [that] it's a city 
environment. It’s not a natural environment in any way, 
and we should be a bit more critical in terms of -  it’s bit 
more of a humanist approach -  how people can use it 
better. And presumably if we [ value? ] some of the range 
of specifically natural elements, like having a range of 
fish in our streams, a range of vegetation along those 
streams and in those areas, [we can figure out] how we 
can keep those as well. (Andrew; interview)
Through continued suburban expansion consolidationists saw 
the formation of an environmentally dangerous, socially-divided 
city where economic and ecological disparities reinforced each 
other with differential impacts on particular social groups. They 
were the only group to see urban expansion in terms of social costs; 
the others focused on social benefits or environmental costs. People 
who enjoyed suburbs were something of a nuisance to this group 
who saw themselves as having a more sophisticated view of the 
public interest.
Consolidationists were also the only professional group I in­
terviewed that included large numbers of women (although 
women were present as local environmentalists and, to a lesser 
extent, as scientific environmentalists). Both men and women con­
solidationists were also more likely than others to refer to expe­
riences working in human services, observing the human costs 
of suburbs. As a planner working in an environmental bureau­
cracy explained: I
I think that the city unfortunately will increase in its 
polarization. I think we do have a city of the haves and 
the have-nots now, and I think that will unfortunately 
be even more pronounced in the future, which saddens 
me. And I’ve actually worked in [outer suburban] places 
like Parramatta and Campbelltown for about half of 
my career, and I know what it’s like to see people who 
are a whole lot younger than me pushing prams full of 
blonde-headed kids up and down the main street and 
who look obviously shabbily dressed and who you know, 
you don ’t know where they ’ve had their last hot meal. I 
mean I ’ve come into contact with people for whom the
FIVE IMAGES OF A SUBURB 59
harbor bridge and the opera house are a meaningless 
sort of icon. ... /  think we run the risk of alienating a 
whole lot of people, and we could have some strong 
undercurrents and tensions. (Helen, interview)
This offered a particularly striking contrast with expansionists, 
mostly older and therefore more likely to be men, who talked about 
planning for nuclear families (like their own), about the egalitar­
ian impact of working-class suburban home ownership, and about 
its popularity: “I’ve worked too much in the area, I’ve worked in 
the [outer suburbs, the] Mount Druitts and Campbelltowns, there’s 
a place for everybody. I mean people there like it” (Frank, inter­
view, previously quoted).
Like scientific environmentalists, consolidationists talked about 
the lack of regional coordination. While in theory consolidationists 
hoped Rouse Hill would be stopped or curtailed, those working on 
the project had decided to compromise their principles in order to 
work on it. They reasoned that involvement was better than merely 
leaving the project to the expansionists and developers. As one 
explained:
I wanted to see a balance between ulets get it right”
[and stopping the development] because I think it will 
still happen no matter what. And /  think it’s more im­
portant to put energy into ensuring that it happens in 
the best possible way rather than putting energy in try­
ing to stop it when your chances are probably fairly 
slim. (Margaret, interview)
Consolidationists saw Rouse Hill as partly developer driven and 
partly inevitable. They hoped, however, that given the increasing 
social and environmental costs of sprawl, it would be one of the 
last, large, greenfield developments. Sydney’s growth, although 
dominated at the time by the Department of Housing and the pro­
development lobby, could follow a more ecologically, economi­
cally, and socially responsible process.
The consolidationists were not very powerful in the early 1990s. 
Their balancing of multiple objectives seemed weak and naive 
against more singular perspectives. On the urban fringe their ideas 
were also pitted against public and private sector developers with 
high-level government contacts and large financial resources.
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Similarities and Differences
The previous section has outlined five ways that groups of profes­
sionals, activists, and residents, all middle-class, envisaged urban 
form in the context of a new suburban development project. In the 
remainder of the chapter I examine the extent of these similarities 
and differences among the frameworks; give my interpretation of 
the importance of roles, interests, and personal experiences in form­
ing these perspectives on urban form; and outline how those in­
volved in Rouse Hill interpreted their differences.
The perspectives in the Rouse Hill debate shared a number of 
elements. This agreement reflected a common professional 
background and class position, a common legal and policy context, 
and a limited historical and geographical situation. In public confer­
ences and reports, and in slightly less public interview and meeting 
settings, those involved in debating Rouse Hill agreed that free-stand­
ing houses were popular; opposition to pollution was increasing in 
public importance; that privatization was inevitable; and that ratio­
nal, holistic, or balanced arguments were generally better arguments. 
Economic language was the dominant language and characteristics 
that could not be expressed in it were often excluded. Translating 
infrastructure financing, river ecology, and concepts of community 
into economic terms involved quite different levels of selection, but 
did manage to provide a common ground for conversation (see also 
Nash 1989, 15). Environmental standards formed a secondary lan­
guage of bottom fines and thresholds. Rouse Hill thus became an 
area designed to fulfill a quantifiable housing need but with quanti­
fiable environmental impacts, quantifiable financing difficulties, and 
the potential for quantifiable social problems. This language of quan­
tification, thresholds, and standards was used to describe “air qual­
ity,” “water quality,” and even, through the use of various social 
indicators, “quality of fife” (see Peattie 1987,126; McCloskey 1985, 
141-153 for related analyses).
The one group that sometimes violated these norms of economi­
cally rational discussion, the local environmentalists, were widely 
censured as “hysterical” (Helen, interview). In contrast, those lo­
cal residents who played by the economically rational rules of de­
velopment by having their land rezoned, making a speculative profit, 
and moving out, were both more comprehensible to developers 
and planners, and far less disturbing.
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The perspectives differed, however, in the emphasis they gave 
environmental and economic issues, how they saw social life, what 
kinds of urban forms they saw as desirable and practically achiev­
able, and in the content of the arguments they considered to be the 
most balanced. As these were public debates the concerns for one 
group had to be at least thought about by others, but they were 
often treated in different ways and with very different levels of 
seriousness or coherence. The result was a pattern of converging 
and diverging visions that both enabled strategic alliances and pro­
voked conflicts, and could not be reduced to two sides.
Both expansionists and developers saw growth as inevitable, 
wanted housing to be affordable to the majority of the middle and 
working classes, and saw environmental concerns as overstated 
and needlessly expensive to confront. Expansionists, however, were 
stubbornly committed to suburbia as a good end in itself, a social 
benefit in terms of the character of environment and the access to 
opportunities and services it provided. In contrast, developers could 
support a variety of urban forms while still making profits and 
building things. They were also generally less vocal. Developers 
had access to capital and high-level government contacts and so 
the persuasive power of their ideas -  at least to more general audi­
ences -  was less important. For others, compelling perspectives or 
stories were vital in that the persuasive, legitimating, and rational­
izing power of ideas was a major form of power (Marris 1990).
While the various environmentalists saw the need for limits, their 
specific concerns were quite different. For scientific environmen­
talists, consolidation was a means toward an end of minimizing 
ecological damage to the Sydney region. Social issues did not figure 
in their perspective except in terms of figuring out how to control 
environmentally damaging human actions. For local environmen­
talists, consolidation was a necessary, if unattractive, means of pro­
tecting their local environment. For consolidationists, in contrast, 
compact urban forms had a wider set of social and cultural ben­
efits, benefits that other groups either did not see or more actively 
questioned.
The positions had a complicated relationship with the positions 
of formal political parties. A consensus about the benefits of growth 
in the immediate postwar period had been replaced by the 1990s 
with a concern about the various costs of growth. By the early
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1990s the state Liberal-National government and the federal La­
bor government agreed that growth had severe costs. As I have 
shown, however, those involved with the development, and in the 
wider debates, disagreed on whether and which of these costs were 
excessive. Even cabinet members within the same government took 
opposing positions. The departments they oversaw were often in­
ternally divided in terms of views on growth.
These perspectives on good city form did not necessarily in­
volve images of streets and houses. The form of the city was seen 
as collection of elements that could be bought and sold, the con­
text for access to social and cultural opportunities, a means of pro­
moting social equality, a source of social division, or a technology 
with measurable environmental impacts. Perspectives also reflected 
the practical constraints of implementation, what these middle- 
level professionals and activist leaders thought they had the power 
to do or to influence. In more reflective moments some could imag­
ine a number of possible options for urban development, but prac­
tically they focused on the proposals they thought the best that 
could be achieved.
As I proposed in chapter one, the perspectives or frameworks 
were related to roles or interests: expansionists, many scientific en­
vironmentalists, and consolidationists were involved in the project 
professionally; developers and local environmentalists were local 
landowners or employees of landowners. However, people with the 
same function, with similar experiences and interests, who had cho­
sen to work in similar jobs in the same agencies, who had moved to 
the Rouse Hill area at about the same time, had different perspec­
tives on urban growth. Thus a level of interpretation was occuring in 
the translation of interests into an image of good city form.8
One explanation for these interpretive differences between the 
frameworks that coexisted in the early 1990s is that they reflected a 
kind of generational effect as described by Mannheim (1952; 
Ginsburg 1989, 139-140; Burner 1986, 139).9To Mannheim, gen­
erations are structured in a similar way to class positions, limiting 
individuals “to a specific range of potential experience, predispos­
ing them for a characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a 
characteristic type of historically relevent action” (1952,291). Certain 
experiences are fresh in each new generation and have great impact. 
Older generations have already developed “frameworkfs] of usable
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past experience” (296) that they can slot these new experiences into 
without much change to their perspective. It is the younger cohorts 
that are most deeply affected by change. The length of generations 
thus varies with the pace of change. Members of one generation 
who differ in the way they “work up” their experiences into frame­
works comprise different “generation units” (304). Rouse Hill’s 
lengthy planning and development process meant that several gen­
erations and generation units was involved, particularly reflected in 
diverging views on family life and the natural environment.10
People were explicit about the experiential basis of their ideas. 
In answering a question about how their ideas about suburban 
growth were formed, over half of those interviewed talked first 
about their own housing history as the main experience shaping 
their ideas. Most of the rest came up with anecdotes from profes­
sional work or travel. In interview after interview informants talked 
about their childhood, early years of marriage, and the beginning 
of their careers, as key in shaping their approach to growth. These 
experiences were quite different for two key groups. First were 
those coming to adulthood in the early postwar years, who had 
formed nuclear families, had helped develop the middle and early 
outer ring of suburbs, and at the time of the interviews were aged 
in their late 50s and 60s. The second group were those reaching 
adulthood in the 1970s and early 1980s once the costs of growth 
were apparent and at a time when the best development areas had 
largerly been used up. This generational effect was important for 
expansionists, consolidationsts, and scientific environmentalists, with 
the logic of property ownership stronger among the other groups.
Overlaid upon these generational effects and housing histories 
were a set of assumptions about class and gender. Expansionists, 
more often older men, talked about planning for nuclear families 
(like their own), the egalitarian character of working-class suburban 
home ownership, and the popularity of suburbs: “people there like 
it” (Frank, previously quoted). Consolidationists, often younger, 
involved in human services, and more likely to be women, noticed 
“people who are a whole lot younger than me pushing prams full 
of blonde-headed kids up and down the main street and who look 
obviously shabbily dressed and who, you know, you don’t know 
where they’ve had their last hot meal”(Helen, interview, previously 
quoted).
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The following quotes from interviews evoke some of the use of 
personal experience in formulating ideas about suburbs and subur­
ban development:
Ann: Where were your ideas formed about suburbia?
Alan (consolidationist, late 20s to early 30s): Probably 
my childhood in Canberra. Because I lived in a Radbum 
scheme... . I never had to cross a road, I was always 
basically in a park, I was never very far from anything, 
and nothing bad used to happen. Everything was just 
fine, nice trees, grass. Everything was good... .
I also found when I got a car it was fantastic thing to 
drive in Canberra because there was no congestion, 
but you still took a really long time to get from one 
place to another because it was so spread out and the 
density was so low and every center was separated by 
either topographic or physical barriers.... [So] travel­
ing time is ridiculous and you 're just burning petrol 
the whole time and it's car-based and all those prob­
lems started to just weigh on me.
Ann: [Can you tell me] how your ideas about subur­
ban development, perhaps getting back to human ser­
vices, were formed?
Margaret (consolidationist, 40s): I suppose one of the 
things is I lived in [an affluent outer suburb] and that 
probably did have a major impact. I migrated here when 
my children were little, so I actually lived in a new hous­
ing area... and certainly that can have a detrimental 
effect on your whole life.
Ann: What formed your ideas about suburbia ?
Frank (expansionist, mid 50s to early 60s): Yeah, my 
views of suburbia? I mean I have views. I love living in 
inner suburbs and things. In fact from the age of eight 
to 28 I lived in a small flat in [a harbor-side suburb], 
which is, you know these Bondi-type [three-story] flats.
And so it's not as if Eve got a hang-up about living in 
flats and [think everyone] should move to suburbia, 
not at all. In fact my theory is children love high den­
sity. It's the parents who hate it, the parents can't stand 
it because of the noise and the kids love it because 
there's lots of kids around. It's wonderful.
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But it's parents who, whenever they could afford it, 
got out of that [and although they ] said “the back yard’s 
for the children,” it wasn ftfor the children at all. It was 
for them, and you can understand that.
In spite of these differences, however, in each case ideas about 
the social world of the city -  although differing -  shared a charac­
teristic I call “thinness”.11 That is, they did not envisage society as 
rich networks of multiple interdependencies. For expansionists it 
was a world of private male-headed families where an essentially 
dislocated family unit ventured out into the world to gain access to 
economic and cultural opportunities. This image of economic men 
formed part of the basis of their alliance with developers. A larger 
human society as a positive whole was at most conceptualized as a 
market, buying and selling things that were created by individuals 
and corporations, rather than as a more multifaceted setting for 
diverse human relations.
Scientific environmentalists probably shared some of this eco­
nomic view of the city, but it was secondary to their main concern 
and that was the destructive force of human society. They were 
negative or ambivalent about the collective life of the city. Hu­
mans were essentially damaging and dangerous. Meanwhile local 
environmentalists seemed to split the social world into two groups: 
those, like themselves, attuned to nature; and those who lived in 
urban areas huddling close to infrastructure in an inferior lifestyle. 
These were problematic catagories as local environmentalists hardly 
wanted a great conversion of people to their way of life, poten­
tially crowding them out (see also Dorst 1989, 22). However, I am 
not sure that local environmentalists saw this potential paradox 
clearly.
Even the consolidationists, who conceived of a demographi- 
cally more diverse society and talked about the negative possi­
bilities of social isolation and social conflict, described society 
more as a set of social issues than social networks. It could be 
that these stronger attachments were so intrinsic to people’s lives 
that they did not think to articulate them, but perhaps it also re­
flects the ways that economic or ecological terms began to shape 
the ways people saw themselves rather than merely limit the ways 
they expressed ideas (c.f. Bellah et al. 1985, 8).
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I was surprised by the lack of a rich view of contemporary social 
life. Trained as an urban planner in the social science tradition, I 
was strongly influenced by discussions about the character of com­
munity, justice, and social change. From numerous positions -  
modernist, postcolonial, communitarian -  recent debates in these 
areas have been grappling with issues such as people’s obligations 
to one another and the character of group identity. This obsession 
with ideas about social life turned out to be unusual in the profes­
sional and activist debates. I need not have been so surprised about 
this, however. Two Australian studies, recently completed at the 
time of my fieldwork, described similar thin conceptions of soci­
ety in groups that frame the middle-class, middle-level professionals 
and activists I studied.
Pusey’s (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra was based 
on a survey of 215 members of the Senior Executive Service, the 
elite bureaucrats in the Australian federal government, which was 
Labor at the time. He found that although this group were rela­
tively confident in talking about the economy, they had difficulty 
in talking about society except as a series of issues or problems 
(Pusey 1991, 41). In a very different social context Richards, in a 
longitudinal study of residents moving into and living in a new 
outer suburb in Melbourne, found people valued the physical space 
of the house rather than the social space of the neighborhood 
(Richards 1990, 11-12). This replicated previous findings in the 
US and Canada, and in Sydney.12
Whether the lack of depth in public positions in Rouse Hill was 
due to problems in articulation, or reflected a profound absence, it 
nevertheless formed a powerful context for debates over growth 
(see Perin 1988, 63-106; Biellah et al. 1985). Pusey’s work on bu­
reaucrats had wider press coverage, but each study was mentioned 
to me several times in the course of my fieldwork by people using 
the findings to interpret or confirm their experiences.
Participants’ Observations of Difference
These are my analyses of the situation, reflecting my insider- 
outsider status and my research approach. Those involved in Rouse 
Hill had their own opinions both about the character of differences 
among perspectives, and about the reasons for these differences.
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The range of responses was shown when answering my question 
about why other people saw things differently. For some the ques­
tion was surprising, and perhaps even unimportant.
That’s a good question, I dont’t know; 1 don’t know.
[laugh] I really can’t answer that. I don’t know the 
answer. (Timothy, developer, interview).
Others had a more traditional interest-based explanation with 
the interests of public and private sector developers confronting 
the interests of others wanting to reshape the development.
There’s a number of factors there. I think one of the 
main factors is self interest... the pace and approach of 
the proposal... I think was very threatening to the 
established way of doing things. ... The whole private 
sector participation ... these horrible money making 
people who are trying to screw us to the wall and pro­
vide no facilities and just simply get away with as much 
profit as they can. (Gregory; developer, interview)
There are others who have very powerful vested inter­
est reasons for [growth]. (Gerald, scientific environ­
mentalist, interview)
And you’re fighting some very strong interests, the inter­
ests of developers who find that greenfield sites are just 
easier and cheaper to develop. In many ways they are, 
and once again Sydney would grow. (Andrew, consoli- 
dationist, interview)
A significant group pointed to issues of knowledge and under­
standing, assuming that if people shared the same knowledge or 
information that they would come to the same conclusions.
OK. I ’m not, it’s very difficult. I find that a very difficult 
question to answer. I think a lot of people don’t have a 
very good understanding of housing issues in Sydney... .
(Helen, consolidationist, interview)
The level of knowledge that’s around that’s shared by 
everyone is not high. (George, intellectual, interview)
Maybe they’re naive. I think more so it’s probably po­
litical naivete. (Dennis, local speculator, interview)
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Still others pointed to subjectively-held basic values, related to 
experiences and to interests but also to what was in people’s 
“hearts.” This affected the kind of commitment individuals brought 
to their work and activism.
There's a whole range of arguments you can follow 
through and they're all quite logical and what you come 
hack to is a subjective first premise, always a subjective 
first premise. ... And I mean the people who are brought 
up by sort of millionaire developers to rape and pillage, 
their fundamental moral principles are based on a belief 
that its right to do that, and that it's necessary, and that 
it's a valuable thing to do it. (Gerald, scientific environ­
mentalist, interview; see also MacIntyre 1981,8)
It all breaks down to values, doesn 't it?... Well the com­
munity has vision, as I said, and their hearts in it. It's 
not [like that for everyone] as I was saying of the 
bureaucrats, it's a nine to five jo b ... . The developers 
see it as a way of getting a return and [are] not really 
looking at the long-term impacts they're creating on 
the environment. They're looking at it in the short-term 
and not the long-term, and it is biased... . (Nancy, local 
environmentalist, interview)
Thus participants explained their own differences in several ways, 
as: totally inexplicable; due to different interests; caused by different 
amounts of knowledge; due to resentment about change, particularly 
privatization; and resulting from differences in premises or values 
where this was due to people starting with the wrong first premises 
or because first premises are never more than subjective. These 
explanations represent quite a range of interpretations. Some people 
implied that with equal amounts of knowledge people could agree. 
Others thought interests, or fundamental values, divided people.
There did not seem to be a narrow correspondence between per­
spectives on urban form and explanations of differences. Environ­
mentalists, particularly local environmentalists, did talk more about 
values, but they also discussed the interests of developers and poli­
ticians. Others mentioned differences in knowledge more often, 
while also referring to interests. These were only broad tenden­
cies, contradicted in many instances.
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Perhaps this level of incoherence -  at least relative to the five 
frameworks -  reflects a lack of public debate about why people 
saw things differently. Perspectives on urban form were a hot topic 
in Sydney’s environmental and planning circles in the early 1990s 
and people involved in the issues had, at some time, to place them­
selves in the debate. The level of discussion provided a great deal 
of information from which to choose; and the controversy forced 
positions to become more coherent and defensible. Similarly 
people, in order to act, had to have some ideas about power relations 
and about their own sources of power. However, a deep under­
standing about why people saw things differently -  except insofar 
as it was necessary for political strategies such as changing values -  
was just not as necessary. It did not seem to particularly trouble 
people that others saw things so differently, except to the extent 
that it thwarted their purposes. That they were more right and oth­
ers less so was an ordinary situation needing only fairly simple 
explanations.
While some characteristics were defining features of groups and 
were shared by all members -  a focus on providing family housing 
for expansionists, a commitment to ecological sustainability for 
scientific environmentalists -  on less central issues people within 
groups could vary significantly in their opinions. Developers, for 
instance, gave a variety of reasons for why people lived in cities. 
Local environmentalists had differing perspectives on affordable 
housing with some seeing it as an important issue to tackle and 
others not. Frameworks had areas of variation as well as certain 
core features.
Although incorporating many simplifications and stereotypes, 
perspectives did represent a compelling and workable vision formed 
through long experience, in response to the important issues of the 
time, and in the context of differing power resources (see Majone 
1989, 32). This is not to say people were completely locked into 
one path, but neither did they change ideas easily. People were 
often deeply suspicious of each other and harshly dismissive of 
others’ views and strategies. They rarely met each other in forums 
that promoted free-ranging discussion of issues, and they did not 
express much interest in doing so.13 A few groups were sure that 
once I understood their side I could act as a kind of independent 
expert witness, arguing for their cause and undermining others.
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These reflections do not exhaust the possible areas of common­
ality and difference in the various positions. Moreover, most pro­
fessionals, while holding particular ideas about urban form, could 
step back from these at times to a more purely administrative or 
technical role leaving larger decisions to the formal political pro­
cess. Even activists had varying levels of commitment to their ideas 
in different situations. Thus along with qualitative differences in 
perspective were quantitative differences in commitment or pas­
sion. Overall these frameworks describe the range of most vocal 
opinion on Rouse Hill and are common perspectives elsewhere. In 
the next chapter I explore in more depth some ways the groups 
represented these positions.
End Notes
1 In what is otherwise a quite subtle analysis of the complexity of interests, 
Schwarz and Thompson (1990,124) use this kind of formulation; for example, 
writing of “civil engineers” as a unified group. Elsewhere they propose a more 
generic, four part, typology of rationalities: the fatalist, hierarchist, individualist, 
and egalitarian (for professional training classifications see also Calavita and 
Caves 1994; Marris 1987; Peattie 1987; Schneider 1989).
2 Some informants came up with well developed classifications that paralleled 
my own analysis. Others did not contradict these typologies but tended to 
collapse together groups they were not familiar with, such as “environmental­
ists” or “bureaucrats.” The categories of consolidationists and expansionists, 
both mainly involving planners and other bureaucrats, were the least well 
articulated.
3 Whether or not this characterization of working-class home ownership was 
entirely true was another matter.
4 Expansionists in Sydney, however, were not pure followers of Stretton, as he 
was somewhat negative about Sydney (Stretton 1989, 274).
5 The Australian figure includes households with additional adults as well 
(Castles 1994, 100-101).
6 Sarah’s descriptions of this conversation echoes a 1946 broadcast by novelist 
E.M. Forster who had lived in the area of Stevenage and was unhappy about 
proposals for a new town: “ “well”, says the voice of planning and pro­
gress, “why this sentimentality? People must have houses” ” (quoted in 
Orlans 1953,142).
7 Rufus probably meant to say people who were “affected” (by the development). 
Interestingly, affected means both “influenced injuriously,” which he thought 
he had been, and also something which is “assumed artificially,” which was an 
accusation leveled at local environmentalists about their environmentalism 
(Concise Macquarie Dictionary).
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8 This study of perspectives drew on previous work on normative theories of 
urban form. Lynch (1981, chapter 4) describes three such theories: representing 
a cosmic order, as a practical machine, and as an organism. Peattie (1987,44- 
45), in her analysis of planning Ciudad Guayana, describes five ways to think 
of a city, as: “built form -  building, open spaces, passages, barriers”; “a system 
of rules and regulations -taxes, building codes, rules of ownership and tenancy”; 
“social relationships and social institutions -  neighborhoods, organizations, 
ethnic groupings”; “an arena of power and of the political arrangements which 
organize power”; and “an economic system -  capital investment, supplies of 
labor, housing and land markets”. In related work Meinig (1979) describes, 
from a geographical perspective, ten ways of reading a landscape, as: nature 
with people removed, a habitat for people, an artifact of human creation, a 
system (a scientific view), a problem needing social action, wealth, representing 
an ideology, history, place, and in aesthetic terms. At a more general level, 
perspectives also resemble Schon and Rein’s (1994, vii) institutional action 
frames and metacultural frames.
9 Although Mannheim’s work is now dated, his hypothesis of generational effects 
on memory and attitude has been confirmed in recent open-ended survey re­
search (Schuman and Scott 1989; Swidler and Arditi 1994, 301).
10 The generational shifts were reinforced by the world of work. With the rise of 
(the perception of) environmental problems and financial concerns, jobs ex­
panded for environmental bureaucrats and economists even as jobs serving 
social issues declined. Thus, in the 1990s, more people were paid to think 
about economic and environmental concerns and this was at least partly re­
flected in debates. In these areas humans were conceptualized as interacting 
through markets and as damaging natural resources. Those that were paid to 
deal with social issues were both relatively powerless and focused on the nega­
tive side of social life, on social problems. By the 1990s the character of Aus­
tralian cities had also shifted, generally becoming physically larger and perhaps 
more unequal. This administrative history formed part of the context for the 
experiences, and interpretations of those experiences, people drew upon when 
debating Rouse Hill.
11 This was inspired by Geertz (1973, 6) who was in turn inspired by Gilbert 
Ryle.
12 Classic North American studies include Clark (1996) and Gans (1967). The 
Cumberland County Council (1948,104) noted similar thin ideas. Troy (1971, 
1), in a study in Sydney, claimed that people did value a variety of social 
elements, but his examples seemed to indicate the opposite.
13 Schwarz and Thompson (1990) make a similar argument about persistent dis­
agreement among experts in science and technology fields.

C hapter T hree
Visual Rhetorics in Growth 
Debates: Sydney’s Future as a 
Los Angeles, Toronto, or Canberra
In disputes over urban development, such as the one over Rouse 
Hill, arguments frequently hinge not on what is, but on what could 
be. This chapter explores a class of images that were used in the 
Rouse Hill project and are frequently used in planning and growth 
debates; describing the future of an urban development with the 
name or picture of another place. This form of synecdoche and 
metaphor taps into cultural and subcultural understandings of other 
places, with these understandings shaped at least in part by media 
images. This a common politics in urban development and urban 
design as people try to understand, explain and persuade; verbally 
or visually evoking Manhattan, Paris, Beirut, Hong Kong, or 
Disneyland as an image of the future (e.g. Peattie 1991, 36).
In the early 1990s, in meetings and interviews, reports and news­
letters, newspaper and television accounts, three such images pro­
vided an intriguing way of imagining the future of Rouse Hill and 
of Sydney. Although the various environmental professionals and 
activists criticizing inland expansion were split on a number of 
issues, they all managed to agree that, without firm intervention, 
Sydney would become “another Los Angeles.” However, some 
pointed to an alternative path away from automobile dependence 
like the one that “European” Toronto had followed. For another 
group, particularly expansionist planners, the contrasting image of 
“doing a Canberra” evoked both the possibility of creating a uto­
pian city in the growth corridor, but also provided a warning about 
the huge investment that entailed.
Of the groups actually involved in debates about the development, 
only the development professionals had relatively consistent and
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direct access to such power bases as the state cabinet and large 
lending institutions; the kind of political, economic, and institu­
tional power that could shape the development directly. Others had 
more need to shape public opinion and professional consciousness 
to value certain urban forms. The city images I discuss were a key 
mechanism for reaching out both to other professionals and to wider 
publics in the early 1990s. The expansionist planners were most 
likely to evoke a positive image of the corridor as “doing a Canberra”; 
the consolidationist planners to use the image as a warning of the 
need for resources. The environmentalists focused on regional and 
local issues warned about forming “another Los Angeles.”
Returning to this study area in the mid-1990s, with the first houses 
in the growth corridor already occupied, the city comparisons were 
no longer in as much currency. While in vogue, however, these were 
powerful and accessible images evoking other suburban-type cities 
through their names, short descriptions, and carefully chosen slides. 
The images related highly technical arguments through pictures of 
desirable or frightening futures. For those groups lacking easy ac­
cess to institutional and political power, compelling arguments based 
in these accessible images were important means of influence.
The city images were so popular that “discovering” them did not 
involve much sifting work. Interpreting their meaning, however, 
engaged me in a more subtle hermeneutic circle. Unlike many of 
those participating in the Sydney discussions, I also had first hand 
experiences of all the cities mentioned in the debates, including ex­
perience as a resident of Los Angeles. Although the chapter relies on 
data from documents, interviews, and meetings in developing its 
argument, this personal background gave me an insider-outsider status 
that was extremely useful in the research (Greenhouse 1985). This 
made me particularly sensitive when, for example, “Los Angeles” 
sometimes meant “smog” and sometimes meant “sprawl,” but rarely 
meant the kind of complex metropolitan region that I had lived in 
for two years.1
As I examined the growth debates I became intrigued with how 
the widespread practice of using an image of another named city 
to represent an urban development’s future shaped the kinds of 
actions that could be imagined. What did these images highlight 
and what was obscured, silenced, or even misrepresented? Two 
kinds of rhetorical devices seemed particularly important. Most
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obvious were metaphors where a word is applied to something to 
which it is not literally applicable: a fringe suburban growth corri­
dor as a new city like Canberra. More interestingly, these images 
were a form of very visual and regionally-shaped synecdoche, a 
figure of speech where a whole is named but a part understood 
(Los Angeles standing for smog), or a part is named but a whole 
understood (Los Angeles standing for all of the US).
In these particular city images parts and wholes were linked in a 
complex web of meaning. Crucially, the images were truer to profes­
sionals’ and activists’ hopes and fears for the future than to the de­
tails of the situation in Sydney, Canberra, Los Angeles, or Toronto. 
The images tapped into a set of cultural understandings or 
imaginings partly formed by the mainstream visual media, partly 
by planning lore, and partly through the debates themselves. These 
images of possible futures created scenarios that left room for the 
professionals and activists who used them to have a role protecting 
and shaping the environment. These characteristics of multiple 
meanings, visual emphasis, regional flavor, misrepresentation of 
details, and professional empowerment provide the focus for the 
final part of the chapter.
“ANOTHER LOS ANGELES” AND A “ ‘EUROPEAN 
TORONTO”
Image Structure and Context
While including some areas for commercial and industrial 
development, and described as a “new city,” the Rouse Hill growth 
corridor was proposed in the late 1960s as a development prima­
rily meeting the expected demand for suburban housing (SPA 1968, 
22). This made transport for residents to workplaces outside the 
area a key issue. While a railway line ran through the area, adja­
cent flood lands severely limited development potential near the 
line. From the start of detailed planning, buses on ordinary roads 
were seen as the major form of public transport (Pund and Fleming 
1997). It was generally agreed that private transport -  cars -  would 
play a key role. Throughout the corridor’s planning this caused 
concern as the area was serviced primarily by rural roads and 
upgrading would be expensive.
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Set on a costal plain and surrounded by mountains, Sydney 
experiences air inversion effects. From the corridor’s early detailed 
planning in the 1980s, air pollution emerged as a problem, although 
only in the 1990s was it characterized as excessively severe and 
amenable to control through growth limits. In this latter period, 
two events catalyzed political action over air pollution: high smog 
levels in May 1991, dubbed the “smog event”; and the release 
after Freedom of Information requests of a 1990 study on air qual­
ity (Hyde and Johnson 1990).
That study, sponsored as part of the investigation of two addi­
tional southern inland growth sectors, found air pollution had 
declined close to the coast. It had, however, increased inland due 
to changes in the composition of vehicle exhausts following the 
introduction of catalytic converters. Pollution had shifted inland 
(downwind) and was likely to increase dramatically with urban 
growth. Most importantly, the Rouse Hill Development Area was 
sited exactly in the location where most of Sydney’s pollution 
pooled overnight in calm periods. Even if the residents in the area 
lived car-free lives they would still experience high pollution level 
(Hyde and Johnson 1990, 1-7; Johnson 1991).
Local and scientific environmentalists pointed out that Sydney, 
with its inversion effects, was becoming “another Los Angeles” and 
the inland development would exacerbate this. As Dr. David Hughes, 
a physician who was president of the large Coalition of Hawkesbury 
and Nepean Groups for the Environment (CHANGE), explained:
Faced with the realisation that the urban dream is of­
ten a myth, residents of Western Sydney now find that 
their environmental amenity is being threatened even 
more, by Sydney*s landuse and urban transport strate­
gies. Dependence upon the private motor vehicle in 
Greater Sydney, and a failure to really address the is­
sue or rail options for public transport, are leading to 
serious issues of air pollution for residents who are of­
ten forced, for economic reasons, to live in the Nepean- 
Hawkesbury Basin. The CSIRO-Macquarie University 
Pilot Study [Hyde and Johnson 1990] into air quality 
has found that on some days, air pollution is more than 
double acceptable public health limits in parts of the 
region... .
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What we are doing, knowingly; w allowing the de­
velopment of another Los Angeles in the West of Sydney.
(Hughes 1991, 7 )
The image of “another Los Angeles,” popularized by Dr. Hughes 
and others, was used in written materials, in speeches, and taken 
up by newspapers, radio, and television (e.g. Allison 1991a; Earth­
worm 1991; Finlay 1994; Travers 1991; Trembath 1991).2 How­
ever, as well as drawing on popular knowledge and on the Hyde 
and Johnson study, people using this metaphor also evoked the 
work of perth academics, Peter Newman and Jeff Kenworthy.
During the early 1990s, following the publication of their book 
on Cities and Automobile Dependence (1989a), Newman and 
Kenworthy traveled to Sydney regularly to give lectures to profes­
sional and community groups. Their book was not in wide 
circulation; at around 150 Australian dollars it was beyond the price 
range of many professionals. Their research focusing on the links 
between urban form and car use was, however, widely known 
through their frequent lectures and a number of shorter journal 
publications. The expense of the book became important for the 
debate as it meant few of those listening to the oral presentations 
had easy access to the book to check the detailed findings laid out 
in lengthy appendices, particularly in the first few years after the 
book’s publication.
Newman and Kenworthy had personally collected data on 
land use and transportation from 32 major cities in Europe, 
North America, Australia, and Asia for 1960,1970, and 1980. From 
these data they argued that although incomes, fuel efficiency, and 
oil prices accounted for 40 to 50 percent of gasoline use in major 
world cities (and by implication air pollution), the physical form 
of cities was also an important variable (Newman and Kenworthy 
1989a, 73). Residential and employment density, road length per 
capita and per vehicle, numbers of cars and car parking spaces, 
provision of public transit, and job distribution, although not city 
size, explained much of the remaining geographical variation in 
automobile, and thus gasoline, use.3 Of particular interest was a 
finding that cities, or parts of cities, where significant proportions 
of the population used public transport rather than automobiles 
had densities over 30 or 40 persons per hectare (Newman and 
Ken worthy 1989a, 127-129).
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Newman and Kenworthy’s Sydney presentations emphasized 
the roles of planners in manipulating urban form to reduce 
gasoline use, particularly in terms of the measurable variables of 
population or housing density, and road length per capita. A graph 
of density versus energy use was a prominent part of their talks 
and was widely reproduced (Newman and Kenworthy 1989a, 
figure 5.7; Bailey 1991). The density versus energy use chart 
showed a sweeping black curved line joining, but also separating, 
European and Asian cities with high density and low energy use 
and US cities with the opposite.
In their presentations Newman and Kenworthy juxtaposed aerial 
slides of the Los Angeles freeway system under a dirty smog haze 
with closer up views of high-density, mixed-use, urban village type 
developments around transit nodes in Europe and Toronto 
(Kenworthy 1991b; Newman 1991). As Kenworthy wrote at about 
the same time:4 Australian cities have the opportunity to learn from 
Toronto’s vision and approach to urban development. The alterna­
tive appears to be a gradual drift towards the Los Angeles model 
with all the problems this entails” (Kenworthy 1991a, 154).
The Images’ Shortfalls
The images of Los Angeles and Toronto were thus quite graphically 
presented in Sydney by experts such as Newman and Kenworthy 
and more widely publicized by activists through the media.4 How­
ever, the focus on Toronto and Los Angeles as the alternative pos­
sibilities for the future development of Sydney was misleading, 
especially given its basis in the Newman and Kenworthy study of 
physical characteristics of these cities focused on density and road 
length. In 1980, the latest figures in Newman and Kenworthy’s 
book, Sydney was slightly less dense than LA and it had a greater 
length of road per capita (see table l).5 Thus in terms of the two 
variables emphasized in public speeches by Newman and 
Kenworthy as leading inexorably to high automobile use, Sydney 
was already in worse shape than Los Angeles. Yet in Sydney people 
drove much less each year and each took many more transit trips, 
even when adjusted for incomes and prices. Newman and 
Kenworthy did not mention the actual densities of Los Angeles 
and Sydney in the presentations I attended. In contrast, high-den­
sity Toronto, Newman and Kenworthy’s public transport utopia in
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TABLE 1





Gross Density (Persons/ha) 17.6 20.0 39.6
Road Length per Capita 
(Meters) 6.2 4.5 2.7
Passenger (?) Vehicle 
Kilometers per Year 6,442 10,003 7,422
Transit Trips per Capita per 
Year 142.3 59.2 177.6
Source: Newman and Kenworthy (1989a, 317-318 , 339-340 , 343-344).
their Sydney presentations, had just a little more transit use than 
Sydney but also more travel by car.6
Thus Los Angeles and Toronto were not the best cities to compare 
with Sydney to illustrate that low-densities and longer lengths of 
road per capita led to auto-dependence and that higher densities 
decreased it. The paired comparisons of LA-Sydney and Sydney- 
Toronto actually “proved” the exact opposite. For Toronto, Los 
Angeles, and Sydney other variables such as the number of car 
spaces per-CBD worker showed a clearer pattern, as did their his­
torical development, but Newman and Kenworthy did not empha­
size these variables in lectures.
Although there is heated disagreement about how to measure 
city densities, in terms of the data presented in their own book 
their comparison was misplaced. For the particular variables they 
chose to emphasize, it would have been far more precise for 
Newman and Kenworthy to say Sydney could deteriorate into 
another Perth or Phoenix or even San Francisco’s metropolitan area 
(all metropolitan areas less dense than Sydney), or in contrast take 
the path of Singapore or Paris or Moscow away from automobile 
dependence.
However, the images of “another Los Angeles” and a “Euro­
pean” Toronto were not simply about presenting data. Rather they 
were a strategic use of cultural symbols.
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Perth and Phoenix just did not carry the negative symbolic weight 
of smoggy, sprawling, superficial, materialistic LA. Moreover, 
many Australians had come as immigrants to get away from Asian 
and European cities, and others had visited them and been happy 
to return to suburban Sydney. Thus proposing a European or Asian 
alternative was unlikely to be as attractive as the relatively un­
known Commonwealth Toronto, part of a country perceived to be 
culturally similar to Australia and looked on approvingly in 
planning circles (e.g. SPA 1968, 43; c.f. Kenworthy 1991a, 148, 
153). Thus the images Newman and Kenworthy chose reflected 
the general thrust of their research, while obscuring its detailed 
findings. They were indeed talking about Sydney becoming “an­
other Los Angeles” in the sense of a Los Angeles somewhat differ­
ent to the Los Angeles described in their book.
Newman and Kenworthy’s presentations reinforced negative 
views of Los Angeles and, with popular interpretations of the Hyde 
and Johnson study, gave a stamp of expert or scientific approval to 
activists’ warnings of a Los Angeles-style future. As one local en­
vironmental activist claimed:
And it becomes the same situation as Los Angeles which 
has been shown historically and at present to be a di­
saster. And any person who studies town planning, any 
person who studies architecture, knows that [the] Los 
Angeles style [of] planning and urban sprawl are things 
that are very bad and yet we have the Department of 
Planning that is perpetrating exactly this style of plan­
ning. (Rufus, interview)
For those who saw Los Angeles as a frightening dystopia, 
the original proposal of development of the Rouse Hill growth 
corridor seemed quite irrational and it was often interpreted 
as a regrettable mistake. This hypothesis of ignorance was, how­
ever, only partially true as even the earliest detailed planning 
documents in the 1980s had noted severe air pollution problems 
while recommending the corridor go forward (DEP 1982, 18; 
1984a, 80, 84). In interviews pro-expansion planners and develop­
ers from a variety of planning and housing agencies often described 
Los Angeles in a more benign way. These groups that had laid 
the planning structure for the Rouse Hill, argued that Los Angeles
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did not “choke to death,” that mobility was a positive thing, and 
that technological changes could eliminate any danger (Frank, 
interview).
“DOING A CANBERRA”
Image Structure and Context
Los Angeles and Toronto formed images for the future of all of 
Sydney as well as the growth corridor. However, they were not the 
only cities with which the development was compared. Its various 
development concepts, with populations projected generally in 
excess of 250,000, evoked a steady stream of comparisons with 
the Australian national capital, Canberra. Planners and others used 
these comparisons to help politicians and the wider public visual­
ize the scale of the undertaking. As one expansionist planner 
explained:
People have got to understand the scale of what we're 
talking about, we're talking about a Canberra. We made 
that [comparison], I think you'll see that in the first 
area of 250,000, to show people what we're talking 
about, we 're talking about a Canberra. And you can't 
just put those people elsewhere because if you look at 
Canberra, Canberra started in 1917 7 and its only just 
reached 270,000 with all the money that the Common­
wealth had at its disposal. And its done extremely well,
[but] you just can't have lots of [new cities]. And to 
start off a new city somewhere is even more expensive 
than starting off [Rouse Hill]. At least you can get the 
water from Prospect [reservoir]. At least there's bil­
lions of dollars spent on the whole water catchment 
area [and] you've just got to tap that. While it's expen­
sive [to build the corridor], to start a whole new city is 
ridiculous. (Frank, interview)
This focus on Canberra was not inevitable: people could have 
compared the Rouse Hill corridor with Newcastle or Wollongong, 
similar sized steel-producing cities to the north and south of Sydney. 
In 1986 Newcastle’s population was 256,000, Canberra’s 247,000, 
and Wollongong’s 207,000, making them the sixth, seventh, 
and eighth largest Australian cities respectively (Castles 1988, 4).
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However, people rarely used these other cities as comparisons. 
Although often explicitly about size, the underlying theme of the 
Canberra image was about financial and intellectual resources, 
particularly the government resources that Canberra had lots of 
and the other cities few. Two passages from the Sydney Morning 
Herald, one from its Northern Suburbs supplement, make this clear.
When the [state] Premier, Mr. Greiner, annoucedplans 
for a new mini city in the north-western suburbs of 
Sydney, he said it would be “like building another city 
the size of Canberra.”
But will it get the same financial backing that 
Canberra has had? (Boson 1989, 4)
Dr. Hughes [from CHANGE] said a city the size of 
Canberra was being dumped on a bankrupt Baulkham 
Hills Shire, which would take the blame from the State 
Government fo r inadequate roads and transport.
(Allison 1991b, 6)
These references to Canberra evoked other aspects of Canberra 
as well: suburban, green, automobile dependent (see also Logan 
1992, 5; RHCPT 1992b, 5; Riddell 1991; WSROC 1984,2). These 
aspects were not unambiguously good or bad and so the image 
was a contradictory one. For groups like the expansionist plan­
ners, car-based environments, whatever their drawbacks, gave an 
appealing form of automobility to large groups of people. For 
others, including many scientific environmentalists, automobile 
dependence was a disaster.
Although the various accounts pointed to the high level of 
resources Canberra had received, this did not necessarily mean 
that all involved wanted the same subsidies for the Rouse Hill 
development. Some may have, but others were highlighting the 
difficulty of developing such a large site in a period and a place 
where extensive government investments were unlikely. For those 
concerned with social services it was obvious that: “An area the 
size of Canberra needs more than one youth worker de-funded 
[the outer suburban Local Government Area of] Liverpool” 
(Arnold, meeting transcript). However, it was quite possible that 
this was the kind of social service provision the corridor would 
get, at least in the initial stages.
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In addition, for some planners working on the project, the 
image of Canberra also evoked a more personally compelling 
reason for involvement in the corridor that, while still about scale 
and resources, had a more exciting gloss. The opportunity to “do 
a Canberra” allowed planners to build a new “mini city” 
(Boson 1989). It was a chance to leave one’s mark, to create some­
thing new, to do things better than one could in more fragmented 
projects. Reflecting on the lot of local government planners, a 
senior expansionist planner summarized this appeal.
With planning there's so many subjective opinions.
There's always controversy over it, always room for 
debate. And you find that it's always the thing that cre­
ates the most activity at council, verbal activity that is, 
and of course puts a lot of pressure on planners. And a 
lot them opt out rather than put up with it because 
may be it's not too bad outside there or in the state 
government where you've only got to convince one 
person or so. But here you've got a stack of aldermen 
all with different ideas and it really sends you up 
the wall.
And so we don't have that many planners go the 
normal progressive path through their local govern­
ment. They're always sort of moving out. And so you 
say to them... “what would you like to do?" And they 
all say they want to do a Canberra and, you know, want 
to go down and have all these cow paddocks and build 
a whole new utopian city of it. And those opportunities 
only come along once in a hundred years. But here 
we've got a smaller version of it. (Thomas, interview)
Thus the corridor was a chance for planners, perhaps more 
crucially than other professionals, to do something where they 
had control and where their expertise was relatively unchallenged. 
It provided a place where they could show their skills without 
those skills being contested by local residents, where technical 
planning knowledge did not need to confront local knowledge, at 
least too much. Particularly for those planners of the generation 
trained in physical planning and design, and for those influenced 
by Australian urbanist Hugh Stretton’s championship of Canberra 
(Stretton 1989), Rouse Hill provided something approaching the
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ideal space of a “utopian city.” Not all planners saw Canberra in 
this way -  some saw it as merely “nice trees, grass” -  but for some 
it was a utopia (Alan, interview).
The Image's Shortfalls
The image of a utopian city was perhaps why plans rarely stated 
in the current population of the area but focused on projections of 
the future (see Peattie 1991, 36, 50). Of the published state-level 
plans only the 1984 Regional Enviromental Study, covering the 
broadest geographical definition of the North West Sector, at 
126,000 hectares, included population figures of 82,968 in 1981 
(DEP 1984a,121). In other state plans, focused more specifically 
on the 9,400 hectares in the Rouse Hill Development Area, it 
was treated as basically unpopulated.8 For example, the 1991 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Sewage Treatment Plant 
used aerial photographs from the late 1970s in showing surround­
ing properties, highlighting only seventeen “existing residences” 
in the vicinity of the proposed sewage treatment plant (Manidis 
Roberts 1991, figure 14).9 In contrast, local residents found 280 
houses located in the area contained in the aerial photograph, some 
new and some obscured by trees in the photograph, a “silence” 
in the map (Harley 1988, 290). Further, as planners often experi­
enced the site largely through these maps and photographs, rather 
than through site visits, the silence was compounded. As one local 
resident activist remarked:
It's the land that the planners seem to look at not the 
total picture, not the environment. There's already a 
community and a lifestyle that exists in the area that's 
been totally disregarded. And when I've spoken to plan­
ners they talked about it as remnant farmland, open 
fields, and it's really land of little importance. It's land 
that they see that can be developed and it's really the 
opposite of the way I see it. (Sarah, interview, previ­
ously quoted)
Thus for at least one group of pro-expansion planners the corridor 
was imagined as a flat field without human inhabitants, “cow pad- 
docks” where they could develop an ideal city or at least an ideal 
growth corridor. They ignored the local population, although as many
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of the most vocal locals had moved in after planning had commenced, 
affluent enough to purchase small farms in an urbanizing area, this 
was perhaps a pointed omission. In any case, the corridor was the 
closest many would come to planning a new city and it was intensely 
attractive for that reason.
The image of Canberra, however, only approximated the situation 
in the Rouse Hill project. As a national capital, Canberra received a 
high level of resources in terms of funding, government good will, 
planning, and design. It had been placed in a rural landscape, not 
semi-rural one. All land in Canberra was owned by the federal gov­
ernment. In contrast, planning responsibilities in the Rouse Hill cor­
ridor were fragmented between state and local governments, and the 
private sector. The public-private Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consor­
tium, representing the largest landowners in the area, had used state 
cabinet-level connections -  the state Department of Housing was a 
m em ber-to  pressure local government planners for speedy 
rezonings in a generic subdivision pattern. This made sophisticated 
urban design difficult, although Baulkham Hills worked hard to cre­
ate separate neighborhoods, Blacktown to get social services, and 
individual property developers to calm traffic and create entrance 
“statements” (e.g. Baulkham Hills Council 1993, 1994a, 1994b; 
Berkhout 1992). In addition, local and scientific environmentalists 
complained loudly to state and local planners, and to a wider public, 
calling for a moratorium. Given these pressures it took some work 
to sustain the image of the development as a benign utopia.
IMAGES AND ARGUMENTS
This growth corridor was not only a location on the edge of Sydney, 
it was a place in people’s minds. Using the images of Los Angeles, 
Toronto, and Canberra, the present and the future were made simple 
and evocative, even if that meant screening out a host of contradic­
tions. They were not the only metaphors or images used to describe 
the corridor’s future, but they were powerful ones and they were 
also of a common kind; representing the future of one city with the 
name or photograph of another.
Of course in popular and academic life metaphors and images 
with elements of synecdoche are both ubiquitous and useful, if
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also partial and potentially misleading: calling a computer screen 
a “desktop”; a city neighborhood a university’s “urban laboratory”; 
declaring “wars” on drugs or disease; evoking the US “wall” 
between church and state; seeing nations as “families,” “bodies,” 
“melting pots,” or “mosaics”; describing a “backlash” against femi­
nism.10 Social scientists invent metaphors in creating theories; 
social theory is overflowing with metaphorical gatekeepers, iron 
cages, structures, games, and dramas.
In planning and design, metaphorical images are similarly 
useful, problematic, and unavoidable. Information about urban 
growth is frequently technical and homing and making it more 
accessible necessarily involves interpreting and representing it in 
particular ways. In many ways Los Angeles, Canberra, and Toronto 
were very efficient and effective images. However, choosing LA 
as a possible future and not Perth or Phoenix or San Francisco; 
choosing Canberra and not Chandigarh or Brasilia or La Defense 
or Milton Keynes; Toronto and not Paris or Moscow; involved a 
set of choices between cities that were equally as appropriate as 
images of sprawl or new-town planning or European-style city 
structure. Similarly, why choose an actual city at all when other 
images are possible: gridlock, oasis, machine, organism? It is a 
kind of choice that planners and activists frequently make as they 
describe a proposal as like one city and not another. It is a kind of 
image that may in any case be used by others to represent one’s 
data, as the Los Angeles image was used by activists to popularize 
the Hyde and Johnson air quality study.
These images worked on several levels. First, while explicitly about 
one aspect of the cities they simultaneously evoked wider associa­
tions. Second, the images were particularly visual and seen in over­
view, something shaped by the strong television presence of Los 
Angeles and Canberra. Third, they had a regional flavor. These cit­
ies had particular meanings for people in Sydney, that would not be 
replicated in Cincinnati or San Diego. Fourth, the images were more 
representative of the overall idea that people wanted to convey than 
the actual details of the places, raising issues of truthfulness. Fi­
nally, they were generally empowering for professionals and 
activists, giving individual human agents -  if relatively elite profes­
sionals and activists -  a role in shaping a city, or else pointing out in 
a negative tone the lack or resources for this kind of role.
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Like the maps and plans that planners so often dealt with, these 
popular images sacrificed some details for others, using figures of 
speech in a rich kind of shorthand. As well as metaphors, they could 
be read as a synecdoche where a whole is named but a part is under­
stood; where Los Angeles represented its own smog and sprawl, and 
Canberra represented its planning.11 However, in using these “se­
mantically dense” images it was not possible to limit the images to 
only those aspects focused on -  smog, sprawl, size, and planning 
(Barthes 1980; Entrekin 1991,11,138). Rather the synecdoche op­
erated in the reverse direction as well, where a part is named but a 
whole understood, evoking a wider set of connections; not only Los 
Angeles but all of America or materialism or sprawl or freeways 
(c.f. Soja 1989); not only Canberra but all of utopian and garden- 
city style planning. Interestingly, in this case study, the images 
were generally used in one direction which was their power. For 
example, Los Angeles could have been used positively by envi­
ronmentalists as an example of city making multi-billion dollar 
investments in rail and other measures for improving air quality, 
but this was negatively portrayed as too little and too late.
These images and metaphors tapped into broadly-held but 
narrowly-based understandings. Both Los Angeles and Canberra 
were particularly visual images, images of cities often seen in 
overview from aerial photographs and as background shots (c.f. 
Schein 1993; Peattie 1987, chapter 6). As an intemationl center for 
the production of popular culture, Los Angeles was well known to 
all involved in the corridor (see also Meinig 1979, 169-172; 
Goring 1988). Television series like Beverly Hills 90210 and LA 
Law were clearly located there and not just somewhere in “America,” 
and showed a particular kind of materialistic life. Even those who 
had visited LA had often experienced it in a way that was focused 
like a video: flying in and out, driving on the freeways, looking out 
for the attractions they had already read about or seen on TV. Rep­
resented in Sydney’s urban debates by slides of those freeways, 
often aerial views through the grayish haze of smog, the LA image 
was a kind of “still” suggesting a larger script of descent into chaos 
and by implication the imperative of recognizing environmental 
limits in Sydney. It was particularly well suited to both regional 
and local activist campaigns that needed to compress ideas into 
soundbites. In contrast, Canberra was one of the few “planned”cities
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in the world; green, spacious, and a little boring; a suburban uto­
pia of modernist monuments and suburban houses. While only 300 
kilometers from Sydney it was, however, likewise familiar to most 
Australians through video images of reporters talking in front of 
government buildings on the television news each night.
Los Angeles and Canberra were thus places, or perhaps more 
accurately landscapes,12 that people had looked at frequently on 
television and could visualize in order to evaluate; they could 
imagine freeways and smog, trees and parliament house. How­
ever, like the images of spatially-distant locations constructed in 
tourist guidebooks and advertisements, these images of the tem- 
porally-distant completed growth corridor were partial and mis­
leading (Goss 1993; Cooper 1994). This correspondence with 
tourist promotions is interesting but complex. Tourist material is 
engaged in creating a sense of the place it refers to, rather as was 
the case with the image of Toronto. However, the more common 
images of Los Angeles and Canberra relied on pre-existing un­
derstandings shaped by others and perhaps because of that evoked 
somecontradictory responses. A few people liked LA; others were 
worried about Canberra.
These verbal and visual images of the three cities were, how­
ever, powerful enough to create senses of place, even if they were 
to some extent imaginary and contested. In a sense, the potential 
of communications technologies to homogenize space had been 
counteracted by a new kind of regionalism the technologies had 
created, a regionalism of virtual landscapes located in people’s 
minds.13 In this virtual geography, Los Angeles and Canberra were 
recognizable to people in Sydney as unique places, as types 
(smoggy, planned), and as locations representatives of particular 
countries. Snapshots of the location could be retrieved from 
memory, cued by slides but also just by the names of these places. 
Although quite different to the images residents of the cities might 
have, these virtual images were nevertheless compelling.
This name association is also reminiscent of Hertzog et al.’s 
(1976) study of “preference for familiar urban places” where the 
researchers achieved similar results in an experimental study by 
using slides of local buildings, by simply listing names and loca­
tions, and by listing these names and locations followed by a brief 
period of mental visualization. That is “when dealing with familiar
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environmental settings, the use of photographs adds little not al­
ready conveyed by the place names.... [T]he reaction is not to the 
presented stimulus per se [such as words or image] but to a distil­
lation of experience and knowledge of the place depicted” (Hertzog 
et al. 1976,640-641). Although Los Angeles, Toronto, and Canberra 
were not part of people’s local experiences but were shaped by 
visual media, the images gained from these media were still com­
plex and familiar enough to enable people who heard the names to 
look out at the corridor and see more than smog and planning but 
to imagine alternate possible landscapes. Cued by the place names, 
and using the vocabularies, information, and experiences avail­
able to them, they could make judgments about which futures were 
best, while others remained unimaginable.
The interpretations were also particularly Australian takes on 
these images, although the general pattern of regionally shared 
perceptions of particular cities is likely to be a widespread 
phenomenon. Canberra is well known in Australia as its national 
captial: Australian professional planners have a high level of know­
ledge about Canberra’s planning; the television-watching public is 
very familiar with pictures of its public buildings. The image of LA 
certainly said something about superficiality, sprawl, and material­
ism, but it did not seem to be linked with ideas about “crime... 
gangs and earthquakes” that people from the US link with Los An­
geles (Till 1993, 72 Goring 1988). In the Rouse Hill debate these 
characteristics seemed to be linked with a more generalized image 
of the US or perhaps California.14 The Los Angeles image did tap 
into a kind of low-level anti-American feeling within the Australian 
public in the early 1990s, a widespread view fed by a range of US 
foreign policies from wheat subsidies to defense, although perhaps 
not as widespread as the various environmentalists imagined. The 
LA image, in particular, needed heavy cueing to suppress alterna­
tive interpretations. In contrast to the Hertzog et al study of indi­
vidual buildings referred to above, LA is a very complex landscape 
and the name “Los Angeles” could have many meanings. Using pic­
tures and accounts of smog and freeways, environmentalists sup­
pressed the alternative positive associations with Hollywood, surf, 
Disneyland, economic boom, or even transit investment. By com­
parison, Toronto was far less well known so its image was formed in 
the debate itself.
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This regional pattern of understandings echoes Adams’(1992) 
innovative discussion of television and place. Adams refers to 
a distinction between insider (local) and outsider (distant) televi­
sion audiences where insider audiences are more likely to see 
programs as reflecting part of their culture, or as being fantasy, 
and outsider audiences are more likely to see programs as repre­
senting all of “them.” As Adams points out, although this division 
is easy enough to make theoretically, empirical work has shown 
more complex patterns with, for example, some local groups 
perceiving themselves as outsiders. This case study confirms some 
of this complexity.
With a good grasp of the public’s overall knowledge, and some 
effective cueing slides, experts such as Newman and Kenworthy and 
their followers tailored their talks to fit a politically cogent image, 
and their own overall findings, rather than the complex details of 
their own data. By de-emphasizing the more complex variables they 
oversimplified in a way that ultimately discredited them with many 
pro-development and pro-expansion professionals (and even pro­
consolidation professionals who were concerned about issues of 
evidence). However, in public forums a more complex discussion 
may well have obscured their basic point just as the LA-Toronto 
image obscured their published data. This issue of simplification 
and (mis)representation was, and remains, a difficult issue for many 
researchers wishing to have public influence or to have their work 
taken up in public debates. It is an issue I return to below.
Even the obstensibly more benign Canberra image functioned in 
a similar way. The Canberra image used the corridor’s size to raise 
resource concerns and, when addressed to other professionals, it 
evoked utopian city planning. This in turn enabled the current popu­
lation to be imagined away, replaced by “cow paddocks” and ob­
scuring the more complex situation of a rural residential urban fringe.
In their partiality the city images are thus reminiscent of the 
metaphor of the “dual” city critiqued by Marcuse (1989), where a 
complex set of overlapping inequalities is represented as a split­
ting in two, generally on the lines of income or race. This dual city 
image was in fact used from time to time in Sydney with the rela­
tively well-off eastern suburbs contrasted with the disadvantaged 
west (e.g. Travers 1991). Marcuse explains the dual city meta­
phor is misleading in its ahistorical oversimplification of urban
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inequality. The images of Los Angeles, Toronto, and Canberra 
were also misleading, although through a slightly different pro­
cess of simultaneously simplifying (the future as smog) and evok­
ing wider associations (smog being inextricably mixed up with 
materialism, the US, and so on).
Was there, then, anything wrong in using these kinds of meta­
phors? Did these images mislead the public, or other profession­
als, in a way that was manipulative? Forester (1989, 36) has 
applied Habermas’ criteria for unmanipulated communication to 
this issue of power in planning.15 In this formulation, unmanipulat­
ed communication should be: clear and comprehensible, sincere 
and trustworthy, appropriate and legitimate, accurate and true. 
Against these criteria the Los Angeles-Toronto image would per­
haps be judged as manipulation by experts. This is “perhaps” 
because it is not at all certain. The image was clear and can easily 
be seen as a sincere attempt to represent problems and possibili­
ties for intervention. The image was arguably appropriate for 
people with a visionary bent talking to audiences with varied 
educational and professional backgrounds, and it was arguably 
truthful to the overall findings of various research projects if not 
all their details. This demonstrates a dilemma for professionals 
and activists addressing mixed audiences on complex matters as 
well as some difficulties in operationalizing Habermas’ criteria 
for unmanipulated communication in such situations (cf. Hillier 
1993).
My interest in the LA-Toronto image started because of my sense 
that there was something wrong with it, a sense that was confirmed 
by my own analyses and by others who published critiques of the 
work (e.g. Brindle 1992; Gordon and Richardson 1989). Some 
observers came to understand the LA-Toronto image as a delib­
erate misrepresentation of an ambiguous situation, betraying the 
public trust given to experts, and leaving the public ill-prepared 
as participants in a democratic decision-making process. I have 
sympathy with this position. I would not have conducted this 
analysis if I had found the city images to be (literally) unremark­
able. The lay public and even many professionals took up the 
Los Angeles image, in its Newman and Kenworthy form, quite 
trustingly. I think it seemed so obvious to many that Los Angeles 
was a sprawling mess, and that Sydney must be different, that
92 CONSTRUCTING SUBURBS
they did not even think about exploring the detailed findings. 
These images were not the only areas in my research where I 
heard and saw experts making claims that were not backed up by 
their own data, but they were a disturbing subset of such events. 
I still however see these rhetorical devices as, in general, pre­
senting a dilemma rather than being simply dishonest.
Due to its extreme form the LA-Toronto image highlights a 
fundamental characteristic of metaphor, that at the base it is wrong 
in that it is claiming one thing is like another in a way that can never 
be totally the case. Geertz, drawing on the work of Percy (1958), 
argues that:
[Metaphor] tends to be the most effective when the most 
“wrong” The power of metaphor derives precisely from 
the interplay between the discordant meanings it sym­
bolically coerces into a unitary conceptual frame­
work . . . .  When it works, a metaphor transforms a false 
identification (for example of the labor policies of the 
Republican Party and those of the Bolsheviks) into an 
apt analogy; when it misfires it is mere extravagance.
(Geertz 1973, 210-211)
Of course, part of my argument is that what was disturbing about 
the Los Angeles, Toronto, and even Canberra, images was not only 
their mismatch with the situation in Sydney (the kind of wrong­
ness Geertz is referring to), but their mismatch with the situation 
in Los Angeles, Toronto, and Canberra, particularly in terms of the 
data presented by Newman and Kenworthy. They represented these 
cities in sometimes partial and sometimes over-generalized ways, 
tapping into existing biases and creating additional ones.16
Interestingly, the public and private sector developers in this case 
did not tend to use these city images, perhaps because they had 
other forms of economic and institutional power that they had used 
very effectively to push the development along. However, this 
silence was in some ways specific to this case at a particular 
period as property developers frequently employ these kinds of 
place associations when naming and promoting developments.
In Rouse Hill the juxtaposed city images were useful in abbrevi­
ating quite complex arguments about causal factors in automobile 
use and air pollution, and urban planning, making the future of the 
specific corridor imaginable. Even if they inaccurately represented
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the present and future, they were still appealing in enabling a pub­
lic to visualize that change and to see their own role in fostering or 
preventing that future: fighting ecological devastation, building 
spacious cities. The Canberra image was particularly interesting 
in this light: giving planners a role in creating a new city, but also 
warning about the probable lack of resources for that task. In pro­
viding room for individual human agency the images stand in some 
contrast to the disabling metaphor of “structures” of power that 
Marris (1987) describes in the context of Britain in the 1970s. There 
professionals and activists were constrained by a sense that they 
had to totally dismantle the structure of existing economic condi­
tions, something that was not possible. Perhaps, however, these 
images were falsely enabling, like the dual city image, providing 
too easy a solution to a complex set of urban problems with too 
grand a role for professionals and activists.
These kinds of images were not, then, simple to use. They were 
culturally specific and even within a culture or subculture there 
was disagreement about their full implications. Sprawling Los An­
geles was not quite such a terrifying possible future to those who 
liked Canberra and who knew Sydney’s density was already lower. 
Among environmentalists it also held different meanings with those 
with a background in regional issues likely to fear environmental 
damage, those with a humanistic bent worried about socio-envi- 
ronmental inequalities, and those with a local focus often more 
offended by the LA aesthetic. Similarly, Canberra was only a uto­
pia to a particular group of those I interviewed who were generally 
older and less concerned about the negative effects of suburban 
sprawl. The simplifications, then, raised questions about the char­
acter of design debates where complicated futures are being imag­
ined through images that are rarely as complex.
While imperfect, these kinds of visual multi-layered city images 
are common and unlikely to depart. The mainstream visual media, 
and planning debates, will continue to portray particular places in 
greater and less depth, and planners, designers, and activists will be 
able to use their visually familiar characteristics (or the lack of them) 
to help a wider public imagine a particular future.17
In the following chapters I place the perspectives, frameworks, 
and images I have dealt with so far more concretely in the context 
of planning and debating Rouse Hill. Different groups faced each
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other not in some neutral landscape of ideas but in specific politi­
cal contexts where the persuasive, inspirational, and identity-form­
ing power of ideas interacted with other power relationships on an 
uneven and historically shifting terrain. What ideas could do was 
shape the character of the impacts on the urban landscape of 
economic, administrative, and political power.
End Notes
1 This analysis extends a subset of the work on planning communication mentioned 
in chapter one, work that has examined how the language of planning shapes 
planners’ and others’ imaginations in particular situations (see Mandelbaum 
1990a).
2 Richmond (forthcoming) also briefly discusses this concern about Sydney 
becoming another Los Angeles. Recently Ewing (1997) has used the term 
“Los Angeles-style sprawl” in a US context but has received some criticism 
for this (see Gordon and Richardson 1997; Levine 1997).
3 Newman and Ken worthy considered a number of “economic factors” affecting 
fuel use -  “the demographic size of a city, vehicle ownership, income, gasoline 
price and vehicle fuel efficiency” -  along with a set of “social/cultural factors” -  
“climate related lifestyle, spatial traditions and politics” (Newman and 
Ken worthy 1989a, 69). However, the emphasis of their research was on the 
physical form of cities.
4 While Newman and Kenworthy’s thesis of the contribution of land use practices 
to auto dependence, over and above economic factors, seems basically sound 
(Evill 1995), both it and their specific analyses were criticized (Brindle 1992; 
Gordon and Richardson 1989; Kirwan 1992; McManus 1992; Moriarty and 
Beed 1992). Newman and Kenworthy were, however, quite prolific in ex­
pounding their ideas about the connections between land use and transportation 
(see Kenworthy 1991a, 1991b; Newman 1990,1991; Newman and Kenworthy 
1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992; also Cervero 1989, 1990; Handy 1992; Mitchell 
and Rapkin 1954).
5 I used Newman and Kenworthy’s standardized data for these comparisons. 
The definition of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area was the LA-Long Beach 
SMSA except in density calculations which cover a broader area. Sydney is 
defined as the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Sydney Statistical Division. 
Toronto is defined as the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, including 
only 2,137,000 of the 3,148,000 people living in the Toronto Metropolitan 
region (Newman and Kenworthy 1989a, 18-19).
6 Further, because Canadian vehicles had very low fuel efficiencies, per capita 
energy use for both public and private transport in Toronto was actually 40 
percent more than the same figure in Sydney.
7 The results for the competition of Canberra’s design were announced in 1912, 
with Burley Griffin appointed to start building in 1913 (Stretton 1989, 28).
8 Although in their background information for the Draft Local Environmental 
Plan, Baulkham Hills Council did note the number of existing residents in
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their part of the first stage of the corridor development -  7,603 in 1986 -  then- 
discussion of the existing population was limited to one short paragraph 
(Baulkham Hills Shire Council 1990, table 3).
9 The estimate of the photograph’s date came from local residents, members of 
the group SENS.
10 Each of these metaphors has been analyzed (see, in order, Wozny 1989; Adams 
1991; McGaw 1991; Ross 1989; Stein 1990; Hammond et a l  1981; Morris 
1984; Appadurai 1974; Stein and Hill 1977; Newson 1991).
11 This is a figure of speech related to metonymy where words are seen to be 
related by “proximity be that spatial, temporal, or conceptual” (Miller 1982, 
145).
12 The word landscape originally referred to a picture of inland scenery, but over 
the years its meaning has been enlarged (Cosgrove 1984, 16-17). Within cul­
tural geography place more commonly refers to the insiders’ views of a location, 
landscape implies outsiders’ views.
13 Entrekin (1991, 28-29) contains an interesting discussion of early warnings 
of homogenization of place due to improved communications and transportation 
technologies.
14 Writers in other parts of Australia used the LA image differently, for example 
referring to such characteristics as social division (e.g. Peel 1995).
15 I should note here that Forester’s work goes well beyond interpreting Habermas.
16 Although this chapter does not attempt to undertake a full-scale semiotic analysis 
of the city names, these complex associations with city names relate to work in 
semiotics, for example that of US pragmatist Pierce. Pierce sees “signs” in three 
parts: “a vehicle that conveys an idea to the mind, which [Pierce] called the 
representanamen\ another idea that interprets the sign, which he called the 
interpretant', and an object for which the sign stands” (Gottdiener 1995, 9). For 
example the word “Los Angeles” (representanamen) stands for the location called 
Los Angeles that exists in the world (object) but the particular meaning Los 
Angeles takes on depends on the idea (the interpretant) that exists in people’s 
minds about these objects. As this chapter has described there was some dis­
agreement about the meaning of these city names, with dominant views resisted 
by minorities.
To Lyotard, and others more critical of any claims to transparent truths, 
discussing manipulation may itself be misleading as what is occurring is a 
kind of clash of language games with different rules (Lyotard 1984, 65-66). 
The LA-Toronto image in this sense can be seen as part of a political language 
game and to judge it as detailed technical description is to unfairly impose on 
it a different set of rules.
17 That these images are likely to oversimplify and misrepresent is a cause for 




Formal Planning Processes: 
The Privileged Language of 
Professional Planning
Although Rouse Hill is a place to the north west of currently 
urbanized Sydney, the Rouse Hill Development Area was the cre­
ation of a formal planning process that has already spread across 
three decades. By transforming a group of farms, houses, and small- 
scale work places into a ‘Sector’ and then a ‘Development Area’, 
the formal planning processes focused attention away from the 
existing landscape and toward the changes that would occur in the 
area. It set the agenda both conceptually in terms of the shape of 
the development as a growth corridor, and literally in terms of the 
many formal meetings that occurred during the long planning pro­
cess. Of course not everyone has to follow an agenda, particularly 
when it is set by someone else far in advance of the actual develop­
ment and in a context of fairly rapid change. In Rouse Hill the 
agenda was increasingly questioned. These questions transformed 
suburban development from a social good into an environmental 
and economic problem, at least for some participants.
This chapter gives an account of Rouse Hill’s formal planning as 
it faced changes in infrastructure finance and housing affordability 
along with rising citizen and bureaucratic awareness about air and 
water quality issues. These components -  plans, finance, affordability, 
pollution -  were the things that planners, property developers, envi­
ronmental and human service bureaucrats, residents, and activists 
talked about and fought over. They were the issues that slowed the 
project and reshaped its direction into the 1990s.
First, I explain some of the context of the formal planning pro­
cess in Rouse Hill along with its bureaucratic politics. For many 
people, particularly those in government, this was the most basic
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story of the Rouse Hill Development Area. Without this formal 
planning process few changes would have occurred in the area and 
those that did occur would likely have been more gradual. I then 
explore the process of citizen participation and of the representation 
of public needs; describe debates over infrastructure financing and 
priorities; trace the history of increasing awareness of water pollu­
tion; and introduce the range of publicly debated alternatives to 
Sydney’s urban expansion, from stopping immigration to reshaping 
urban form. As problems emerged a series of adjustments and com­
promises enabled Rouse Hill to continue, although the original goal 
of providing detached houses for first-home buyers was increasingly 
undermined. Throughout the project’s history, state and local plan­
ners tried to use the formal planning process to gain some control 
over other participants in the development process, but they were 
only partly successful.
Formal Planning
As I explained in chapter one, although the 1968 Sydney Region 
Outline Plan projected that the main development of the North West 
Sector Would start in 1980, Sydney’s slower than anticipated popu­
lation growth meant that it was not until 1981 that even preliminary 
planning commenced (SPA 1968, 95; DEP 1982, 36). Beginning in 
1984, a series of publicly available environmental studies and plans 
-  broad land use planning exercises carried out by the New South 
Wales state planning agency -  were produced. These were followed 
by more detailed local plans, the zoning and urban design instru­
ments, carried out by the two local councils (see chronology and 
figure 7). Literally dozens of plans, studies, impact statements, and 
determinations were produced by state and local governments, and 
consultants, in the decade leading up to the start of construction. 
Many were part of the legally defined planning sequence of Re­
gional Environmental Study, Regional Environmental Plan, Local 
Environmental Plan, and Development Control Plan.
Although in hindsight this process seems quite formal and pre­
dictable, following a pattern laid out in legislation, the exact scope 
and timing of each study and plan was actually open to quite a 
wide range of discretion. Under the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act, the Director of the Department of Planning was
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1968 Sydney Regional Outline Plan: North West Sector indicated for 
future investigation for urban development.
1980 December: Development Coordinating Committee of state 
cabinet requests structure plan for North West Sector.
1982 January: Structure Plan presented to Urban Development
Committee.
1984 July: North West Sector Regional Environmental Study released 
for public comment.
1986 October: Rouse Hill Development Area North West Sector Draft 
Regional Environmental Han released.
1988 New metropolitan plan published.
1989 September: Rouse Hill Development Area Regional 
Environmental Plan made official.
1990 June: Draft Local Environmental Plans for Paiklea Release Area, 
(Blacktown City Council) and Kellyville-Rouse Hill (Baulkham 
Hills Shire Council) released.
1991 Environmental Impact Statement for proposed sewage treatment 
plant released.
1991 Local Environmental Plans for Parklea and Kellyville/Rouse Hill 
Release Areas gazetted.
1991 June: Determining Authority's Report (acceptance) of
Environmental Impact Statement for sewage treatment plant.
1993-1994 Development Control Plans for Parklea and Kellyville/Rouse 
Hill.
1995 New metropolitan plan published.
Figure 7 Formal Planning Process Summary
given the ability to prepare a draft Regional Environmental plan 
for the region or issue that was “in the opinion of the Director, of 
significance for environmental planning for the region”(NSW 1979, 
section 40). Section 51 gave the Minister the ability to include “such 
matters as are, in his opinion, of significance for environmental plan­
ning for the region.” Section 52 gave the Minister the authority to 
determine “the regulations, the format, structure and subject matters” 
of a Regional Environmental Plan or draft Regional Environmental 
Plan. Generally this led to two types of plans -  some dealing with 
broad strategy in a region, and others rezoning an area of regional 
significance -  but the room for latitude was significant (DEP 1984a,
100 CONSTRUCTING SUBURBS
253-254). Similar variations existed in the scope and content of Re­
gional Environmental Studies, Local Environmental Plans, and 
Development Control Plans with the Director of Planning or the 
Minister given broad powers (see NSW 1979, sections 41, 57).
This flexibility in interpretation was the subject of some conflict 
throughout the planning process as different government departments 
and authorities tried to gain control over the development agenda. For 
example, an alteration to the minutes of the August 1983 meeting of 
the interdepartmental Urban Development Committee indicated that 
the decision to undertake the Regional Environmental Study was taken 
by the planning agency “without prior consultation with either the 
Sub-committee set up to advise on the development of the NW 
Sector or the relevant Ministers” (Urban Development Committee 
12 December 1983). Putting Rouse Hill on the “statutory” plan­
ning track of Regional Environmental Study and Regional Envi­
ronmental Plan in the early 1980s was seen by many “as a political 
step by the Department of Planning so they wouldn’t lose control 
of the planning process to the Department of Housing who own[ed] 
substantial amounts of land in the area” (Eric, interview).
However, far from providing detailed specifications about the 
development’s form, the Regional Environmental Study and Re­
gional Environmental Plan were very general in content. This is 
particularly obvious in the graphical representation of the REP 
where most of the area was undifferentiated except for some indus­
trial areas, flooding zones, and the regional center. This was a rather 
vague concept diagram for an area planned to house a quarter of a 
million people. Those I interviewed at the local government level 
commented on this negatively (see figure 8).
While this process formally enabled the Department of Plan­
ning to coordinate other departments, it turned out to be a week 
coordination mechanism. Canberra, a city of a similar size to the 
proposed Rouse Hill Development Area, had been planned by a semi- 
autonomous development body, the National Capital Development 
Commission, that had proved far more powerful. The Macarthur 
Growth Area around Campbelltown in the South West Sector had 
also been developed under a separate Development Corporation, 
originally within the Department of Environment and Planning 
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While the slow planning process seemed to allow generous time 
of public comment, various government agencies actually held tight 
control. In the early 1980s, attempts were made to limit public 
access to plans because they provided a “speculators guide” (Frank, 
interview).1 Once the public planning process started, direct par­
ticipation by members of the public was generally confined to re­
acting to plans, often at short notice, rather than participating in 
their drafting. This occurred equally for local and regional plan­
ning. Finally, in the early 1990s, public participation and access to 
information was further limited through privatization. Throughout 
the process information was provided either in excess -  mountains 
of detail to be slowly waded through -  or in schematic form with 
many details missing.
Further, as one local environmentalist pointed out, public sub­
missions were required at each stage of the multi-step formal plan­
ning process.2 Rather than a collaboration or a conversation, the 
process became a “war of attrition” (Sarah, interview). People had 
to keep objecting to keep their concerns under consideration but 
could only do so when the planning process allowed it. As far as I 
can tell, the only public meetings called by government authori­
ties, at least until the middle of 1992, were Blacktown’s oral sub­
mission section of their Local Environmental Plan Environmental 
Impact Statement.
During the 1980s and 1990s, a small number of public meetings 
were, however, called by community groups. The Western Sydney 
Action Group held meetings in Richmond and Blacktown in March 
and July 1985 and produced a short-lived newsletter People Build­
ing Community: A Community Response to Proposed Developments 
in Sydney's North West. Six years later, in November 1991, another 
public meeting was held attracting 120 people. The speakers in­
cluded members of parliament and local environmental activists, 
and passed the unanimous motion: “that this meeting expresses its 
total opposition to further urban development in [the] North West 
Sector until complete guarantees are provided of all and adequate 
infrastructure and environmental measures to the satifaction of the 
community of the area” (Minutes of the... 1991,5; Hills Mercury 
1991). The Rouse Hill Community Planning Team, a coalition of
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human service providers, held a public meeting about social service 
issues in October 1992 and held another with existing community 
groups 1993 (see chapter five).
Of course, direct participation of citizens in a planning process -  
whether in reaction to plans or through some more robust mecha­
nism -  is only one way of having people’s ideas and interests 
represented in the planning process. In interviews some planners 
were cynical about the whole idea of existing residents participat­
ing in planning for release areas.
Who you really ought to be talking to [are] the fifty 
thousand people who are going to come and live in 
there. And they don ’t know they ’re going to come and 
live in there and all the people, the only people that 
make a submission are the ones who basically see that 
your plan is affecting their chance of making millions 
in a couple of years. And they want you to change that, 
often not in the best way for the ultimate community.
(Eric, interview)
In Rouse Hill, planners and activists were adept at representing 
the needs of the various publics they related to without having to 
hold public meetings. They did this though such mechanisms as 
social statistics, professional observations, and measurements of 
effects on the natural world.
In new areas, public participation also faces dilemmas about 
private speculation, particularly in situations without massive 
government land holdings. Early in the planning process there 
were such proposals for significant government land ownership. 
The Development Area became, however, a largely private sec­
tor development with public sector guidance (DEP 1984b, 21). 
This private sector role was extended in the late 1980s when the 
Department of Housing, as part of a consortium with private de­
velopers, proposed privately financing water services (see 
chapter five).
A final issue to do with public input was a sluggishness in using 
new data. I, like many of the activists I interviewed, was quite 
surprised at how repetitious the plans were. A number of consult­
ant studies, as well as reports by other government departments, 
were prepared throughout out process.3 Once collected, however,
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data for the early reports were used and reused in later reports even 
though the slow planning process meant that conditions had 
changed. More importantly perhaps, data not collected in the early 
1980s were not collected later either. As local activist complained:
I think that part of the problem with this North West Sec­
tor development is a lot of the initial decisions were made 
with the wrong information at hand. They didn ’t know 
about the storm water problem. They didn’t know about 
the traffic problem. When these original decisions were 
made to go ahead with this [development], these very 
vital pieces of information weren’t looked at. And be­
cause they weren’t looked at they ’ve just continually been 
overlooked and... it’s just going to mean devastation for 
the whole region of Sydney, because the wrong premises 
have been used to start. (Sarah, interview)
Reusing data certainly gave reports consistency and saved plan­
ning time. This may well have been appropriate under more stable 
conditions. In Rouse Hill, however, it locked in assumptions that 
could be criticized as outdated.
Infrastructure Costs and Financing
In Australia, housing has long been a major policy issue. Austra­
lians expect governments to intervene in the housing market in 
order to promote home ownership and, at least sometimes, public 
housing. Detached housing has remained popular in Australia and 
government support for fringe suburban development has allowed 
both low-income families and more affluent groups to buy into this 
housing form, or to at least rent it. A number of studies conducted 
in Sydney have documented this support. Thome et a l (1980), in 
an interview survey, found 90 percent of the 990 respondents 
preferred detached housing over other types, although in 1986 only 
68 percent of Sydney’s dwellings were free-standing houses (Thome 
1983, 1991).
In Sydney the state government had, over the years, directly pro­
vided rental public housing, funded community (non-profit) housing, 
sold public housing, acted as a land banker and land developer, and 
provided a wide range of infrastructure. By the late 1980s, however, 
the practice of governments financing fringe suburban expansion
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had come under question due to three major changes: increases in 
real interest rates, government aversion to increased deficits, and 
the rising cost of infrastructure provision on the fringe.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s federal policies deregulated 
the Australian financial system. This led to an increase in foreign 
debt mainly due to private corporate borrowing. From 1945 to 1980, 
a period of major urban growth and thus of borrowing for urban 
infrastructure, real interest rates had averaged around one percent 
per year. The period of deregulation either caused or coincided 
with, depending on one’s interpretation, an increase in real interest 
rates that reached 8 percent in 1989 before falling. This increase 
severely reduced the amount of debt borrowers, including govern­
ments, could service (Gregory 1991; Kirwan 1991, 4).4
At the same time the federal government reduced the amount 
governments (including state and local levels) could borrow. The 
New South Wales “global borrowing limit” for both state and local 
governments dropped from AUS$ 1,940 million in the 1984-1985 
financial year, and $2,060 million in 1985-1986, to $1,144 mil­
lion in 1989-1990 (NSW 1992a, 2). While it was unclear whether 
these figures were in constant or current dollars, in either case the 
reduction in borrowing was quite dramatic.
Meanwhile the costs of providing physical infrastructure on 
the fringe of Sydney increased. The remaining undeveloped sites 
in the region were physically difficult to service and over time 
environmental standards became more stringent. Rouse Hill, in 
particular, had few existing services to build on. As one develop­
ment professional explained:
People find it difficult to visualize that we ’re talking about 
an area of something like five and a half thousand hect­
ares [in the first stage], and there are [new] services 
[needed] all over that area. It’s probably, I think some­
body said to me it's the biggest urban release area in 
Sydney’s history and I think it’s probably close ... [and] 
there have been a lot of problems that people just didn’t 
anticipate in the first place, and that’s tended to delay it 
past where the private sector would have liked it. (Timo­
thy, interview)
A major shift in the practice of fringe development was being tested 
at Rouse Hill.
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The 1988 Metropolitan Strategy had projected that the popula­
tion of the outer suburban areas would rise from 60 percent of the 
metropolitan figure in 1986 to 70 percent in 2011. For the Strategy’s 
target population of 4.5 million people, 323,000 to 358,000 of the 
588,000 new dwellings would be on the fringe and aimed at “low 
income families who are purchasing their first homes” (DoP 1988, 
11). Although grounded in the expansionist ethic of providing fringe 
suburban housing for first-home buyers, the Metropolitan Strategy 
began to raise the issue of increasing infrastructure costs across 
the region.
Detached houses are popular and on the urban fringe 
such dwellings tend to be less expensive than detached 
houses elsewhere in the Region. However, the whole 
community pays dearly for continued urban expansion.
The costs of providing physical and community services 
for new urban areas have to be met by Local and State 
Governments. Only a fraction of these costs is recover­
able from developers and home buyers. In new growth 
sectors it is estimated that Government will bear a net 
cost of $20,000 ($1987) per lot for services ranging 
from water and sewerage to community and education 
facilities. (DoP 1988, 11)
As the Metropolitan Strategy warned, these “implied subsidies” 
were likely to “increase substantially” (DoP 1988, 11). Combined 
with the locational disadvantage experienced by low-income fringe 
dwellers, these increasing infrastructure costs began to make pro­
viding cheap infrastructure for fringe expansion seem a misguided 
approach to increasing housing quality for low-income people. 
Moreover, in the year that the Metropolitan Strategy was published 
the cost of the same package of physical and social services in the 
Rouse Hill area was estimated at $53,300 (see table 2). This figure 
did not include the developer costs of $21,100 per lot for local 
roads, water, electricity, and fees. The estimate of the unrecouped 
cost to government in 1988 dollars was $30,000 per lot. In 1991 a 
report in the Telegraph Mirror put the cost of servicing a residential 
block at Rouse Hill at $71,525 compared with $50,000 average for 
the nation (Farr 1991, 8). The report did not indicate exactly which 
services were included. As journalist Carmel Travers (1991) declared 
on a television special City Limits: “ The question must be asked; 
can we really afford Rouse Hill?”
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TABLE 2
ROUSE HILL INFRASTRUCTURE COST ESTIMATES







Water, sewerage, drainage 9,000 9,000
Main roads 14,900 2,200
Public transport 2,000
Local government 7,300 7,300
Electricity 800 800
Gas 2,000 2,000
Telecom [phone] 2,000 2,000
Total 38,000 23,300
Social Services
Police, pre-college education, 
family and community 
services, health 
Total 15,300
Total Infrastructure by Government
(physical and social) 53,300
Direct Developer Costs









Broadacre land costs 30,000
Developer’s cost 73,400
Price to home purchaser 100,000+
Source: NSW (1992b, 19).
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This recognition of the high cost of infrastructure provision in 
new areas reinforced a long-term trend toward the government in­
creasing the amount of infrastructure costs that it collected at the 
time of development. This trend applied to a variety of infrastruc­
ture components. In existing areas where most services were already 
available private sector developers were charged for all additional 
services, but on the fringe where most services had to be specially 
laid the practice into the 1980s was to charge property developers 
only about 60 percent of the cost (Hughes Trueman Ludlow 1991, 
x; NHS 1991d, 66). The move was to make this percentage higher.
The effects of these changing practices of infrastructure finance 
were the cause of some debate in professional circles, particularly 
relating to issues of equity or fairness, and efficiency.5 In the early 
1990s the federal government’s Industry Commission conducted 
an “Inquiry into Taxation and Financial Policy Impacts on Urban 
Settlements” and the Federal Parliament’s Standing Committee for 
Long Term Strategies examined urban settlement patterns.
Several common understandings emerged along with some 
severe conflicts. In terms of areas of agreement, local roads and 
connections to various utilities on, or close to, individual lots were 
generally seen as the responsibility of property developers. For the 
remaining infrastructure people generally separated physical infra­
structure such as main roads, water, and electricity from recurrent 
human services funding. Parks and the buildings housing human 
services occupied an ambiguous intermediate space.
In equity terms most groups agreed that recurrent funding for 
human services should come from general taxation -  collected na­
tionally but usually distributed through the state -  as it was tied 
to population rather than location. There was quite a bit of dis­
agreement, however, over paying for physical and intermediate in­
frastructure. Some argued the move to have home buyers pay for 
infrastructure up front was shutting lower-income and working- 
class first-home buyers out of the fringe suburban market. Others 
pointed out that this was no longer the group moving to the fringe, 
but a higher income group were “trading up” to extremely large 
homes. This group should pay the full cost. In support of this con­
tention they pointed out that the size of new houses had increased 
from 130 square meters to 180 square meters between the early 
1970s and the early 1990s (NHS 1991a, 38). There were many
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more sticky questions, however, about physical infrastructure; 
should regional dams and local pipes be paid for in the same way? 
Integrating physical and social infrastructure was difficult; for ex­
ample, local governments were allowed to collect contributions 
for constructing child care centers but could not be sure the state 
would pay to staff them.
Whatever the specific details, Rouse Hill was being developed 
in an era of a new kind of suburban development. As one planner 
remarked: “The big difference is, and it’s yet to be shown, is that 
the outer areas are not for low-income people anymore. It has com­
pletely changed that around” (Frank, interview).
Water Quality
The Department of Housing and private developer consortium pro­
posal for funding water works not only responded to changes in 
government policy and in infrastructure finance but coincided with 
a period of changing perceptions about water pollution issues. For 
all of the eastern part of Sydney, and much of the currently urban­
ized west, sewage flows to oceanside treatment plants that discharge 
effluent into the sea. Sewage treatment in Sydney was controversial 
in the late 1980s as few of the oceanside treatment plants treated 
sewage even to full primary level and beach pollution was a growing 
problem. The Water Board’s first solution was an extension of the 
ocean outfalls and a public relations campaign (Beder 1989, 110). 
Continuing problems resulted in a revised plan to treat effluent 
to at least secondary level with options for upgrading this later 
(Water Board 1991a).
However, only a very small part of the southern edge of the Rouse 
Hill Development Area drained into the ocean outfall system. Sew­
age effluent from the vast majority of the area would flow into the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean River, a situation that in the 1990s became 
almost as controversial as the ocean outfalls.
For Rouse Hill, the 1982 “Structure Plan” had set out the op­
tions that guided development for the next decade; that a very high 
level of treatment must be provided or else other uses of the river 
would essentially have to be abandoned.
Distance from the coast makes the N. W. Sector un­
suitable for an ocean outfall system of sewerage and
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urban run-off would be discharged into the Hawkes- 
bury-Nepean River system. This could only be achieved 
at the expense of other competing uses associated with 
the River; namely recreation and irrigation. The 
Hawkesbury is considered to be nearing maximum pol­
lutant carrying capacity and the River has only lim­
ited reserves to satisfactorily accommodate sewerage 
discharge. Therefore the M.W.S. & D. [Water] Board 
and the State Pollution Control Commission require 
nutrient removal before any effluent can be discharged 
into the Hawkesbury River system. (DEP 1982, 18)
The 1984 Regional Environmental Study again noted the 
problems that urban runoff and increased sewage effluent flows 
would cause the river. The main problem was eutrophication, 
“the nutrient enrichment (or over-fertilization) of waterways 
which may cause changes to the characteristics of the water 
and the aquatic life it supports” (DEP 1984a, 89). It referred 
to State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC) recommenda­
tions for technical solutions to these problems: providing 
stormwater drainage detention basins to “prevent first flush 
pollution loads entering natural watercourses,” reducing nu­
trients in effluent, and reusing effluent through means such 
as irrigation (DEP 1984a, 87-89, 93; SPCC and Water Board 
1985).
By the late 1980s, however, the water quality problems, or at 
least the perception of those problems, had increased in severity.6 
Even the 1988 Metropolitan Strategy, otherwise quite optimistic 
about pollution trends, recommended against further development 
in areas “where environmental impacts are likely to present spe­
cial problems and it is practicable to avoid urban development.... 
Areas draining into the Hawkesbury Nepean River system clearly 
fall within this category” (DoP 1988, 27).
As a representative of the Water Board pointed out:
One of the reasons that people enjoy living in western 
Sydney is the amenity that the river offers -  the para­
dox is that unless controlled, there is a risk that each 
successive development will lead to further deteriora­
tion in water quality. The worst case scenario is that 
continual urban expansion will ultimately result in a
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biologically dead river which no one wishes to live near.
While this is some time away; it is brought much closer 
every time a development decision is made in isolation 
from other legitimate existing or proposed uses in the 
catchment and without regard to cumulative impacts 
and long term sustainability. (Dodds 1991, n.p.)
Before the Rouse Hill development the catchment already con­
tained 23 sewage treatment plants for 480,000 people and supplied 
the vast majority of Sydney’s water. The Hawkesbury-Nepean catch­
ment also involved a complex set of administrative arrangements: 
12 State Ministerial Portfolios, approximately 20 major govern­
ment agencies, over 20 local government agencies, approximately 
30 state and federal members of parliament, and the Nepean- 
Hawkesbury Catchment Management Council (NHCMC) (Dodds 
1991, n.p.). Also interested in the river were a set of private parties: 
industries reliant on the river for fishing, sand extraction, and tour­
ism; environmental groups; recreational users; and nearby residents.
While initial design work on the Rouse Hill treatment plant had 
occurred in the early 1980s before much heated debate about water 
quality, the public environmental impact assessment process occurred 
in the late 1980s with the consortium proposal (Camp Scott Furphy 
1984; Water Board 1985). Problems with water quality attracted 
public attention, so the river became an increasingly important part 
of the planning agenda. As one senior planner explained: “The De­
partment of Planning just follows trends. Now all of a sudden there 
is a lot about it in the newspapers so it’s going to respond to it” 
(Claude, interview). By the time of detailed planning for the Rouse 
Hill sewage treatment plant, a significant group of decision makers 
had realized that water quality in the Hawkesbuiy-Nepean River 
might not be amenable to technical solutions.
Before that time I think the Water Board had thought 
that the treatment plant was going to, if you put in the 
world’s most sophisticated treatment plant then you’d 
have no water quality problems. But by late 1989... I 
became aware that the EIS for the [Rouse Hill] treat­
ment plant that was being done was showing that there 
may be adverse impacts that couldn ’t be managed un­
less very innovative sorts of things could be done.
(Helen, interview)
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Planned for construction in six stages, each serving 50,000 
people, the sewage treatment plant was both controversial in itself, 
as well as the major infrastructure component required for the whole 
development to occur (Water Board 1991b, 5). As such it had far 
wider implications that mere waste water treatment and became a 
focus for opposition to Rouse Hill. In its determination, or evalua­
tion, of the Rouse Hill Environmental Impact Statement document, 
the Water Board made this explicit.
Of course the implications of such a major component 
of the physical infrastructure of the North West Sector, 
and one of the first components to be constructed, are 
much wider than the sewage treatment plant and its 
direct impacts. In one sense the whole of the urban de­
velopment in the North West Sector hangs on the pro­
posal. (Water Board 1991b, 7)
The Water Board went on to highlight the tensions it faced in its 
judgments, given what at least some at the Board now saw as ques­
tionable assumptions of the regional planning process.
There must be some presumption that planning for the 
North West Sector considered the macro-environmen­
tal impacts, including regional water resources impacts, 
such that environmental determinations for essential 
component infrastructure would focus on local impacts. 
Unfortunately, this is not a reasonable presumption in 
this case with the regional planning for the area being 
underlined by the presumption that technical solutions 
will be able to correct adverse environmental impacts.
(Water Board 1991b, 7)
Given the context of the earlier Water Board and metropolitan 
planning decisions, however, the plant had to be designed within 
the framework of technical solutions. As outlined in the Environ­
mental Impact Statement, the plant included an array of post-ter­
tiary treatments such as artificial wetlands (to absorb nutrients) 
and rapids (to increase oxygen), and a second set of pipes allowed 
use of treated sewage effluent for toilet flushing and irrigation 
(Manidis Roberts 1991). Many of these measures were unique in 
Australia and all added to the capital cost of the development. Even 
combined with concerns over air quality dealt with in the previous
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chapter, however, these problems with water infrastructure were 
not enough to stop Rouse Hill totally.
Alternatives to Growth
Given these concerns over costs and pollution a number of alterna­
tives to fringe growth were suggested. Three stood out: stopping 
population growth, consolidating existing areas, and decentralizing 
urban development out of the Sydney region. By the 1980s, the last 
was considered by politicians and planners in Sydney as too 
expensive so population policies and consolidation formed the fo­
cus of the debate. By the time of the 1995 metropolitan plan, how­
ever, refocusing some growth to nearby Wollongong and Newcastle 
was proposed as a kind of compromise decentralization (DoP 1995; 
c.f. Development Corporation of New South Wales 1969).
Throughout the postwar era Sydney’s population growth proved 
to be relatively unpredictable as it was linked to the volatile na­
tional immigration program. As I explained in chapter one, the 
1980s was a period of high immigration. The peak growth through 
immigration occurred in 1989. If immigration was what was driv­
ing Sydney’s growth many in the early 1990s, before the subse­
quent immigration drop became evident, believed that preventing 
immigration would eliminate the need for Rouse Hill.
The environmental, social, and infrastructure impacts of immi­
gration had been a focus of debate in Australia for some time. The 
“Blainey Debate” of 1984 was one of the most famous contribu­
tions. It was initiated by a prominent historian who questioned the 
Australian public’s ability to adjust to high levels of Asian immigra­
tion. The subsequent controversy culminated in a federal inquiry 
that supported continuing a non-racial immigration policy with a 
high number of immigrants (Collins 1988; Committee to Advise on 
Australia’s Immigration Policies 1988).7
In the context of this recent history it was easy to accuse envi­
ronmentalists advocating cuts in immigration of being anti-Asian, 
or at least unrealistic about the foreign policy implications of re­
ducing the intake. Many environmentalists were vulnerable to these 
criticisms. It was, however, not clear whether stopping immigra­
tion would actually stop population growth in Sydney. At times of 
high immigration from overseas there was also high out-migration
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of long-term Sydney residents keeping overall growth fairly stable 
(Vipond and Ho 1992).8 Further, as immigration was a national 
policy, the state government, and those hoping to shape its policy, 
turned to acting where they could, in the policy of controlling the 
growth of developed urban land through urban consolidation.
Urban consolidation was first used as a term to indicate building 
additional dwellings within the urbanized area. Its definition was 
later expanded to include developing fringe areas at increased den­
sities (DoP 1991d). Under the first definition of urban consolida­
tion, population growth did not necessarily lead to growth at the 
fringe. Under the second definition it was assumed to occur in a part 
of the fringe, unlike Rouse Hill, with good access and easy servicing. 
The consolidation emphasis was theoretically on increasing densi­
ties around existing services and transport, although sometimes its 
implementation fell short of this ideal. The policy was supported 
by a variety of rationales including reducing infrastructure costs, 
locational disadvantage, and environmental damage, as well as in­
creasing housing choice.
Consolidation was not a new policy and throughout its history it 
had been controversial. Following the 1948 Cumberland Plan, the 
Housing Commission and private developers aligned in a pro-ex­
pansion push to undermine the plan’s vision of a compact city.
In studies published by the [Cumberland County 
CJouncil on the Economics of Urban Expansion (1958) 
it was clear that council saw considerable virtue in 
firmly consolidating growth within the existing urban 
areas bounded by the Green Belt. But by 1959 pressure 
by the Housing Commission, from developers who had 
acquired tracts of Green Belt land in the expectation of 
retraction of its boundaries, and the local councils had 
become too strong to resist. (Harrison 1971, 125)
In this context, the 1967 prelude document to the Sydney Re­
gion Outline Plan virtually wrote off consolidation as a practical 
alternative, particularly given that increases in inner area dwelling 
numbers were also counteracted strongly by declining household 
sizes.
It should be noted that although the number of dwellings 
in the City of Sydney and the Eastern and Inner-Sub-
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urbs increased by 14,000 between 1947-66, the popu­
lation of these areas declined by about 80,000 over the 
same period. This has to be taken into account in argu­
ments sometimes advanced that Sydney's population 
growth should be accommodated by redevelopment in 
the inner areas instead of by additions on the periph­
ery. (SPA 1967, 17, cf 31; also SPA 1968, 9)
In 1982, a Draft Medium Density Housing Policy was withdrawn 
following 13,000 written submissions (Munro-Clark and Thome 
1987, 27).
The 1988 Metropolitan Strategy, although cataloguing the “con­
tinued decline in population of the inner and middle suburbs” was, 
however, more hopeful about accommodating growth in existing 
areas (DoP 1988, 9).
The distribution of population within the Sydney Re­
gion is largely determined by the location of new hous­
ing. The distribution of housing in turn tends to be 
dependent on the location of available land and the 
level of government support for development in spe­
cific areas. The extent that additional housing is 
provided in the built-up areas compared to the level of 
growth in the new areas will depend on these contin­
gencies. (DoP 1988, 9)
In the early 1990s, the state Minister of Planning started to pro­
mote minimum fringe densities of 15 lots per gross hectare, up 
from yields of 8 in the early 1980s, and the federal government 
talked about national density targets (Webster 1991, n.p.; DHHCS 
1992a, 12). A state policy released in 1991 enabled the Minister of 
Planning to over-ride local councils to rezone vacant sites for multi­
unit housing (see DoP 199Id, 1991e). Local governments in outer 
areas, faced with growth pressures, also supported consolidation 
even in their own municipalities.
The state liberal government was, however, internally split on 
the issue and these internal clashes were quite public by the early 
1990s “with the Minister for Housing, Mr. Schipp, vigorously 
promoting mostly older-style [low-density] housing developments 
on the city’s fringes while the Minister for Planning, Mr. Webster, 
favored higher density housing” (Cook 1991b, 6). The manager
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of the Water Board was quoted as a “strong supporter of urban 
consolidation” (Moore 1991, 3; Wilson 1990). The 1995 metro­
politan plan was largely on the side of consolidation.
Each alternative -  consolidation or fringe expansion -  meant 
large losses to some group. Property developers with fringe urban 
land, including the Department of Housing, risked losing a huge 
investment if their land remained undeveloped, while other gov­
ernment agencies were faced with huge capital costs if expansion 
occurred. Although infrastructure costs might be lower in consoli­
dation, some construction costs were higher due to union classifi­
cations (that sharply divided houses on individual lots from other 
construction), more stringent government regulations, and high land 
prices in areas attractive enough for location to be traded off against 
size (Bird 1991b, n.p.; Roseth 1992). Union workers, government 
regulators, and land owners in existing areas would gain from the 
process of consolidation, and builders and non-union subcontrac­
tors would lose. While many argued that continued unchanneled 
urban growth would lead to declining air and water quality, a mat­
ter of great concern to existing residents and environmentalists, 
consolidation also had negative effects in reducing the options for 
home buyers to obtain new detached houses, an option regarded as 
an inalienable right by a significant proportion of Australians 
(Woolcott Research 1990, 40^43; Leyshon 1992).
In this controversial situation, attempts were made to quantify 
the advantages and disadvantages of different growth patterns.9 
Although calculating the full cost of infrastructure was a difficult 
task, several studies were carried out in Australian capital cities in 
the late 1980s finding significant cost savings on local physical 
infrastructure through consolidation (e.g. Neilson Associates 1987). 
In Sydney a Department of Planning study of four areas, including 
Rouse Hill, had found these savings occurred under a variety of 
fringe lot size and consolidation density scenarios, even where 
augmentation or replacement of physical services such as sewers 
was necessary (Hughes Trueman Ludlow 1991).10
According to the Hughes Trueman Ludlow and Dwyer Leslie 
study of the Public Sector Cost Savings o f Urban Consolidation, 
cost savings to state local governments ranged from $7,857 to 
$14,075 per dwelling at 1989-1990 prices. Overall savings to the 
community varied from $17,038 to $30,684 per dwelling. Govern-
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ment costs included sewerage, water, stormwater, gas, power, and 
telephone. Community costs added local roads and some other 
charges. The costings excluded public transport and main roads 
(Hughes Trueman Ludlow 1991, ii-v). I expect that adding public 
transport and main roads would only reinforce the findings of sig­
nificant savings.
Groups such as the Housing Industry Association questioned the 
assumptions behind these cost benefit analyses.
Part of the response to the recognition of the supply side 
problems in the housing industry has been to argue that 
urban consolidation strategies must be developed and 
implemented. As essential as such strategies may be to 
meeting increased housing demand in already large 
sprawling cities, it is not clear that they will achieve as 
large economies in associated infrastructure investment 
as is often assumed. The pressures on existing infrastruc­
ture -  including roads and public transport, water, sewer­
age and drainage systems and social and community fa­
cilities -  may well bring forward necessary expenditures 
on refurbishment and augmentation. There may be excess 
capacity in some infrastructure services (e.g.sewerage) but 
not necessarily in others (e.g.roads and public transport).
(HIA 1990,69-70; see also HIA 1992)
This was further complicated by difficulties assessing the costs 
and benefits to different parts of the community of regional facili­
ties such as opera houses and cricket grounds disproportionately 
located at the center of Sydney. Although this placement was largely 
for historical reasons, and had the advantage of superior public 
transport access, it still gave an infrastructure advantage to the cen­
ter. Others pointed out that as residential uses made up only part of 
the urban area, increasing residential densities would have only a 
limited effect on sprawl.
The arguments of groups like the Housing Industry Association, 
were in turn questioned in terms of specific infrastructure compo­
nents by groups like the Water Board:
As some of the Board's infrastructure in the older 
suburbs is ageing and in need of repair or replacement,
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expenditure on these systems will be necessary irrespec­
tive of consolidation taking place. Urban consolida­
tion will help to maintain the populations in areas where 
it has been declining, thus utilising existing systems 
more efficiently and making the replacement of ageing 
infrastructure more cost-effective. (Water Board 1991c,
4-5)
The Water Board was also in the process of identifying areas where 
declining household sizes had led to excess capacity.
A larger issue, beyond the potential for cost savings, involved 
the equity implications of changing urban form, and the way ser­
vices were priced and paid for, two separate issues that were often 
linked in the consolidation debate. This passage from Westerman’s 
report to WSROC outlines the dilemma.
The proposition of charging the full costs [of physical 
infrastructure] in new urbanising areas raises an im­
portant equity issue which needs to be addressed. Ex­
isting urban areas of Sydney have been developed with 
hidden subsidies and without the higher environmental 
standards which are demanded today and [these 
developments] have contributed to the water and air 
pollution which now force a radical change in devel­
opment practices. These areas enjoy a high level of ac­
cessibility and services, which is not reflected in rates 
and charges. Why should the new areas be required to 
bear the full infrastructure cost when those in existing 
areas do not? (Westerman 199], n.p.)
The Water Board proposed an alternative view.
The concept of equity is often taken to mean continued 
promotion of the quarter acre block (because that's what 
everyone else has) and no up front infrastructure pay­
ments (because it wasn't done before) and is somewhat 
nefarious. If we are interested in having sustainable hous­
ing development and sustainable environments, etc., then 
the mistakes and excessive resource consumption of the 
past cannot be continued under the guise of equity, just 
as environmental rigour is demand to a greater extent 
now than in the past. (Water Board 1991c,8-9)
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Unresolved, these issues of equity, financing, sustainability, and 
the roles of suburban housing in the Australian way of life, were 
crucial background to debates over Rouse Hill as consolidation 
was the major alternative to its development (see also Murphy and 
Burnley 1990, 173-174).
Planning and Change
The years from 1968 were years of change in the planning context 
of Rouse Hill, as they were for many places. In particular the pe­
riod of the late 1980s and early 1990s was a crucial one in Sydney. 
The speed and severity of the changes, if only changes in “under­
standing,” were exemplified by the decision to revise the 1988 Met­
ropolitan Strategy soon after its publication (DoP 1992). The 1988 
metropolitan plan came at the very beginning of a growing aware­
ness both of the costs of fringe development and of environmental 
problems. Although flagging some emerging problems with growth 
and the potential for more compact development, the 1988 plan’s 
basic premises were firmly behind fringe expansion.
The development of new urban areas on Sydney*s fringe 
will ensure the continuing availability of housing for 
the growing population, especially low-income families 
who are purchasing their first homes. (DoP 1988, 11)
A population of 3.5 million exerts pressures on the physi­
cal environment of a city. Fortunately, many of the en­
vironmental problems still experienced in other major 
cities have been solved for the most part in Sydney, while 
the air and beaches are relatively unpolluted. (DoP 
1988, 27)
This confidence was short lived. As Gabrielle Kibble, Director 
of the Department of Planning, announced only three years later:
Since the strategy was published a number of signifi­
cant changes have occurred. These changes include a 
better understanding of the impact of urban expansion 
on air and water quality, improved understanding of 
the cost of developing new sectors and the need to make 
better use of existing urban areas, changes in the way
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employment areas work and the need to take into ac­
count the opportunities presented by surplus govern­
ment sites. (Kibble 1991, n.p).
Thus Rouse Hill’s final planning was conducted in a period of in­
tense questioning of old patterns of development.
/  suppose it's common in any planning situation that 
the plan has probably been prepared sometime in the 
past, and the adage that it's immediately out of date 
and not representing contemporary expectations. It was 
a period I suppose when those expectations were chang­
ing quite rapidly, although [not?] unlike any time in 
the past. But once again the planning had not kept up 
with community expectations and the approach that the 
government was starting to take on urban development.
So you had the regional environmental planning being 
done in the mid-eighties. And now the [Water] Board 
coming on with the first major bit of infrastructure that's 
proposed for that catchment, having to go through a 
process that you would normally expect regional plan­
ning to have done at some time in the past. (Andrew, 
interview)
The decision to develop Rouse Hill was not made at one mo­
ment but rather involved a series of incremental actions. The 
North West Sector was at first a tentative oval mark on the Sydney 
Region Outline Plan, but a mark that meant that people could claim 
that the North West Sector had been “planned” since 1968 as, in a 
sense, it had been. A series of planning studies and plans strongly 
shaped the way the project could be discussed. They kept the focus 
on growth. As problems arose with the development someone -  
particularly expansionists and developers -  came up with a way to 
go ahead. Without major disruptions or catastrophes people con­
tinually adjusted to new information and revised the planning in a 
partial way, enough to allow Rouse Hill to go on. The timing of the 
different problems was crucial to an understanding of Rouse Hill. 
Their gradual unfolding, at least up to the 1990s, enabled solutions 
to be found one at a time, and undermined opponents’ abilities to 
paint the development as a disaster.
An increasingly severe set of environmental problems were 
resolved by implementing increasingly expensive mitigation
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technologies, to the point that the possibility of realizing the 
development’s original purpose of providing a large proportion of 
its housing to lower-income first-home buyers was uncertain. Al­
though the overall corridor was scaled back in the 1995 metropoli­
tan plan, this was too late to stop the first stage. Once the planning 
process was locked in it seemed to generate itself, although at any 
time the absence of funding could have stalled it completely. In 
this way the formal planning process was partly superseded by the 
consortium proposal to privately finance and build mandated in­
frastructure and push the development along. Although constrained 
and shaped by the planning system, as I show in chapter five, this 
proposal also reshaped the development to reflect consortium 
priorities.
End Notes
1 The term “speculator’s guide” was quite a common one in planning circles.
2 Local governments were also constrained in their opportunities for comment 
on plans (e.g. Blacktown City Council 1984, 1987).
3 The project kept a fairly diverse range of consultants occupied throughout the 
1980s (e.g. Hirst et al. 1989; Howard Tanner and Associates 1984; Kinhill 
Engineers 1989; Logan and Luscombe 1984; Nesbitt and Donahee 1990; 
Sinclair Knight Buchanan 1989a, 1989b).
4 Stretton’s example is that under a one percent real interest rate a $10 million 
increase in annual debt service allowed a government to borrow $ 1000 million, 
but under an eight percent real interest rate it could only borrow about $130 
million for the same increase in annual debt burden (Stretton 1989, xl).
5 These debates were carried out both in journals such as Urban Policy and Research 
and through government sponsored research (e.g. DoP 1990; Hughes Trueman 
Ludlow 1991; Kirwan 1990; Lang 1990; Murphy and Burnley 1990; Payne 1990; 
Wilmoth 1990).
6 Much of this concern with water quality actually came from within govern­
ment (e.g. Burgess no date; DoP 1989b; Camp Scott Furphy and Hawkesbury 
Agricultural College 1988; DoP 1989b; Water Board 1990; Wilson 1990).
7 The early 1990s was a time of significant work on environmental and infra­
structure issues associated with immigration (e.g. Clark et a l  1990; Fincher 
1991; Murphy et al. 1990; National Population Council 1992).
8 One explanation for this process is that immigrants create a demand for housing 
making it attractive for long-term residents to sell up and relocate to cheaper 
areas. When overseas migration slows, this demand lessens and fewer people 
leave Sydney.
9 Frank (1989) reviewed similar studies for the United States concluding 
that contiguous and medium-density development is less expensive to build
122 CONSTRUCTING SUBURBS
and service that detached housing and non-contiguous growth (see also 
Real Estate Research Corporation 1974). These findings have been con­
tested however in methodological terms (e.g. Windsor 1979). Moreover 
sprawl is not necessarily expensive in terms of such variables as commuting 
time by automobile (Gordon and Wong 1985).
10 Consolidation scenarios were at densities of 18, 25, 50 and 150 dwelling per 
net hectare (including local roads). Fringe development was at lot sizes of 
840,660,450 and 380 meters squared. Although the authors were vague about 
comparing these figures, in an appendix they say a lot size of 500 meters 
squared would deliver a density of 20 dwelling per net hectare, a figure that 
would seem to ignore local roads as a hectare is 10,000 square meters. In very 
rough terms the lower-density consolidation scenarios approximate the smaller 
lot sizes (Hughes Trueman Ludlow 1991, iii-iv, appendix D9).
C hapter F ive
Hard and Soft Privatization: 
Unequal Impacts of Government 
Withdrawal
The Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium (RHIC) involved in 
physical or “hard” infrastructure, and the Rouse Hill Community 
Planning Team (RHCPT) dealing with social or “soft” infrastruc­
ture, both officially emerged in 1989. The groups were alliances of 
government and non-government organizations brought together 
at the instigation of state government bureaucrats as both lobby 
groups and alternative providers of services. As the development 
came close to a halt in the mid-1980s because of concerns over 
costs to government, the two groups -  particularly the consortium -  
provided a means of continuing the project.
The Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium, a joint venture be­
tween the state Department of Housing and private developers, 
was exclusively concerned with providing those services critical 
for state and local government approval of the project. Although 
subject to an increasingly expensive set of environmental require­
ments and the focus of a high level of suspicion by other profes­
sionals, they seized the initiative in privatizing, gaining a large 
amount of control over both the form and timing of development. 
In contrast the Rouse Hill Community Planning Team, a group of 
non-profit and local government service providers, fought for fund­
ing for a set of social services that were not mandated and for 
which many earlier lower- and middle-income fringe (sub)urban 
developments were still waiting. The group was the reluctant heir 
of service privatization.
Privatization allowed this increasingly expensive development 
to proceed and for the group providing hard infrastructure the re­
sult was a net again; they paid for more services but could at least
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develop their land. Further, for this developer group, as privatization 
was only partial they still benefited from many government pro­
vided services. For the RHCPT, that tended to move toward a 
consolidationist perspective and whose members were providing 
social infrastructure, the result was less positive. The increasingly 
dispersed population became increasingly expensive to service, par­
ticularly given service backlogs in earlier fringe developments. The 
privatization process, then, had different effects on different forms 
of infrastructure even within Rouse Hill.
Two studies recently published at the time of my initial fieldwork 
frame these findings. Dear (1989) had examined how privatization 
was represented in academic writing by planners, noting how par­
ticular sectors or perspectives -  social planning and social reform -  
had been marginalized in this privatization debate.1 As I described 
in chapter two, Pusey (1991,41) also found that compared with eco­
nomic issues, images of society were quite weakly articulated by 
elite Australian bureaucrats.
However, rather than seeing this marginalization of social con­
cerns as an inevitable outcome of recent privatization policies and 
economic rationalism, it seems to have a longer history. New-town 
style urban development throughout the postwar period, and in a 
number of English-speaking countries, has generally given high­
est priority to such social services as recreation facilities and shop­
ping, with other facilities being less uniformly available (see Aldridge 
1979; Marans and Zehner 1974; Osborn and Whittick 1969). Since 
the early 1980s state government planning documents had also 
been telling eloquent stories about the need for social infrastruc­
ture in Rouse Hill but had only mandated “hard” infrastructure as 
a development prerequisite. In Rouse Hill this inequality between 
hard and soft infrastructure under privatization reflected more than 
the privatization process itself, drawing on both a longer-lived set 
of policy priorities favoring physical services as well as a set of 
underlying differences in the ability to recapture or reallocate money 
spent on hard and soft infrastructure.
This chapter describes the two coalitions both through their self­
representations and the representations of others. Each story deals 
in turn with the coalition’s members, reasons for forming, devel­
opment through the early 1990s, financing, and political activities. 
I then analyze their images as consortium and team, their concen-
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trations on physical infrastructure versus community planning, and 
differences in their power over Rouse Hill. I particularly explore 
how those involved in Rouse Hill’s privatization represented their 
roles, how these representations were treated by others, and how 
the power of their representations interacted with other forms 
of power. For example, while the consortium claimed that its 
work would provide a broad public benefit, this interpretion was 
treated with suspicion by many other professionals and activists. 
The difficulty of finding detailed information about the consortium’s 
activities intensified this suspicion. The Rouse Hill Community 
Planning Team, in contrast, probably had a more interesting story to 
tell about the quality of life of the residents of outer suburban areas 
but lacked the political and economic power to have it heard. Par­
tial privatization also imposed costs on the general public both 
in terms of continued government expenditure and of reduced 
openness and accountability. An urban development strategy that 
reduced the need for suburban expansion may have reduced or lim­
ited these costs.
Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium
Until the mid 1980s, the practice in urban development in Sydney 
was that public bodies put in place most physical and social infra­
structure in new suburbs. In the late 1980s that practice was chal­
lenged. As described in the previous chapter, the high cost of 
infrastructure made at least some privatization attractive.
In Rouse Hill, the 1986 Draft Regional Environmental Plan 
estimated state and local government infrastructure costs at AUS$ 
2,500 million. By 1989 the estimated cost had risen to $3,090 mil­
lion or $44,000 per lot, although it was possible some of this could 
be recovered from developers (DEP 1986b, 81; DoP 1989a, 23). 
As I explained in chapter four, in 1992 the Water Board released 
estimates of $53,300 per lot for putting a similar package of physi­
cal and social infrastructure in the Rouse Hill area, although in­
creased developer contributions kept the cost to government at 
$30,000 per lot (see table 2). With these large and growing costs 
Rouse Hill’s planning came close to a halt in 1987.
In March 1988 a Liberal government interested in privatization 
replaced Labor at the state level (e.g. State Development 1990).
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The Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium was officially proposed 
in that year, involving the Department of Housing and other large 
landowners. The aimed to finance water infrastructure in Rouse 
Hill as it was the key service required for development approval. 
The consortium’s story shows how a group of powerful public and 
private sector developers pushed through a privatization proposal 
where they gained the development initiative and where much of 
the cost was retained by others parts of government.
At the time of its formal registration as a company in 1989 the 
RHIC involved AHL Properties and Lauriston Development that 
owned over 135 hectares, North Sydney Brick and Tile with 385 
hectares, and the Department of Housing with over 800 hectares 
(see chapter one). Other developers joined the group later (see Fig­
ure 9).2 Although most of the Department of Housing’s holdings 
had been bought for public rental housing by the then Housing 
Commision, by the late 1980s this had been amalgamated with 
land in the sale program (Land Commission) and the exact split 
between rental and sale was unclear into the 1990s.
The initial concept behind the Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consor­
tium was to provide funding for and carry out the design, con­
struction, and commissioning of water infrastructure to service the 
first stage of the Rouse Hill Development Area over a period of 
approximately 15 years and in 11 or 12 “precincts.”3 The consortium 
also agreed to contribute a small proportion of the construction 
cost of major roads, a contribution that in 1989 totaled $440 mil­
lion (Baulkham Hills Shire Council 1991).
The consortium’s investment was attractive to them because 
keeping land for long periods involved high “holding costs”-  the 
interest payments on loans and the costs of lost opportunities for 
other investments. By paying for some physical infrastructure their 
land would be developed earlier than if it had to wait for the Water 
Board’s own timing. This saving in time was a saving in holding 
costs. In addition, the consortium hoped to build the infrastructure 
more cheaply by using private sector principles in design and con­
struction. In public explanations the consortium generally expressed 
its goals in terms of the community benefits of increased land sup­
ply and affordability (e.g. Nedeljkovic 1991, 4).
The first stage of the Rouse Hill Development Area involved around 
20,000 to 23,000 lots and a potential population of 70,000. Around
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Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium 
Registered: February 1989
Principal Activity: Urban Infrastructure Development 
Total value of shares in 1993: $60 (60 shares at $1 each)
Shareholders and Directors (to 1993)
AHL Property (previously Hooker Mercantile and Onmax), 10 shares 
Alan Zammit, Director since July 1990 
Brendan Crotty, Director from March 1989 (also Lauriston)
Robert Brown, Director March 1989 to July 1990 (also Lauriston) 
NSW Land and Housing Corporation (Department of Housing),
10 shares
Richard Flint, Director from March 1989 
Peter Dransfield, Director from March 1989 
Graham French, Director from November 1991 
Graham Trilby, 10 shares
Bruce Lyon, Director from July 1990 
Lauriston Development, 10 shares
Brendan Crotty, Director from March 1989 (also AHL Property) 
Robert Brown, Director March 1989 to July 1990 (also AHL 
Property)
North Sydney Brick and Tile, 10 shares
Douglas Lanceley, Director March 1989 to July 1990 
David Magney, Director September 1992 to October 1992 
Stocklands (Constructors), 10 shares
Robert Welsh, Director since July 1990 
Peter Daly, Director since November 1991 
Member not on board ofRHIC shareholder companies
Donald Dwyer, Gutteridge, Haskins, Davies, Director March 1989 to 
November 1991
Figure 9 Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium Shareholders and Directors 
Sources: Australian Securities Commission (1992, 1993); Department o f  
Housing (1989, 1990, 1991).
13,200 lots or 42,000 people were in precinct one, the precinct with 
the most consortium land. The cost of water infrastructure for the 
first precinct was well over $200 million. This included: water res­
ervoirs and trunk mains for potable (drinking) water and for treated 
effluent in the innovative dual use system; stage one of the sewage
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treatment plant including artificial wetlands and riffle zones for high- 
level tertiary treatment; and various other sewers, mains, and drain­
age works. Even in the first precinct, however, consortium land was 
only about one third of developable land (Feizkhah 1994,12; Manidis 
Roberts 1991; Zannetides 1991, 1-2, 4—5).
The mechanics of the process were that the consortium, as a 
non-profit company, would raise money to pay for the approxi­
mately $500 million worth of water infrastructure works in the 
whole of stage one. The consortium would then be repaid in three 
ways. First, consortium members would pay the consortium for 
their share of infrastructure at the time of construction (Zannetides 
1991, 6). Second, other property developers would continue to pay 
capital contributions, known as Section 27 contributions, to the 
consortium via the Water Board at the time of development. Under 
the consortium arragements these would be calculated to reflect 
the total cost more exactly than in the past. For those parts of stage 
one not developed within five years of completion of construction 
the Water Board agreed to buy the outstanding debt (Feizkhah 1994, 
5). In early documents this buyout period was three years (e.g. 
Nedeljkovic 1991). At this time the Water Board would own and 
maintain the entire system including that part paid for by the con­
sortium and by earlier Section 27 contributions. The Water Board 
would be able to pay off some of the remaining debt through fur­
ther collections of Section 27 contributions, including an interest 
component, as land was eventually developed (Macquarie Bank 
1989,3; Phelan 1992; Zannetides 1991). Although the consortium’s 
purpose was to have its land developed first, it was in the Water 
Board’s interest to have non-consortium land developed as they 
would receive consortium contributions whether or not consortium 
land was developed while non-consortium landowners only paid 
for infrastructure at the time of development. Although some 
accounts tried to argue that this deferral arrangement would 
virtually eliminate the Water Board’s financial responsibilities, 
other accounts from the consortium and Water Board talked only 
of “significant deferral” and “significant reduction” of Water Board 
expenses.4
The project was widely seen as an example of innovative financ­
ing.5 As a result, the chief executive of the Rouse Hill Infrastruc­
ture Consortium was in demand as a speaker at conferences during
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the early 1990s. As a private venture, however, the consortium was 
not subject to Freedom of Information regulations and so apart 
from information released at these (generally expensive) confer­
ences, and brief mentions in rather dispersed reports, the exact 
details of the financial arrangements between the Water Board and 
the consortium were not made public in the early 1990s. Further, 
the agreements with the Water Board were lengthy, complex, and 
in negotiation for a long time, and so publicly available informa­
tion was often several years out of date. This lack of public infor­
mation was an additional cost of privatized development.
Crucial to an assessment of the costs and benefits of privatization, 
were the various assumptions about rates of development. Of most 
concern was the consortium’s assumption of a high development 
rate as lower rates would force the Water Board into an expensive 
buyout. In the early 1980s the maximum development rate in the 
Rouse Hill Development Area had been set at 3000 to 3500 lots 
per year based on estimates of private development at 1000 lots 
per year, and Department of Housing production at 1000 lots of 
public housing and 1000 lots for sale. It also took into account 
Water Board, local government, and human service capacities 
(DEP 1986b, 17-18; DoP 1988, 47). A figure of 2000 lots was 
seen as more achievable (Searle 1984, n.p). These 3000 and 2000 
lot figures were used by the consortium (e.g. Macquarie Bank 1989, 
3). The consortium idea was floated in a very buoyant resi­
dential property market. In Sydney, house prices rose 19 percent 
in 1987 and 41 percent in 1988, a gain that contrasted favorably 
with the 1987 stock market crash (Wood and Bushe-Jones 1991, 
13; Boylen 1991).
In 1988 a study prepared for the Department of Housing, how­
ever, found that development rates in single areas (or “fronts”) in 
Sydney were generally around 300 lots per year, one-tenth of the 
estimated production at Rouse Hill, with “little scope for substan­
tially increasing development rates” (Cardew 1988, 61). In 1990 
and 1991, the Indicative Planning Council for the Housing Indus­
try -  a joint public-private organization -  estimated lot production 
in Rouse Hill at betwen 900 and 1800 lots per year with the higher 
figure described as “optimistic” (DITAC 1990, 65-66; see also 
DITAC 1991, 57). The worldwide recession of the early 1990s also 
affected this residential property market significantly, making
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investment in residential property less attractive to both large inves­
tors and individual home buyers and making even 2000 lots per year 
seem a high figure.
These different analyses had important implications for the rela­
tive risks to the consortium and other parts of government. At lower 
development rates the cost to the Water Board of its commitment 
to buy out the consortium after five years could be very high. Al­
though the consortium paid for the infrastructure on its land at the 
time of construction, consortium land was not a majority of land in 
the Rouse Hill Development Area. As the consortium was in con­
trol of infrastructure construction and phasing, members were in a 
good position to market their land quickly. If development was 
slower than 3000 lots per year, or even the 2000 lot alternative 
scenario, it was likely that the undeveloped lots would not belong 
to those in the consortium. However, it was these non-consortium 
lots that were costly to the Water Board as it had to pay for the 
infrastructure servicing them after five years while not collecting 
payments for the infrastructure until the land was developed. In a 
worst case scenario, a low development rate would leave little non­
consortium land developed and the Water Board footing the bill 
for the majority of the Rouse Hill Development Area infrastruc­
ture. This was an improvement over the situation where the Water 
Board financed all infrastructure up front. However, without the 
consortium’s pressure Rouse Hill may have been kept on hold much 
longer also deferring Water Board expenditures in this expensive- 
to-develop area, particularly as serviced land was available in other 
parts of the Sydney region.
While quite technical, and often buried in reports and submis­
sions that were not widely distributed, enough of this discussion 
circulated to reinforce a more general perception that the Depart­
ment of Housing in alliance with private developers had devised 
the consortium arrangement to reduce the DoH’s own (holding) 
costs. The Department of Housing pursued this goal even though 
the resulting urban growth would mean greater expense to other 
departments and to the government as a whole. They refused to 
budge from an outdated metropolitan planning process, a process 
that favored growth.
Consortium members certainly used their financial power and 
government connections to ensure development continued,
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including putting the local governments under pressure to work 
quickly and threatening them with a loss of planning powers. As 
two local government employees remarked:
We were under enormous pressure to deal with all these 
issues and we [were] aware of the state government 
being an important player and stakeholder in the whole 
exercise and the pressure being exerted by the consor­
tium. I don’t think any one of those players will deny 
that there was pressure being exerted because there was.
(Edward, interview)
[The state government]keep[s] on telling us we've got 
to be financially responsible, we've got to assess the 
financial implications of all the planning we do. Yet we 
were forced into doing this, really railroaded and threat­
ened with loss of planning powers and goodness knows 
what if we didn 't put through the [local rezoning] plan.
(Eric, interview)
The consortium’s own financial arrangements remained unclear 
during the recession of the early 1990s, but by late 1992 financing 
had been organized from a syndicate of banks to build and com­
mission the sewage treatment plant (Phelan 1992). However, in 
1993 the Water Board publicly acknowledged that it did “not know 
what the services would cost in the long term” (Southern 1993a, 4; 
1993b).
In terms of preliminary estimates of development rates, resi­
dents started moving in during 1994. Development rates were 
around 500 per year in year one (1993-1994) and 600 in the sec­
ond year with 1000 per year expected over the next five years. 
However, with the property market in a slump it was unlikely to 
reach 1000 lots per year very quickly (Cardew 1997). In addition, 
local officials worried that the consortium was only putting in mini­
mal physical infrastructure in the early precincts, necessitating 
augmentation if the development took off (RHCPT Minutes, 17 
February 1994).
Issues of finance were not only problems faced by the consortium 
in developing its water infrastructure. Changes in the regulation of 
pollution sources had a significant influence, increasing the cost of 
anti-pollution technologies in the sewerage and drainage systems.
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Certain design features of the water infrastructure, including the 
decision to have one large sewage treatment plant, were inherited by 
the consortium that was then forced into finding increasingly so­
phisticated technical fixes for the problems that arose from these 
decisions. This occurred even as many greener elements of the Wa­
ter Board questioned these fixes and the development as a whole.6
The story of the consortium is thus the story of a partnership 
between private developers and a pro-development government de­
partment proposing privatization as a way of dealing with the high 
up-front costs of new development. While there were alternatives 
to development, with the help of Joe Schipp, the powerful Minis­
ter of Housing in the Liberal-National Party government, the con­
sortium was able to override these objections. However, many state 
and local government agencies and officials expressed concern at 
being forced into paying for a large number of physical and social 
services in the mixed-income housing area. Others were also wor­
ried about the overall costs to government. As one local govern­
ment professional explained:
We had the state government election in May [1991] 
and the most notable decision, from our point of view, 
that happened after that was the Minister for the 
Water Board became [the same person as] the Minister 
for Housing. And it was only I think a week after the 
[election]... that these insurmountable problems with 
the plant had been sorted out and the plant was given 
an approval. Otherwise no housing could have oc­
curred. And it's our cynical view that the Department 
of Housing's probably won yet again and they'll get 
what they want, when they want, where they want. (Eric, 
interview)
Rouse Hill Community Planning Team
The second public-private alliance operating in Rouse Hill -  the 
Rouse Hill Community Planning Team -  was formed in 1989 shortly 
after the consortium was registered. The story of the RHCPT is of a 
group struggling to define its role in the development within a con­
text of quite limited resources.
Over the years a number of interdepartmental working groups, 
Department of Planning officers, and local government groups had
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come up with an evolving list of “baseline” human services for the 
Rouse Hill area.7 The Rouse Hill Human Services Working Group, 
an interdepartmental committee formed in late 1988, “identified 
that non-government agencies could also play a major role in 
providing adequate services” (Notes.... 1989, n.p.; Green 1988). 
Following a seminar called by the Department of Planning in Sep­
tember 1989, the Rouse Hill Community Planning Team was 
formed as a planning and advocacy group for human service pro­
viders (RHCPT 1992b, 1).
Rouse Hill Community Planning Team meetings included local 
government officers and non-government groups such as churches, 
the Boy Scouts, the Red Cross, organizations serving immigrants, 
and public health groups. Government bodies were classed as “re­
source” members of the team while non-govemment groups were 
classed as full members. Representatives from federal government 
community service agencies, and from the offices of members of 
state parliament, attended from time to time. Some members of 
the group were from the local area, but others represented metro­
politan-wide organizations; the organizers of the initial seminar 
were particularly interested in increasing the level of knowledge 
about the Rouse Hill area for these city-wide groups.
The goals of the group were reformulated several times. By 1992 
the team had reached a succinct statement, that they were involved 
in: “informing the community of what was taking place in the 
region; and advocating on behalf of future residents in the North 
West Sector for the timely, adequate an appropriate provision of 
community services” (RHCPT 1992b, 1; Southam 1992). These 
aims reflected team members’ experiences working in the local 
area and dealing with the problems of earlier land releases.
From an initial emphasis on individual organizations coming 
together to further their separate concerns, the group developed 
toward an interest and involvement in larger issues including in­
frastructure finance, transport, and public health. This interest in 
broader issues, however, caused many on the team to question the 
whole development, leading to a series of intense discussions. The 
issue was a difficult one. As the Rouse Hill Community Planning 
Team members learned more about the Rouse Hill development 
they became more uneasy about it. They worried that transporta­
tion would be underfunded and this would lead to social isolation.
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They were concerned about the public health impacts of building 
in an area with high smog levels. However, the evidence that 
produced this sense of unease frequently took a long time to un­
derstand and was often in areas -  environmental standards, state 
government finance -  in which their organizations had no exper­
tise. Even if they protested the development they were unlikely to 
stop it. Even if the development was stopped many of their organi­
zations would need to provide services for the same increase in 
population in another location, although locations in established 
areas would have some existing services to build upon and would 
not need as many new buildings. While many team members felt 
that the Rouse Hill development could have negative social conse­
quences, they felt that persuading their organizations to oppose 
the development was impossible. The team finally decided that 
while many of its members did not support Rouse Hill’s develop­
ment as individuals, they needed to be pragmatic and represent 
their organizations in making human service provision in Rouse 
Hill as effective as possible (e.g. RHCPT Minutes 21 October 1991, 
21 May 1992).
Crucial for the team was the apparent lack of government or 
consortium commitment to providing a set of basic human 
services they could then augment. In its early planning the 
Department of Environment and Planning had included both 
community services and physical infrastructure in its list of “basic 
services on new housing estates” (DEP 1986b, 15; DEP 1984a, 
211-213). However, none of the planning documents specified how 
human services would be funded. Moreover, the legal instrument 
of the Regional Environmental Plan tied development approval by 
local governments to the provision of only some of these “basic” 
services: “water, sewerage, drainage and power” leading to the 
consortium’s focus (DoP 1989a, 28).
Thus physical services, dubbed “hard infrastructure” in devel­
opment circles, had priority over “soft infrastructure” or human 
services. The division between infrastructure as engineering and 
earthmoving, with large budgets and workforces dominated by men, 
and infrastructure based in interpersonal skills, with smaller bud­
gets and workforces dominated by women or by men in caring 
professions, was also reflected in the state budgetary process 
(Connell 1990, 524; Masterplan Consultants 1987, 20-21). Of
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public utilities needed in Rouse Hill, electricity and water were 
both provided “off-budget” where the supplier of the service, al­
though part of the government, was an agency that charged for its 
services and was mainly funded by user charges and not from gen­
eral tax revenues. Telephone was at that time provided by a federal 
government corporation, gas by a private company, waste disposal 
by local councils, and so none of these represented a drain on state 
government funds. Although the state had committed itself to 
an“intermediate” transport corridor to Rouse Hill’s regional com­
mercial center, most probably a bus right-of-way, buses in the area 
would be privately operated. Only roads, traditionally provided by 
state government in the case of arterial roads, presented a large 
initial drain on the state budget. However, not until the early 1990s, 
when the state roads authority began to suffer cutbacks, did road 
provision become a major problem (e.g. Department of Transport 
1992).
While most physical infrastructure was either self-financing or 
not provided by the state level of government, this was not the case 
for social infrastructure. In Rouse Hill, early suggestions that the 
state government should buy up land and use the profits from 
commercial land development and from land rezoning to pay for 
human services were rejected (DEP 1984b, 21). Thus community 
service financing involved potentially difficult transfers of resources 
from one area to another within the state government. However, as 
the transfers did not need to be made until planning was far pro­
gressed and populations about to arrive, they had little influence on 
the initial decision to develop (Masterplan Consultants 1987, 21).
Although human service funding sources were not clearly stated 
in any of the plans, costs were gradually released. In a 1992 docu­
ment the state Department of Community Services (DCS) estimated 
that over 15 years its community services in Rouse Hill would cost 
a total of around $25.3 million for capital works and $127.4 mil­
lion for recurrent funding (DCS 1992, n.p.). Given that the state­
wide recurrent budget for the Department of Community Services 
was about one-tenth of either Education or Health, this Department 
of Community Service costing was presumably only a small part of 
the total human services budget. Although much of the human ser­
vice budget was tied to population alone, capital costs were related 
to urban expansion.
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Problems of human service funding were exacerbated by the 
large backlogs in servicing areas of western Sydney developed in 
the 1970s and 1980s (DoP 1988,23,47). The consortium proposal, 
involving a very fragmented land release pattern on four “fronts”, 
merely reinforced this problem. (The use of “front” was quite 
confusing in this debate as the Rouse Hill Development Area was 
often considered one or two fronts in terms of housing markets but 
four fronts in terms of human service provision.) As the RHCPT 
stated publicly, Rouse Hill was “on the fringe of the fringe” (RHCPT 
1992b, 3).
Although there were numerical standards for human service pro­
vision, with the exception of school education these were gener­
ally ignored. Part of the team’s strategy was thus to attempt to 
make human service standards more binding, to create a firm 
“baseline.” As team members discussed in one general meeting:
John:... If Sydney has to grow; let’s do it the best way.
This team doesn ’t have to get caught up with the jug­
gernaut of the western suburbs.
Oliver: [The environmentalist who had talked to the 
group at a previous meeting] let us off the hook, as 
if everything is done well the development could go 
ahead. The problem is it probably won ’t be done well 
in areas like transport and water. And from our 
perpective, looking at the backlog estates, we can warn 
about the problems that could be avoided. And we need 
to draw a line, a baseline below which we can ’t accept 
the development.
Sam: I wasn ’t here last week but does anyone here 
really believe we ’re in a position to stop things and go 
back to ground level?
Maria: I don’t think we have to look at it like that but 
we need to bring pressure to bear. And unless we think 
we have some influence we may as well go home.
Sam: I think the influence we have is that it’s the first 
time we ’re in before the development is.
Oliver: ...We have influence if we get our facts 
straight, and concentrate where our expertise is.
Laura: ...We can have a significant part in the whole 
picture.
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Matthew: I'm Matthew from [a federal government 
human service agency]. We're interested to get in at 
the ground floor into the area, [in a way that is] suit­
able for the community. And unless there's a strong 
voice at the outset community services could stay at a 
mediocre level.
(Meeting Q, notes)
Obviously, creating a baseline was not their only strategy. In their 
very next statements several other areas of influence were raised: 
alliances, the timing of their own investments, and knowledge in 
their areas of expertise.
Supplementing these strategies the Rouse Hill Community Plan­
ning Team members tried to do what the scientific environmental­
ists had done, argue for their planning interests in economic terms. 
This strategy of arguing in economic terms has a long history in 
Australia (see Sandercock 1990, 67). The team searched for stud­
ies of the long-term economic costs of failing to provide human 
services in an adequate and timely manner, but studies of human 
services tended to be anecdotal or based on non-economic mea­
sures like user satisfication.8 Further, the team did not have 
the expertise, resources, or time to undertake this kind of research. 
Making human services seem critical was a difficult task in 
the face of the compellingly argued and quantifiable economic 
and environmental problems facing western Sydney and the 
government’s history of emphasizing physical infrastructure.
The data problem spurred the team to develop its own “dos­
sier” or information package for use when members approached 
politicians and bureaucrats, stressing the long-team problems of 
inadequate human service provision. It was the basis of a public 
meeting held in October 1992 with approximately 70 people at­
tending (RHCPT 1992a, 1992b).
By 1993 the group decided its mission was clear enough to con­
sider holding a joint public meeting with local progress associa­
tions and with environmental groups -  organizations that the team 
might disagree with but who also represented the “community” 
(RHCPT Minutes, 16 June 1993). The group was still meeting in 
1998, working on baselines, networking with other groups, attend­
ing state-level meetings, and meeting the new residents.
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Consorting and Teamwork
The previous sections have sketched out the histories and activi­
ties of the RHIC and RHCPT. The rest of the chapter compares the 
two groups in terms of their public representations, using this to 
assess the mixed impacts of privatization on issues such as ac­
countability, responsiveness, and government spending.
The Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium and the Rouse Hill 
Community Planning Team, although in many ways occupying 
fundamentally different roles in Rouse Hill, still shared some char­
acteristics. The catalyst for both coalitions came from public 
servants concerned about continuing policies in the context of de­
creasing government funds for development. In the case of the RHIC 
the instigators were bureaucrats at a high level in the Department 
of Housing interested in continuing low-density suburban growth 
in areas where they owned land. For the RHCPT the instigators 
were middle-level professionals concerned with planning for, and 
providing, human services. These bureaucrats formed the groups 
to become external power bases maintaining pressure on the state 
government to promote fringe urban development and to provide 
human services in new areas. The groups were more than external 
power bases, however, in that they were in the position to actually 
take over government responsibilities in those areas where it was 
clear that government had withdrawn or wanted to withdraw: wa­
ter infrastructure, and some social services.
These privatization moves were, however, partial. The consor­
tium included a government department and water infrastructure 
developed by the consortium would eventually be owned and op­
erated by the Water Board. In addition, the move to “up-front” 
payments was arguably not so different from the previous rating 
(taxing) system. Many Rouse Hill Community Planning Team 
members were at least partly government funded and some of the 
services they were advocating had rarely been provided in a timely 
manner by government and so their absence could not strictly be 
called privatization.
Privatization was, however, important in Rouse Hill. Without 
the Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium, Rouse Hill may well 
have remained stalled in the planning process, halted by a lack of 
funds. The Rouse Hill Community Planning Team was potentially
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an innovative way to ensure that a network of non-government 
human services was put in place in a timely and coordinated man­
ner. Although the groups had very different levels of commitment 
to the idea of Rouse Hill, on some level they performed similar 
functions.
The coalitions’ names reflect this pattern of basic similarity along 
with some differences. In Australian usage a team is “a number of 
persons associated in some joint action.” Meanwhile a consortium, 
is l .“ a combination of financial institutions, capitalists, etc., for 
carrying into effect some financial operation requiring large re­
sources of capital. 2. an association or union” (Concise Macquarie 
Dictionary). Thus the meaning of team and the second definition 
of consortium -  as association -  are virtually interchangeable. 
However, the differences in their names were also striking and af­
fected public perceptions.
Most dramatically, the Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium bred 
conspiracy theories through its name: “I think that generally there 
is a suspicion of consortiums. I think that people don’t understand 
what that name means. If it’s a consortium, people are consorting 
to get [other] people” (Susan, interview). There was a general per­
ception of “the consortium being like the Mafia” (Dora, interview).
This perception was based on a number of factors including the 
difficulty of finding public information. Several setbacks to con­
sortium members also provoked distrust. Part of the Hooker group, 
that included two consortium members, filed for bankruptcy in 
1989.9 The administrative culture of the Department of Housing 
also promoted widespread suspicion that came to a head in 1992. 
The final report of the Royal Commission into Productivity in the 
Building Industry in NSW, named the “Gyles Report,” concluded 
of the Department:
It is difficult to imagine a sorrier tale of administrative 
incompetence, if not worse than that, which emerges 
from the combined impact of looking through these 
external windows into the operation of the Department 
[of Housing].
The Department controls the spending of more than 
$300 million of public money per annum. It is obvious 
that it is impervious to criticism, no matter how damn­
ing. It appears to be beyond internal reconstruction. It
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also appears that it is beyond control by the rest of the 
Executive Government. (Gyles 1992, 86)
The Director of the Department of Housing, Richard Flint, resigned 
soon after the report was released, although he remained on the 
RHIC Board. Following the resignation of the state Premier in mid- 
1992 over another scandal, the Department was given to the Min­
ister for Planning in the new cabinet (Coultan 1992). Previously 
the Minister for Housing had been senior to the Minister for Plan­
ning in cabinet and thus able to push his own agenda. A subse­
quent external inquiry recommended reconstructing the Depart­
ment of Housing, contracting out many funtions and regionalizing 
others (Mant 1992).
Even before 1992, however, the actions of the Department of 
Housing had provoked criticism. The Department of Housing was 
generally perceived as a property developer rather than an orga­
nization working in the public interest (e.g. NSW 1990-1991, 
447, 27 February). The vast majority of the land held by the De­
partment of Housing had originally belonged to the Housing 
Commission (over 600 hectares) and was originally intended for 
public housing. The amalgamation of the Housing and Land Com­
missions in the new Department of Housing in 1986 allowed this 
land to be pooled. By the 1990s, although the exact figures were 
not released, the majority was targeted for sale by the Housing 
Department’s trading arm, Landcom. While most people agreed 
that old-style, large, homogenous, inaccessible, fringe-suburban 
public housing estates should be avoided, and Landcom targeted 
the lower and middle sections of the ownership market, this was 
still a significant move toward the privatization of space. It rein­
forced the image of the Department of Housing as a private de­
veloper plotting for its own ends.
In the early 1990s, conspiracy theories also focused on the Lib­
eral government that had approved the consortium plan. In fact the 
group behind the consortium included people with contacts in both 
Liberal and Labor parties, but there was room for concern about 
the business and bureaucratic elites involved in urban development. 
Michael Eyers, who had a role in arranging financing in the early 
period of the consortium, was a member of the Land Commission 
under Labor and was appointed as Head of the Department of 
Housing from 1986 to 1988 by a state Labor government. Macquarie
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Bank, which prepared some early documents for the Rouse Hill 
Infrastructure Consortium, had Liberal Party connections 
(Macquarie Bank 1989). John Hewson, the Leader of the federal 
Liberal Opposition in the early 1990s, had been on the board of 
directors of the bank until 1987 (Australian Securities Commis­
sion 1992).
Other individuals active in forming the Rouse Hill Infrastruc­
ture Consortium were prominent property developers. Brendan 
Crotty, from the Hooker group, sat on the National Home Builders 
Council of the Housing Industry Association, the group that pro­
duced a major report Housing Towards 2000 (HIA 1990). Peter 
Dransfield was the first Department of Housing Director under the 
Liberals in 1988, and returned to his private development firm 
without relinquishing his seat on the consortium board. These elite 
connections fed the suspicions of other professionals about the con­
sorting aspect of the consortium.
The consortium members were aware of these suspicions, pub­
licly blaming it on poor communication and lack of trust. As one 
explained in an interview:
I think there’s a fundamental distrust by the govern­
ment of the private sector. And again Tm not talking 
about senior levels of government, Tm talking about 
further down the line. And that's not in relation to Rouse 
Hill, it's a general thing. ...In most of the negotiations 
that we ’ve had with government w e’ve had a lot of 
agreement, a lot of cooperation, at the senior manage­
ment levels. [But] once it gets below those levels you 
end up with this fundamental distrust, or I guess an 
attitude of “if they want to do this deal there must be 
something in it for them that we can yt see " or “they 
must be trying to get something out of this that we 're 
not aware of." And that's just not the case. (Timothy, 
interview)
In contrast the “team” in the Rouse Hill Community Planning 
Team’s name evoked images of sporting teams or perhaps bureau­
cratic work groups, forms of association that were relatively in­
nocuous as well as powerless. This was a connotation that the team 
members would have, perhaps unhappily, seen as relatively accu­
rate. Compared with the elites in the consortium the RHCPT were
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generally at a middle level in large organizations or the heads of 
local groups. However, the RHCPT’s focus was not primarily on 
the character of their association, but on the substance of their, 
interest, “Community Planning.”
Community and Infrastructure
The word “Community,” in the name of the Rouse Hill Commu­
nity Planning Team, stood for several overlapping elements of its 
mission. The Rouse Hill Community Planning Team claimed, as 
its first aim, “to represent the future population of the Rouse Hill 
area,” the future community (RHCPT Minutes, 21 November 1991). 
Community-based groups from the local area, local governments, 
and city-wide community service organizations, combined to speak 
for the people who would move to Rouse Hill. This use of the term 
community was obviously open to debate as there was really some 
question about who the future population would be, why the Rouse 
Hill Community Planning Team were legitimate representatives 
of that future population, and whether people choosing to move to 
the fringe even wanted community services.
Further, the characteristics of the eventual residents of Rouse 
Hill changed as development costs increased, the mix of housing 
became more diverse to meet consolidation targets, and calls 
for scaling back development made its size uncertain. The gradual 
shift, or the gradual realization by the RHCPT of a shift, from 
lower- and middle-income first-home buyers to a higher end of 
the market, mixed with some public housing, was hard for the 
team to assimilate into their ideas about needs. Many in the group 
worked in the Blacktown local government area, the site of 
public housing developments with thousands of units, along 
with owner-occupied housing traditionally inhabited by young 
families. Although by US standards the areas were physically 
attractive, dominated by detached houses and townhouses, these 
demographic characteristics created a distinct set of human 
service requirements. Many RHCPT members were set up to deal 
with those requirements.
The state government initially added to the confusion by giving 
out ambiguous information about the future population. The 1989 
Regional Environmental Plan started its section on human services
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with the statement: “Many residents in new housing areas are young 
families,” presumably with lower incomes (DoP 1989a, 10). In the 
same document, however, a second section on human services stated 
that the “first areas to be developed within the initial release area” 
would help “overcome the perceived shortage of high priced land” 
(DoP 1989a, 17).
Overall the team’s constituency was uncertain. It was a difficult 
constituency to lobby for, and it was also potentially very expen­
sive to service as those who managed to provide services like 
churches and scout halls ahead of demand risked paying for largely 
empty buildings if development was delayed or dipersed, or if the 
demographics changed still further. In the long, slow process of 
developing Rouse Hill, they were at a distinct disadvantage.
In contrast “Infrastructure,” the term indicating the area of con­
cern for the Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium, seemed a far 
more technical term than community. As it could connote either 
“hard” (physical) or “soft” (social) infrastructure there was a mea­
sure of ambiguity, but in its public statements the consortium made 
it clear that its focus was “hard.”
Privatization and Planning
Neither the consortium nor the RHCPT were particularly happy 
about infrastructure privatization as both would have preferred more 
government subsidies and even government provision. Perhaps 
the main groups involved in Rouse Hill to be positive about 
privatization, apart from some disciples of Milton Friedman 
sitting far off in state and federal treasury departments, were the 
various sorts of environmentalists opposed to the development. 
Local environmentalists interested in protecting the visual charac­
ter of their residential area from suburban encroachment saw 
privatization as a way of pricing others out. Those interested in 
regional and global environmental issues saw privatization as a 
way of making an increasingly affluent group of outer suburban 
residents pay the cost of sprawl. The consortium, however, was 
better placed than others in terms of political contacts, policy con­
text, and economic resources to shape the character and extent of 
privatization to suit their own needs. The consortium took the
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lead in designing the privatization arrangements. The Department 
of Housing had a strong minister at the time of the proposal giving 
them a clear voice in the highest levels of state government.
In the 1990s, then, privatization allowed parts of the state 
government committed to 1960s-style suburban expansion to con­
tinue this practice at Rouse Hill, also benefiting some parts of the 
private sector. The Department of Housing, in particular, was able 
to push its agenda although at some cost to other parts of govern­
ment as well as to itself. In contrast, the human service providers 
in the RHCPT had the difficult job of reacting to, and to some 
extent paying for, others’ decisions. However, human services had 
rarely been high on the planning and development agenda. The 
state government had set up the system that made water infrastruc­
ture the key component needed for development to go ahead, and 
that had marginalized human service funding even in the pre­
privatization days.
This analysis raises at least two issues: that partial privatization 
continued and even generated a number of public costs of urban 
development; and that in terms of minimizing the human and 
monetary costs of development, changing the character of devel­
opment may have been more successful than changing the way it 
was financed.
First, in Rouse Hill the structure of mandates did not keep up with 
the structure of privatization, and so property developers, and pro­
development government departments, could take advantage of this 
mismatch. Thus a relatively small private, or departmental, invest­
ment in mandated infrastructure could leverage large commitments 
in terms of other government provided physical and social services. 
Without privatization, the state government may have looked for 
other options apart from low-density expansion, options that reduced 
its overall costs. It may have thus avoided large capital investments 
in facilities such as roads and human services, using excess capacity 
in existing urban areas and in other fringe locations.
Privatization not only continued these direct government costs 
but actually generated another set of public costs to do with 
responsiblility and openness, for example the consortium’s exemp­
tion from Freedom of Information requirements and its lack of 
accountability to the wider public. These were combined with the 
probable under-provision of social services in the area to provide
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an interlocking set of human costs that were omitted from 
privatization balance sheets.
Second, privatization of infrastructure provision -  through con­
sortium-style arrangements and increased user fees -  was only 
one option for decreasing infrastructure costs to government. The 
other main alternative was consolidation that would cut down the 
need for fringe development. As I described in chapter four, a De­
partment of Planning study of four areas including Rouse Hill, had 
found that savings occurred under a variety of fringe lot size and 
consolidation density scenarios. These calculations omitted the 
counterbalancing subsidies to central locations -  where such fa­
cilities as large sporting and entertainment facilities were located -  
but did seem to indicate that alternatives to suburban expansion 
could provide significant overall savings.
Thus in Rouse Hill the property developers providing physical 
infrastructure generally won the battle to shape the development’s 
services, although only after several decades and with an uncer­
tain future given the likelihood that environmental regulations will 
increase costs still further if future stages go ahead. Their public 
arguments were rather weak rationalizations of pursuing their own 
interests, however their interests were also a continuation of a long­
term state-government policy supporting growth as popular and 
egalitarian. The human service providers generally lost, but even 
in the pre-privatization days their position had been weak. There 
was little money for state government provided human services in 
the 1990s, but the situation had been similar in previous decades. 
There was not a clear way to articulate social needs beyond the 
local level and even good public arguments could not override the 
absence of a mandate for human services.
End Notes
1 In planning, writing on privatization has focused on a variety of strategies 
from load shedding and contracting out to increased user fees, demand man­
agement, and public-private partnerships (see Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; 
Kirwan 1990; NHS 1991d; Payne 1990; Squires 1989; Wilmoth 1990). In 
public policy studies authors have examined the uneven patterns of privatization 
policies over geographic space and through time (Richardson etal. 1992; Stubbs 
and Barnett 1992). The varied institutional frameworks of the shadow state 
have also been a focus in planning scholarship (Mallett 1993; Stoker 1987).
146 CONSTRUCTING SUBURBS
2 The private developers Stocklands Constructors and Graham Trilby also joined 
the base consortium group (see Figure 9). The consortium’s technical advisors, 
the consulting firm Gutteridge Haskins Davies (GHD), were initially repre­
sented on the board. In 1989 property developers Mirvac Limited and Leighton 
had paid subscriptions for provisional membership (Macquarie Bank 1989, 
3). A deed or agreement between the RHIC and the Water Board was signed in
1990, although negotiations continued (NSW 1990-1991, 7751).
3 One of the difficulties in examining the consortium’s proposal was the contra­
dictory information that was given out, in this case over the number of precincts 
(Nedeljkovic 1991, 8; Macquarie Bank 1989, 4; and Zannetides 1991, 1).
4 Those arguing for virtual elimination included the Macquarie Bank (1989, 5) 
and the Water Board (1992, 18); those for significant reduction included 
Nedeljkovic (1991, 9-10) and Zannetides (1991, 6).
5 The project was quite a hot topic in 1991 and 1992 (see DHHCS 1992b, 70; 
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce [DITAC] 1991,74; Kirwan
1991, 13-14; National Population Council 1992, 70-71).
6 Those questioning development in western Sydney included Wilson (1990) 
and the Water Board (1991b,7; c.f. Water Board 1985). Technical fixes, such 
as the use of recycled water, were not only expensive in themselves but required 
quite a bit of advertising and education (e.g. RHIC 1993, 1992-94).
7 There were a number of such baselines (e.g. DEP 1986b; Department of Family 
and Community Services 1990; Nesbitt and Donahee 1990).
8 Australian studies were mostly case studies of problems with provision (Dalton 
1980; Sarkissian and Doherty 1987; see also Land 1990,91). Studies from the 
US were generally older (Burby et al. 1975; Zehner 1977).
9 The two consortium members in the Hooker group were AHL Property and 
Lauriston Development.
C hapter S ix
Urban Development and the 
Power of Ideas
This book has given an account, or rather several accounts, of Rouse 
Hill and of the ideas about urban form that helped to shape it. It 
focused on a period, the early 1990s, when suburban form was 
being actively reinterpreted. The study revolved around two con­
cerns: how ideas, perspectives, or frameworks about urban form 
were constructed or articulated; and the effects of these ideas on 
(plans for) Rouse Hill. It approached these questions by telling 
the story of Rouse Hill in four ways. First, it described the conver­
sations between several frameworks that groups involved in Rouse 
Hill used to interpret the project and envision its future. Second, it 
outlined and critiqued some of the metaphors or images that helped 
focus and represent public and professional discussions about the 
project. Third, it explored the formal planning process and a 
series of emerging problems, a situation at once highly structured 
yet open to external influences and manipulation. Fourth, the vol­
ume examined moves toward privatization, focusing on two pub­
lic-private coalitions diverging significantly in their scope of 
influence.
Although presented separately as a way of highlighting the 
multiple processes at work in a large urban development, these 
stories about Rouse Hill were interdependent. Members of 
coalitions interpreted the project through some of the five frame­
works, working within and around the formal planning process, 
and articulating their positions to others as images rather than 
causal arguments. The various ways of telling the story of Rouse 
Hill also dealt with many of the same substantive issues -  air pol­
lution, water quality, privatization -  although with some stark dif­
ferences in emphasis and approach. In talking and writing about 
Rouse Hill people drew on a set of public and professional
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debates about the future of cities, and some of their actions in turn 
influenced these wider conversations.
While Rouse Hill exists in a specific location as both a pile of 
earth and a proposed urban development corridor, the issues its 
development raises reach beyond the specifics of this location. 
Changes in the economy and the natural environment, activist chal­
lenges to professional expertise, moves to privatize infrastructure, 
and debates over urban form and urban growth, are common to 
many cities, not only Sydney. In this chapter I return to my origi­
nal discussion about urban form and action, examining how profes­
sionals and activists faced these changes and how they dealt with 
those who saw the situation differently.
This chapter is organized in three parts. First, it examines how 
ideas shaped the character of urban form at Rouse Hill. Some ideas 
spoke powerfully to contemporary concerns, provided a resonant 
interpretation of the present and a compelling vision of the future, 
and gave some power to those who lacked administrative and eco­
nomic clout. The second section analyzes how groups claimed to 
speak for a wide set of public concerns, what they called the total 
picture or balanced view, through fairly stripped down representa­
tions. Groups, however, interpreted their areas of concern and res­
ponsibility — in terms of people and issues — quite differently. 
One group’s breadth was another’s bias. In the third section I out­
line some tensions between the kinds of issues and communities 
the different groups felt responsible to and for, and the often dif­
ferent scope of their job descriptions. Planners in particular were 
expected by themselves and others to have a wide area of concern 
or control, although their actual professional role was quite limited.
People and Ideas
Although high-level actors -  directors of major development com­
panies, cabinet members, bankers, and heads of government depart­
ments -  have the ability to approve, encourage, or stop major devel­
opments, this study concentrated on another group. These were 
middle-class, middle-level professionals and activists, people with 
some influence on plans for the Rouse Hill Development Area. They 
included urban planners in a variety of institutional settings as well 
as a number of others performing overlapping coordinating and
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research functions or seeing themselves as having a vision that should 
be taken into account: people such as environmental activists and 
bureaucrats, and human service professionals. These people exer­
cised their influence through a number of mechanisms: making and 
approving policies, planning and designing developments, helping 
shape the climate of ideas about urban form, or opposing or acqui­
escing to particular development components or strategies.
A limited but reasonably diverse range of publicly articulated 
frameworks on urban form were evident in Rouse Hill. Each was 
constructed like a collage, drawing from a variety of sources -  
interests, generation, gendered family experiences, housing histo­
ries, immigration and travel experiences, professional roles -  and 
often involving different interpretations of quite similar character­
istics or evidence. All had qualities admired by a variety of people. 
Expansionists retained a stubborn commitment to providing high- 
quality housing for the middle and working classes. Developers 
did the complex work of producing serviced land and houses. Sci­
entific environmentalists were thoughtful advocates for the natu­
ral world. Local environmentalists wanted to protect their lifestyle 
that brought them close to nature, and other locals hoped to make 
the best of the metropolitan planning decisions to urbanize their 
semi-rural environment. Consolidationists tried to respond to so­
cial, environmental, and economic change with an urban form 
emphasizing the city’s vitality.
I stress these admirable qualities because in the planning of Rouse 
Hill, as in many other planning situations, groups took strong stands 
and tended to ignore or dismiss opponents. Participants easily as­
serted their truth against other’s biases. Stressing their admirable 
qualities does not imply that they were all equally correct, however, 
rather that they were all somehow important for understanding Rouse 
Hill, and debates over growth more generally. They in some sense 
contained a truth, if much else besides (see Bernstein 1976, xx).
For some the strength of these frameworks and images was cru­
cial, for others less so. For example, developers had both access to 
capital and high-level government contacts and so the persuasive 
power of their ideas — at least to more general audiences -  was less 
important than for other groups. Persuading bankers, politicians, and 
elite bureaucrats — and legitimating their actions to a wider pub­
lic — were important tasks, but they could call upon other resources
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to maintain the momentum of the project. For others ideas were 
vital. By writing much of their vision into Rouse Hill’s initial plan­
ning expansionists had defined the discretionary space of planners 
coming after them. In the 1990s, however, they had to fight to 
maintain this framework in the face of enviromental criticisms and 
privatization moves. Local environmentalists tried to use the per­
suasive power of their ideas to create some opportunities to oppose 
the development beyond formal objections to plans, for example 
trying to gain press coverage.1
Public Interests and Rationality
By claiming that their views were balanced, rational, or holistic, 
and accusing others of bias or oversimplification, those involved 
in Rouse Hill seemed to need some public recognition that their 
position was common and correct. That is, their positions were 
based on good reasons that all sensible people either did agree 
with, or would agree with if they considered the situation seri­
ously. In the dispersed and ritualized planning process of Rouse 
Hill these positions tended to be asserted by groups against each 
other with little room for compromise. This situation is in some 
contrast with Innes’ (1996) account of the possibilities of consen­
sus building in large projects, a process that relies on a much more 
interactive form of planning than occurred at Rouse Hill.
The following quotations from a scientific environmentalist and 
developer are just one example of the claims and accusations that 
abounded in Rouse Hill.
In the next few years when Sydney finds out how short 
a supply of land it has and the pressures are on to keep 
those, to even just to maintain supply, I think the issue’s 
going to turn around and become more of a “how do 
we house these people ” type issue, rather than “how 
are we going to prevent development ”
And out of that I see a nicely balanced approach to 
development where for years the developer had it his 
own way, rape and pillage the trees and that sort of 
thing, and knock everything down. And then all of a 
sudden the environmental movement's had it all its way
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over the last few years. And I expect that pendulum to 
swing back and some balanced arguments being put.
In fact, I read in the paper the other day someone putting 
the argument that the environmental movement has got 
to really start to look at itself and start to be a little more 
responsible and not just simply say no to everything, 
and to look for alternate solutions as the development 
industry has had to do. (Gregory, developer, interview)
You see this is the narrow-mined view that developers 
keep taking. They're only concerned with their devel­
opment. They don’t look at what's happening on a catch­
ment-wide basis. If you keep closing down market gar­
dens time and time again where are you going to put 
them? Who's going to supply who? Are you going to 
contribute to, if you 're going to shut down your 
local markets then you're going to have to start 
importing, your [national] deficit gets bigger. (Roger, 
scientific environmentalist, interview)
The approach that we take is really holistic and we give 
the best advice taking into account all the factors.
Whereas if you go through... the Environmental Impact 
Statement, I don't want to single out Rouse Hill here, 
but just from my knowledge, they're always biased.
They're biased because it's the way the process works.
(Roger, scientific environmentalist, interview)
Groups made similar claims to representing truth or breadth -  it 
seemed to be important to have a wider view or perhaps a public 
interest -  but had quite different ideas about the content of those 
positions.
These were generally modernist positions, of the kind of com­
plex multifaceted modernism Berman (1988) so elegantly describes. 
Some were captivated by the more quantifiable aspects of the 
development’s impact on nature; others were concerned about 
issues like equality, liberty, and justice for individuals, families, 
and other groups; some worried about both (Harper and Stein 
1995, 234). From the outside the situation certainly had elements 
of various postmodern positions: a lack of shared foundations, 
some incommensurability or lack of shared premises, an anti- 
dualistic refusal to separate fact from value, and multiple claims
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to truth (Moore Milroy 1991; Harvey 1996). From the inside, 
however, while there was a certain acceptance that people held 
different viewpoints, most people thought their position was clos­
est to the truth and should win out if only everyone else would 
look at things logically and rationally, in a modernist mode. 
Where people’s positions did not win out they often talked about 
others being misguided by their selfish, modernist interests that 
had blinded them to the balanced view. And those who talked 
more frequently about diverging values -  various environmen­
talists -  relied on mainstream, modernist, natural science meth­
ods in much of their work.
Reason and technical knowledge seemed as important in Rouse 
Hill in the 1990s as it was among the high modernist French colo­
nial planners and architects working in the nineteenth and early twen­
tieth centuries and described by Rabinow (1989). Perhaps these forms 
of knowledge were actually more important in the 1990s as both 
analytical capacities and the (perception of) problems had increased. 
While in these times of accelerated and sometimes confusing changes 
in the wider natural and social environment there was, perhaps, 
slightly more public disagreement about urban issues than in the 
recent past, people weren’t giving up on truth, rationality, and a clear 
set of values about better and worse outcomes (Harvey 1996, 2). 
While the sheer competition of rational and holistic perspectives 
tended to relegate each one to being just one of many other possible 
positions, this variety was certainly not limitless (see also Gottdiener 
1977, 117; Meyerson and Banfield 1955, 326).
These claims of broader views related to evidence beyond the 
Rouse Hill site and demonstrated different ways of understanding 
the public interest. Expansionists and developers claimed to rep­
resent the widest set of public preferences and repeatedly quoted 
surveys showing that most Australians wanted detached houses; 
accusing opponents of denying the working class their hard-won 
heritage. In their view individual preference matched the wider 
public good. Consolidationists and scientific environmentalists had 
a more indirect or even elitist argument, claiming to represent the 
long-term common interest in terms of environmental issues and 
then trying to sell this to the public. These groups, concerned about 
economic constraints and environmental damage, did tap into larger 
public debates and concerns about economic security and
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ecological sustainability, but these debates had not yet transformed 
housing preferences on the fringe. Even local environmentalists 
and local speculators argued in terms of a larger set priorities. For 
local environmentalists stopping growth would preserve what they 
considered to be a unique locality for the benefit of the rest of 
Sydney. Local speculators, in contrast, accepted the government’s 
metropolitan planning decisions as representing legitimate public 
decision making and tried to make the best of it. Although some 
form of private interest explanation can be used to understand some 
of the groups’ actions this would oversimplify most perspectives.
These claims of breadth and reasonableness perhaps also had a 
role as a kind of metaphysical consolation. In a context of dis­
agreement -  the multiple frameworks -  and of change, a sense 
of certainty, correctness, or truth seemed essential for most sides. 
In Rouse Hill this certainty came, at least rhetorically or strategi­
cally, from superior rationality. In this it echoed Ignatieff’s (1984, 
62-63) and Brown’s (1967, 374) discussions of the Augustinian 
distinction between two sorts of freedom -  the freedom to choose 
one’s beliefs, and the freedom to know one has chosen correctly 
(see also Augustine 1943 [orig. 399]; MacIntyre 1988,157; Markus 
1967). For Augustine the first was part of basic humanity but the 
second could only be gained through God’s grace. Of course other 
people have found certainty in the fulfillment of desire, the con­
tinuity of tradition, and so on. For the people I interviewed and 
observed, this freedom of knowing one’s beliefs were correct 
seemed to come through having what they considered to be supe­
rior knowlege; rational and balanced ideas about urban form. That 
gave them a kind of freedom to impose their ideas on the land­
scape; it made their ideas seem more powerful to themselves. 
For the moderns I interviewed and observed, Augustine’s grace 
was replaced by trust in knowledge.
Although these ideas of holism, rationality, balance, or seeing 
the total picture seemed important to most people involved in Rouse 
Hill, planners were expected by themselves and most others to be 
the professionals that actually took an overview role in urban de­
velopment. Balance, holism, and rationality were expected in both 
their working process and in their substantive vision of urban form. 
The reality of planners’ influence was often much narrower than 
these expectations, however, with planners only in control of small
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pieces of the picture, such as land use functions or approvals for 
individual developments.2 Planners were expected to be referees 
in the larger process or perhaps advocates for coordination but had 
little actual power to do this.
This discussion about public interests, truth, and urban form raises 
another issues to do with the comparative weakness of arguments 
about society compared with those about the economy and the natu­
ral environment. I was struck by how in debates about human ser­
vices and social life people could appeal only to a weak “context 
of broadly shared ideals” about society or social responsibility 
(Marris 1987, 160). The absence of a strong popular conversation 
about society, or elite support for funding human services, made 
those interested in social issues seem like admirable but lonely 
advocates for a lost cause. Perhaps the high period of urban plan­
ning being centrally concerned with creating a better society is 
over. The natural environment and economy are claiming the center 
for many of those involved in making and protesting urban devel­
opments with people relegated to the role of damagers (for the 
most idealistic) or consumers (for the others). Perhaps, in this sense, 
the people I studied were moving beyond a modernist sensibility 
concerned with human progress, but this movement was not of a 
character that is clarified being called postmodern.
Change and Responsibility
In Rouse Hill economic and administrative resources were 
important, particularly the resources to stay in the project for 
decades and to mandate or fund physical infrastructure. The plan­
ning process, a set of legal and administrative activities, formed 
the context that all groups had to work within, manipulate, or sub­
vert. The Department of Housing and private developer lobby 
pushed the project through many crises under both Liberal and 
Labor governments. Community opposition groups seemed to last 
a few years and then fold. They lacked resources and a certain 
legitimacy in the planning process that those developing the land 
were given automatically through their ownership of land, or 
through the investments they would make providing infrastruc­
ture and services.
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In New South Wales the state government had a great deal of 
influence with federal and local governments following along. The 
state government had the power to stop the development: by not 
funding it, not allowing private funding, or by imposing restric­
tions that made it too expensive. The state was also a key player in 
shaping the character of the development both through the Depart­
ment of Planning’s overview role, and through the design of par­
ticular components by departments dealing with areas like housing, 
transport, education, and health. However, state action met both 
resistance and constraint. Local governments resisted by seeking 
to adhere strongly to the formal planning process and the federal 
government imposed borrowing restrictions and sought to reshape 
the climate of ideas about urban growth.
Of course this makes it appear that the state government was 
unified, something even the state Premier Greiner at the time of 
my fieldwork had to admit was untrue. He put this succinctly in 
his cover letter for the New South Wales Government’s submis­
sion to the Industry Commission Inquiry into Taxation and Finan­
cial Policy Impacts on Urban Settlement.
To purport to provide a single NSW Government sub­
mission would not do justice to the many complex is­
sues and perspectives involved.
Accordingly; I am forwarding the submissions made 
by the various interested government agencies. They con­
tain the views of those agencies and are not necessarily 
the views of the Government. (NSW 1992c, n.p.)
The state government’s pluralism meant that a more accurate read­
ing of the government’s role in Rouse Hill reveals particular 
departments and even persons having the upper hand at various 
times, imposing their service standards and funding their projects. 
In Rouse Hill the shifting relationships of the Department of Plan­
ning, the Department of Housing, and the Water Board showed 
this most clearly.
Given Rouse Hill’s lengthy planning process, and the major 
debates it coincided with, tensions arose between flexibility and 
continuity, responsiveness to change and holding the urban devel­
opment and planning process steady enough to give the kind of 
certainty that enabled action. Expansionists and developers favored
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continuity in Rouse Hill’s physical form. Environmentalists were 
more apocalyptic, warning of impending danger brought on by 
old-style development practices. They tried to persuade others of 
the necessity of reshaping land development practices.
These issues of change raise additional questions about the char­
acter of responsibility in terms of how patterns of underlying re­
sponsibilities structured the ways that people faced change. For 
private sector developers responsibility was typically toward their 
share holders. While state government documents claimed that their 
privatization guidelines would ensure full “community” account­
ability (State Development 1990, 5) this was not quite the case in 
Rouse Hill. As a developer explained, the private sector did not 
have the same requirements for openness as government, even when 
taking over what had previously been a government role.
The legal agreements [for the consortium] are based very 
much on a commercial sort of arrangement. And I think 
it's difficult for governments in general to enter into a 
pure commercial arrangement simply because they ’ve 
got, probably not necessarily a greater accountability to 
the public, but certainly a greater perception of account­
ability. I mean in private organizations directors are 
accountable to shareholders and that sort of thing, but 
for a start you don’t have as many shareholders and you 
also, I guess, don’t have the same sorts of Freedom of 
Information problems. (Timothy; interview)
While the public sector developer, the Department of Housing, 
was theoretically responsible to a wider public, its practice was far 
more like that of a private developer.
Scientific environmentalists saw their responsibility both very 
broadly to the wider human and non-human world, but also quite 
narrowly in that their perspective was focused on physical survival. 
For those in the government this could conflict with their job 
descriptions, often tied to a responsibility for particular aspect of 
the environment -  water, pollution control -  and with adminis­
trative boundaries that rarely reflected the geography of the natu­
ral systems that were of primary concern to this group. This made 
this group particularly susceptible to leaking documents (if in the
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bureaucracy) and to using the media in ways that would expand 
the debate.
Expansionists, rather than focusing on the natural environment, 
thought in terms of their responsibilities within a social world 
structured in terms of class and family type. They were oriented 
toward nuclear families, and the middle and working classes. 
Consolidationists, in contrast, shared the environmental concerns of 
the scientific environmentalists but saw the human groups to whom 
they were responsible as a diverse array of household types with 
changing needs. However, both consolidationists’ and expansion­
ists’jobs primarily involved responsibility for zoning and develop­
ment approval and thus their wider social concerns had to be served 
through manipulating physical space. Local environmentalists and 
other locals, pragmatically, focused on their own land and them­
selves although within the context of a wider debate about the place 
of individuals (adversely) affected by metropolitan planning.
As a spatial, social, and temporal activity, urban planning was 
made more complex by these different understandings of, and con­
straints on, responsibilities. Agreeing on the character of the impor­
tant spatial areas, human and non-human groups, and important time 
frames, presupposed a level of common understandings about what 
was important and reflected a set of power relations. Airsheds, local 
government areas, families, and 20 years into the future, were all 
possible limits on responsibilities -  singularly and in concert -  but 
all open to contest. Could environmentalists impose their definitions 
of regions based on air movement where the traditional boundaries 
were of metropolitan or local government areas? Which human 
groups counted as families: the “nuclear” groupings of the expan­
sionists or the small households talked about by consolidationists? 
Was 20 years irrelevantly long or impossibly shortsighted? Perhaps, 
for example, airsheds were the trendy concerns of the 1990s to be 
reduced in significance when technological innovations eliminated 
air pollution. Local government areas, in contrast, could become the 
future vital centers of democratic participation.
While groups like local environmentalists often called for long­
term planning, this may have been more of a problem than a benefit 
to them as it tended to lock in a set of ideas that became outdated 
in their terms. The balanced, broad, or rational view of one period
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could seem hopelessly narrow and irrational in another where a dif­
ferent kind of public was making judgments about quality of life.
As the development stretched across decades, individuals were 
concerned with, and responsible for, different components -  spa­
tially and substantively -  in different periods. In this context of 
multiple players, multiple actions, and multiple concerns, a sense 
of personal responsibility -  even in a narrow area of professional 
interest or one’s job description -  was hard to maintain. Who was 
responsible for Rouse Hill? Can there be guilt or pride about such 
a diffuse and ambiguous project?
This is a complex question. Rouse Hill is the result of a lengthy, 
multi-stage, formal planning process, already stretching through 
three decades and involving metropolitan, regional, and local plan­
ning as well as coordination through interdepartmental committees. 
Cabinet members or the executives of the consortium had a high 
level of power to approve and fund development; middle-level pro­
fessionals giving advice within the context of their professional 
expertise shaped only some of the options available.
Planners seemed to resolve this tension by articulating goals that 
were far more general than their scope of influence. Plans often 
contained a wider set of aims -  in the discussion sections -  than the 
legal instruments actually enforced. That a guiding principle could 
not be realized practically became a recurring theme in the devel­
opment of Rouse Hill. In principle the Rouse Hill Infrastructure 
Consortium reduced Water Board financial commitments to “vir­
tually zero” (Timothy, interview). In practice this was not so cer­
tain as “these figures will be influenced by the rate of development 
demand in the Rouse Hill Development Area” (Nedeljkovic 1991, 
10). Human services were classed as “basic” services in the draft 
Regional Environmental Plan (DEP 1986b, 15), but in practice fund­
ing these services was an acute problem that no one had solved in 
years of detailed planning. In principle Rouse Hill was to provide 
housing for first-home buyers; however, this became increasingly 
difficult as infrastructure costs rose.
In each case the goals were not, even could not be, implemented. 
Their presence, however, said something about the concerns of the 
writers, or about the way that they wanted to be seen by others. 
They provided a history of hopes that future bureaucrats could call 
upon as evidence of original intentions, embedding fairly narrow
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mandates in a larger context. They made the plans seem generous 
and comprehensive, in contrast to their far narrower enforceable 
sections. In a fundamental way they represented the public’s inter­
ests and concerns, although interests and concerns could not be 
stated or carried out in a coherent way. However, they were mis­
leading in that the legal requirements not only did far less than the 
planning goals promised, but quite often did something quite dif­
ferent. The Water Board’s financial commitment was not virtually 
eliminated; human services were not adequately funded.
What then does this mean about the role and meaning of planning 
in times of change? I have several concluding thoughts. For plan­
ners and for others something like a public interest is still important, 
but its character is interpreted very differently by different groups. 
In Rouse Hill there was both more certainty and more incoherence 
about the concept that I had expected to find even within individual 
work units. Given the divided ideas and interests among various 
parts of government, and the relative flexibility of developers to 
embrace different urban forms and planning processes, the power 
of capital or of the state is not inevitably tied to one approach to 
urban development.
In a long running project such as this one, that is set in a complex 
and changing context, several generations’ ideas about the best form 
of urban development had managed to shape the process. Economic 
issues such as providing housing for workers and supplying hous­
ing demand remained important throughout the planning process. 
Although in the earlier periods of the development a significant 
group of planners was concerned with social issues this was in­
creasingly overshadowed by a sense of urgency about protecting 
the natural world. Concerns about nature and about social goals 
such as equality and opportunity are not necessarily incompatible, 
of course, as the consohdationists argued. However, for many people 
this concern with the natural environment was a major shift in think­
ing. It is a shift that is likely to frame debates about urban growth 
for a significant period.
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End Notes
1 This echoes Marris’ analysis of community development projects in Britain 
(Marris 1987, 50).
2 Stronger coordinating roles seem to be coming into being increasingly through 
environmental bureaucracies and legislation, or through privatization shifting 
coordination and development functions to the private sector. Thus someone 
will have this kind of strong coordinating role in the future. However, those 
performing these roles will likely be environmental policy makers or developers, 
less interested than city planners in the social assumptions and implications of 
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Coalition of Hawkesbury and Nepean Groups for the Environment 
(Australian) Commonwealth Scientific Investigation and Research 
Organisation
Development Control Plan
(New South Wales) Department of Community Services 
(New South Wales) Department of Environment and Planning (1980 
to 1988)
(Australian) Department of Health, Housing and Community Ser­
vices
(New South Wales) Department of Housing, prior to 1986 Hous­
ing Commission and Land Commission
(New South Wales) Department of Planning (1988 to 1995), for­
merly Department of Environment and Planning (1980 to 1988), 
Planning and Environment Commission (1974 to 1980), and State 
Planning Authority (1963 to 1974). From 1995 onwards the De­
partment of Urban Affairs and Planning.
(New South Wales) Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
(1979)
Environmental Impact Statement
(New South Wales) Housing Committee of Cabinet
Housing Industry Association
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State Environmental Planning Policy
(New South Wales) State Planning Authority (1963 to 1974)
(New South Wales) State Pollution Control Commission
Sydney Region Outline Plan
(New South Wales) Urban Development Committee
(New South Wales) Urban Development Program
Western Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils
CHRONOLOGY
1948 Cumberland Plan published by Cumberland County 
Council: Rouse Hill located outside urban area.
1951 Gazettal (official acceptance) of Cumberland Plan.
1963 New South Wales State Planning Authority (SPA) formed 
as the state planning agency.
1968 Sydney Regional Outline Plan, the new metropolitan plan, 
published by SPA. North West Sector, including Rouse Hill, 
indicated for future investigation for urban development.
1974 State Planning Authority is transformed into Planning and 
Environment Commission.
1976 Labor elected in New South Wales (NSW) replacing long­
term Liberal government.
c.1980 State planning agency buys Mungarie Park golf course for 
North West Sector regional center.
1980 Planning and Environment Commission is transformed into 
Department of Environment and Planning (DEP).
1980 June: Review of Sydney Regional Outline Plan published 
by DEP.
1980 September: Urban Development Committee established 
following review of Sydney Region Outline Plan “to provide 
a co-ordinated forum to advise the Government through 
the Minister of Planning and Environment on all matters of 
urban development,” enabling a more orderly process of 
supplying residential land (DEP 1984a, 9). Membership 
was from several different agencies.
1980 December: Consultant report by Patrick Troy recommends 
preparing an outline plan for the North West Sector and 
Development Coordinating Committee of state cabinet 
requests structure plans of North West Sector.
1982 January: Structure Plan presented to Urban Development 
Committee of state cabinet.
1982 May: Structure Plan presented to Housing Committee of 
Cabinet (HCC). HCC requests new Urban Development 
Committee report on order of priority of four areas, including 
two locations in the North West Sector.
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1983 March: Medium Term Options Study presented to Housing 
Committee of Cabinet. Used planning balance sheet style 
cost-benefit analysis to select Rouse Hill in North West 
Sector as most suitable medium term development option, 
for production by 1990.
1983 April: Urban Development Committee establishes North 
West Sector Subcommittee.
1984 July: North West Sector Regional Environmental Study, 
undertaken by Department of Environment and Planning, 
released for public comment. On exhibition 30 July to 28 
September. Start of public planning process.
1986 October: Rouse Hill Development Area North West Sector 
Draft Regional Environmental Plan released for public 
comment. On exhibition October 1986 to May 1987: 250 
submissions received.
1988 Department of Environment and Planning is transformed 
into Department of Planning (DoP).
1988 February: Metropolitan Strategy published by DoP.
1988 March: Liberal-National Party government elected in New 
South Wales after 12 years of Labor.
1988 September: First meeting of interdepartmental Human 
Services Working Party/Group for the Rouse Hill Develop­
ment Area, reporting ultimately to the Urban Development 
Committee.
1988 Late in year: Proposal for infrastructure privatization 
through Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium (RHIC) put 
to NSW State cabinet.
1989 February: Registration of Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consor­
tium.
1989 February: Department of Planning establishes Joint Release 
Area Management Committee to oversee release of Stage 
One of Rouse Hill Development Area.
1989 Mid-year: Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium proposal 
initially accepted by NSW government.
1989 September: Publication of Rouse Hill Development Area 
Regional Environmental Plan by the DoP.
1989 September: Seminar held by Department of Planning for 
non-government human service agencies leads to forma­
tion of Rouse Hill Community Planning Team, a coalition 
of such groups.
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1990 May: Deed (agreement) between Rouse Hill Infrastructure 
Consortium and Water Board signed.
1990 June: Draft Local Environmental Plan for Parklea Release 
Area in the Rouse Hill Development Area placed on exhi­
bition by Blacktown City Council for 17 weeks from 13 
June: 73 submissions from private sector, 52 public autho­
rities consulted with.
1990 June: Bob Wilson, Managing Director of Water Board, 
makes speech to Urban Development Institute of Australia 
questioning whether urban development should continue 
in western Sydney, the site of Rouse Hill.
1990 June: Draft Local Environmental Plan for Kellyville-Rouse 
Hill placed on exhibition by Baulkham Hills Shire Council 
from 12 June to 30 October. Almost 1000 written submisions 
received, mostly dealing with road works and zoning in 
particular locations.
1990 November: Three days of public hearings on Blacktown 
Local Environmental Plan by Commissioner William 
Simpson.
1990 December: Completion of final “Pilot Study” on air quality 
in Macarthur South and South Creek Valley, two major 
growth corridors to the south-west of Sydney. Report by 
Hyde and Johnson not released until 1991.
1991 January: Environmental Impact Statement for Proposed 
Rouse Hill Sewerage Treatment Plant, written by Manidis 
Roberts Consultants, placed on exhibition January to March: 
48 submissions received in comment.
1991 Early in year: Local Environmental Plan for Parklea Release 
Area in Blacktown made official.
1991 May: Three day smog “event” in Sydney with severe brown 
haze.
1991 June: Determining authority’s report (acceptance) of Environ­
mental Impact Statement for Rouse Hill Sewage Treatment 
Plant published. Water Board is determining authority.
1991 June: Local Environmental Plan for Kellyville/Rouse Hill 
Release Area in Baulkham Hills made official.
1991 July: Air Quality “Smog” Summit held by state govern­
ment.
1991 July: Due to mismanagement, Baulkham Hills Shire
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Council has general manager appointed stripping it of 
financial and management powers.
1991 October: Terry Metherell resigns from Liberal Party to join 
four other independents in state parliament. Liberal- 
National Party government now hold only 48 seats out of 
99 in lower house. Cites poor planning of North West Sec­
tor as one reason for resignation.
1991 November: Public meeting with 120 in attendance calls for 
halt to Rouse Hill.
1992 February: Second Smog Summit.
1992 July: New state government cabinet announced after resigna­
tion of Premier Greiner. Minister for Planning given Min­
istry of Housing as added responsibility.
1993 Discussion paper published by DoP setting out proposals 
for changing the 1988 metropolitan plan.
1993- Development Control Plans released for first areas in both
1994 Baulkham Hills and Blacktown.
1994 First lots produced in Rouse Hill Development Area.
1995 DoP release the new metropolitan plan, “Cities for the 21 st 
Century.” Rouse Hill development scaled back.
1995 Labor replaces Liberal-National Party coalition in New 
South Wales government.
1995 Department of Planning is transformed into Department of 
Urban Affairs and Planning.
1996 Liberal-National Party government replaces Labor at fed­
eral level.
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